Armenia, Hostage of Russia and Turkey Amid Power Play

Is Russia Fascist?: Unraveling Propaganda East and West by Marlene Laruelle (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2021)

Mainstream liberal U.S. media such as MSNBC and the New York Times have dedicated countless hours and pages to presenting Russian President Vladimir Putin as the devil incarnate. In 2014, former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton went as far as to compare his actions in Ukraine to those of Hitler in Europe (p. 3). Then U.S. President Joe Biden called Putin a “killer” on March 17 in what appeared to be his way of proving how “presidential” he is compared to Donald Trump. When RT journalists were introduced on a 2019 panel at the Assembly of Journalists and Social Communicators in Caracas, the crowd of Venezuelans burst into applause chanting, “Putin, Putin, Putin!” 

Vilified by certain global class forces and loved by others, what is the true ideological character of Putin and the Russian political leadership? Moving beyond certain propaganda, while remaining bogged down in a clear anti-Soviet evangelism, French historian Marlene Laruelle makes a convincing academic argument that Russian state ideology is not fascist.

The George Washington University professor and U.S. State Department researcher has dedicated her professional life to becoming an expert on Russian history and what she terms the dominant ideology of the Russian state today, “illiberalism.” Her book, Is Russia Fascist?: Unraveling Propaganda East and West, accomplishes two tasks: One that is intellectually honest and another that further contributes to the Memory Wars and Battle of Ideas by perpetuating biased Western views of key issues that have arisen in Soviet history and in contemporary Russia. An example of Memory Wars is when right-wing states raise questions about who actually collaborated with the Nazis in an attempt to create an alternative memory of events.

Dismantling the Claim That Russia Is Fascist

The greatest strength and central thread of the book is Laruelle’s consistency in proving the Russian state is not fascist. 

Chapter 6 analyzes the country’s “vivid far-right landscape.” The author looks at skinheads, militia subculture, combat sports, extreme expressions of the Russian Orthodox Church, conspiracy theories, the Night Wolves motorcycle club, among other examples of this landscape. She concludes these ideological trends—similar to what is found in the West—are marginally present in Russia, but have little to no influence on Russian leadership and receive no institutional support from the state. This milieu, or ecosystem, as she calls it, is in fact “largely repressed by Russian state organs” (157). 

Laruelle dedicates sections of chapters 6 and 7 to evaluating the reach of political analyst Alexander Dugin—known as “Putin’s brain”—and his international far-right contacts. She concludes the West exaggerates Dugin’s influence and his “networks and international visibility should not be the tree obscuring the forest” (126). Despite Western rumors, Laruelle writes, “Putin has never mentioned him [Dugin]” nor met him and she adds, “Dugin has little direct access to the highest echelons of the Presidential Administration” (118).

Laruelle explains slapping the fascist label on Putin and Russia is not scholarly, but is an attempt by certain forces to discredit Russia to prevent the country of 144 million from being taken seriously in the international arena. Her scholarship finds the Russian state draws from myriad ideological sources, such as social conservatism, Soviet nostalgia, illiberalism, Russian orthodoxy and Russian nationalism. The professor concludes: “If there is an overarching ideological trend to identify, it is illiberalism… a denunciation that holds that liberalism is now ‘obsolete’ and has ‘outlived its purpose,’ as Putin declared in 2019, and a return to an ideology of sovereignty—national, economic and cultural-moral sovereignty” (158). The way Laruelle uses “liberalism” sounds innocent enough, but it’s a euphemism for capitalism, imperialism and Western hegemony, words the author never uses in her book.

‘Unraveling Propaganda’ with More Disinformation?

While Laruelle may be on the liberal left of the internal landscape of the State Department, her overall work is far from left or anti-imperialist. As the director of the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES) at George Washington University, she pulls no punches on the Soviet Union. Is Russia Fascist? ignores the Soviet Union’s legacy as a besieged workers’ state the U.S. ruling class and its junior imperialist partners sought to, and ultimately played a key role in, destabilizing and overthrowing. 

Anti-socialism and anti-communism, the unofficial religion of the United States and Western Europe, dot the 166-page text. 

Is Russia Fascist? is a most provocative title for a book. The subtitle however Unraveling Propaganda East and West is misleading and inaccurate on some levels. Here are a few suggestions if Professor Laruelle wants to more honestly entice the reader: Is Russia Fascist? Heaping more Western Propaganda onto the Dominant Historical Narrative or Is Russia Fascist? Is the U.S. more Fascist than Russia? Is U.S. Foreign Policy Fascist? 

