‘U.S.-Africa: How the Peoples’ Struggles Connect’: Second Panel of African People’s Forum

Editor’s Note: This article was originally published in Borkena.

Since December of 2018, the Republic of Sudan has undergone general strikes, mass demonstrations, the forced removal of longtime former President Omar Hassan al-Bashir and the failed formations of several interim administrations.

Hundreds of people have lost their lives due to the repression carried out by the military and its supporters against protests which have been led by the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) and its Popular Resistance Committees (PRC).

The FFC was spearheaded by the Sudanese Professional Association (SPA) as well as other organizations. Since December 2018, the alliance which came about as a direct result of the overall economic and political crisis in Sudan, has undergone several realignments involving the military leadership and within its own ranks.

After an extended sit-in outside the Ministry of Defense during the early months of 2019, the top military leadership staged a coup against then President al-Bashir vowing to create the conditions for the realization of a democratic dispensation inside the country which had experienced the rule of