Laruelle reduces complex, life-and-death military decisions to anti-Soviet soundbites. For Laruelle, it is senso comune (common sense), in the Gramsci sense of the word, that the Soviet Union was bad. Casting off critical reflection, she presents highly-debated topics as already existing, self-evident truths. Here are some examples: “The annexation of Crimea” (19), “the massacre of Polish officers in the Katyn forest” (33), the “widespread anti-Semitism of the late Stalin era” (40), “the great patriotic war as the principle myth capable of uniting Russian society” (45). 

What part is myth? That 27 million Soviets gave their lives? That 20 million more were injured? (2). These are the statistics the author herself offers. “The Ukrainian crisis” (47), “the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (50) and “the democratic regimes” (159) she mentions refer to the “west Soviet occupation of the Baltic states” (165).

These historical events and terms need clarification the author does not provide. The reality is no shortcuts exist in the field of dialectical materialism. 

A book review is not the place to clarify the historical record on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact or the Katyn forest massacre. But in terms of World War II, or “The Great Patriotic War,” as it is known in Russia, the cold, hard, tragic facts speak for themselves. The Soviet Union lost 27 million of its sons and daughters to ward off the hoards of Nazi invaders. For comparison, the United States lost 200,000 troops in WWII, the British lost 400,000 and the Nazis themselves lost 800,000. All of humanity owes a great debt to the Red Army, the Partisans (Soviet resistance groups) and the Soviet peoples. 

These topics deserve intense scrutiny and study. Entire books are dedicated to the subjects. One place to begin is with books like Russia At War: 1941-1945, The History of the Russian Revolution and books by Polish Marxist writer Isaac Deutcher.

In conclusion, while Laruelle makes a valuable contribution to providing a nuanced, sociological portrait of Russia today, she fails to disentangle certain Western propaganda. It quickly becomes clear it is the reader’s responsibility to disentangle her propaganda. 

Behind a veneer of so-called academic objectivity, she directly and indirectly propagandizes on behalf of U.S. imperialist interests, which seek to encroach upon and control Ukraine, Crimea and the entire landmass that was the Soviet Union. 

Danny Shaw is a professor of Caribbean and Latin American Studies at the City University of New York. He frequently travels within the Americas region. A Senior Research Fellow at the Center on Hemispheric Affairs, Danny is fluent in Haitian Kreyol, Spanish, Portuguese and Cape Verdean Kriolu.

While Russia continues conducting its “special military operation” in Ukraine, Moscow’s ally, Armenia, has been seeking to normalize relations with its arch enemy, Azerbaijan. Although the South Caucasus region has traditionally been in the Kremlin’s geopolitical orbit, it is the European Union that seems to be playing the major role in peace talks, border delimitation and the reopening of transportation links.

During the past six months, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev met three times through the mediation of European Council President Charles Michel.

In the past, Russia had mediated conflict between the two Caucasus countries over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Although it is an internationally recognized part of Azerbaijan, it has been under Armenian control for more than two decades. In November 2020, Pashinyan and Aliyev traveled to Moscow to sign a ceasefire deal that effectively ended the 44-day war that Yerevan and Baku fought over the mountainous region.

As a result of the conflict, Azerbaijan restored its sovereignty over most parts of Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as surrounding areas. More importantly, Russia deployed about 2,000 peacekeeping troops, which strengthened its positions in the South Caucasus.

‘Karabakh Has Turned Into South Ossetia’

Russian forces are stationed mostly in parts of Nagorno-Karabakh that are still under Armenian control.

According to Tom Mutch, a New Zealand-born journalist who covered the 44-day war, such a position allows Moscow to turn the region into its de facto military state.

“Let’s be honest, Karabakh has turned into South Ossetia now,” Mutch told Toward Freedom, referring to Georgia’s breakaway region that Russia recognized as an independent state in 2008, following the brief war Moscow fought against its small neighbor. “Russia holds all of the political and military power in the region. But the problem is that the Kremlin is so distracted by what is going on in Ukraine that it doesn’t really have any ability to focus on Karabakh.”

Despite its preoccupation with the war in Ukraine, Russia hosted Azerbaijani and Armenian delegations on June 3 in Moscow, where they held the 10th meeting of the trilateral working group on the opening of regional transport communications. According to reports, representatives of the three countries discussed and coordinated on borders, customs, and other kinds of control, as well as safe transit of people, cars, and goods by roads and railways through the territories of Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Following the Brussels meeting in May between Pashinyan and Aliyev, Baku and Yerevan announced the creation of commissions for border delimitation. In other words, they would look into increasing movement between the two states.

Dr. Gulshan Pashayeva, a board member of Azerbaijan’s Center of Analysis of International Relations, claims that is one of the tangible results of the peace talks held under the EU auspices. Still, she does not think the EU can replace Russia as the major mediator in the South Caucasus.

“EU and Russia are quite different geopolitical actors with incompatible resources and influence,” she told Toward Freedom. “Therefore, they cannot replace each other.”

Both Azerbaijan and Armenia are members of the EU’s political and economic Eastern Partnership initiative. Russia, on the other hand, sees both countries as its allies—Armenia, through the military alliance, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and Azerbaijan, in the form of the allied cooperation agreement signed in February.

No Agreement Without Moscow

According to Russian political analyst Sergey Markedonov, Russia and the West have always cooperated regarding the Karabakh issue. But the problem is Western powers no longer want to work with Moscow amid the Ukraine conflict.

Meanwhile, Mutch said Nagorno-Karabakh could be a place Russia and the EU can cooperate, despite their strained relations regarding Ukraine.

“But I don’t see any agreement that can be signed without Moscow’s final say,” he stressed.

In his view, the real reason why peace talks seem like they are making progress is the military defeat of Armenia in 2020.

“The speech that Pashinyan made in April was widely seen as signaling that he was prepared to give up Armenia’s aspirations for a de jure independent status of Karabakh,” Mutch said. “That was the sticking point of negotiations for the past 25 years.”

In that speech on April 13, the Armenian prime minister said, “The international community is telling Yerevan to lower the bar on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh.” He pointed out Armenia “cannot rely on international partners, not because they do not want to help the landlocked nation, but because they cannot help.”

Pashinyan also recently emphasized that the most important and most urgent issue between Armenia and Azerbaijan is the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. For Baku, however, the status of the mountainous region has already been resolved.

key points of Pashinyan's interview to Al Jazeerahttps://t.co/ffmElVxlpl

The most important and most urgent issue between Armenia and Azerbaijan and for the peace in our region is the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. pic.twitter.com/oT1eCluiOE

— Hov Nazaretyan (@HovhanNaz) June 14, 2022

“I strongly believe that Armenia will come to understand that there will be no special status for ethnic Armenians living in the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan,” Samir Mammadov told Toward Freedom. He heads the international affairs department at “Back to Karabakh” Public Union – a political organization that aims to return ethnic Azeris to Nagorno-Karabakh.

“Armenian government officials often claim that they want the rights of Armenians living in Azerbaijan to be respected. Azerbaijan can and will ensure that without allowing the creation of an artificial autonomy within its borders,” Mammadov said, pointing out that if Yerevan continues insisting on the status of Karabakh, Baku will “probably raise the issue of the rights of Azerbaijanis ethnically cleansed from Armenia.”

In other words, Baku expects Yerevan to recognize Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, while Armenia fears full implementation of the ceasefire deal the two sides signed in 2020 in Moscow would jeopardize the landlocked nation’s sovereignty. According to the Moscow agreement, “Armenia shall guarantee the security of transport connections between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic in order to arrange unobstructed movement of persons, vehicles and cargo in both directions.”

The Fate of a Corridor

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov recently assured Armenian officials the future railway and highway that will connect Azerbaijani mainland with its Nakhchivan exclave through southern Armenian will be “based on the recognition of the sovereignty of Armenian territory.”

For Azerbaijan, the future transportation route should be part of the Nakhichevan Corridor, also known as the Zangezur Corridor.

“The narrative of the wording of a so-called corridor is unacceptable for Yerevan,” Pashinyan said in a June 13 interview. “We have one corridor in our region, and this is the Lachin corridor connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia.”

That corridor is a mountain road that is de jure in the Lachin District of Azerbaijan, but is under the control of a Russian peacekeeping force as a result of the 2020 ceasefire deal.

Thus, the future of transportation links in the South Caucasus will almost certainly be on the agenda of future meetings between Pashinyan and Aliyev, be it in Brussels or in Moscow.

“The EU is ready to step up its support,” Michel said in a May 23 statement. “We agreed to remain in close contact and will meet again in the same format by July/August.”

Meanwhile, Lavrov is planning to meet today in Azerbaijan, which can be viewed as Russia’s attempt to keep both Armenia and Azerbaijan in its geopolitical orbit, despite the EU’s recent new role as a major mediator.

Nikola Mikovic is a Serbia-based contributor to CGTN, Global Comment, Byline Times, Informed Comment, and World Geostrategic Insights, among other publications. He is a geopolitical analyst for KJ Reports and Enquire.

SAINT PETERSBURG, Florida—Three of the four U.S.-based defendants in the U.S. government’s case about a conspiracy with Russia to sow social discord spoke out May 10 for the first time since indictments dropped last month.

“It’s important to note where theres’s some troubling aspects of this case, where the federal government is using federal criminal law to stifle dissenting voices,” said Leonard Goodman, attorney for Penny Hess, chair of the African People’s Solidarity Committee. The committee formed in 1976 in Saint Petersburg for white people to organize in the white community for reparations to Africans.

The attorneys of the newly dubbed “Uhuru 3″—Hess, as well as African People’s Socialist Party (APSP) Chairman Omali Yeshitela and Uhuru Solidarity Movement Chair Jesse Nevel—appeared remotely on Zoom, while the defendants stood at a podium in the Uhuru House, one of the party’s properties in Saint Petersburg.

“There’s been a misunderstanding about my connection to Russia because my first and most significant contact I had with Russians was when I was in Berlin, Germany,” said Omali Yeshitela, chairman of the African People’s Socialist Party.

That’s when his attorney, Ade Griffin, intervened. “I ask that you not to get into any specifics about contacts with Russia at this point.”

Yeshitela said he wanted to explain his experience in the U.S. Army dating back to 1961, when he saw the Berlin Wall erected, which split Germany into east and west. “That’s something that’s not been mentioned at all,” he said, adding, “My crime is my absolute belief in free speech.” Yeshitela went on to recount that he has faced charges and abuse at the hands of police, usually for demonstrating on behalf of the right to free speech. “This is no different,” he said. “They kill Black people for talking in this country … If it’s not afforded to us, there can be no free speech for anybody.”

White Defendants Make Their Case

Hess, a white woman who has been part of the movement since 1976, spoke of the wealth stolen from African people.

“The chairman has done what cities and states don’t do,” she said in explaining the work of the party to build institutions that support African people.

“[These charges] are false to an idiotic and laughable extreme,” Nevel of the Uhuru Solidarity Movement told the press, adding later in his address the U.S. government knows Yeshitela is not a Russian agent. “They know who he really is. Just like they knew who Martin Luther King really was. Who Marcus Garvey really was. Who Malcolm X really was. Who Fred Hampton really was. A freedom fighter for his people and for the oppressed peoples of the world. But they can’t openly say that. They can’t openly charge Chairman Omali Yeshitela with being an agent for freedom. So they lie, and charge him as an agent of some foreign power we’re all supposed to be afraid of.”

Similarly, Nevel spoke of his and Hess’ roles as white people.

“They know who we work for: The African liberation movement,” Nevel said. “We speak not for some foreign malign influence, but for millions of other white people out there who refuse to be complicit with our own government’s unceasing state sanctioned violence against African people.”

Nevel then said that despite the U.S. government’s best efforts to scare white people away from liberation movements, “More and more of us are becoming co-conspirators, too.”

Yeshitela told the press the party was forced to start its own radio station because a white-owned station kicked it off the air.

“They’ve never accused us of hurting anybody or stealing from anybody. It’s [about suppressing] free speech.”

Pointing to Colonialism

The APSP opposed U.S. support of Ukraine after Russia intervened in Ukraine in February 2022. They have connected the U.S. position to a longer history of European colonialism. Yeshitela has noted African countries have not supported the Ukraine position en masse, despite U.S. threats, as discussed in this Toward Freedom article.

Yeshitela denounced the press for only relying on the U.S. government’s press release to report on the party. He tied that to the colonial relationship that has dominated the world for more than 500 years, since Christopher Columbus accidentally landed in the Americas after trying to reach India, intent on exploiting the wealth of that land.

“For the longest period of time, white people have been subjects of history and African people have only been the objects of history,” Yeshitela said. “When we begin to speak for ourselves, we don’t tell the same story … It can be disturbing … And you find out to your surprise that the slave doesn’t feel the same way about the slavemaster as the slavemaster feels about himself.”

Next Steps

The party, nor its attorneys, announced during the press conference the next date for a court appearance. If found guilty, the accused face up to 15 years in prison.

The APSP has launched a campaign called “Hands Off Uhuru! Hands Off Africa!” through which it is fundraising to cover the cost of legal fees.

The fourth U.S.-based defendant, Augustus C. Romain, Jr., better known as Gazi Kodzo, faces up to five years in prison. When the indictment dropped, Romain had been in prison on unrelated charges since July. Romain was the APSP’s secretary general until late 2018. They have since gone on to start another group, Black Hammer, which lost many of its young members in the summer of 2021 following the group’s attacks on other political groups. Romain’s attorney, Stacey Flynn, did not reply to Toward Freedom‘s inquiry as of press time.

Toward Freedom has reported on the FBI’s raid of the APSP’s properties, provided information on Regions Bank ending its 20-year relationship with the party, and covered the U.S. Department of Justice’s announcement of indictments as well as the recent arraignments.

Julie Varughese is editor of Toward Freedom.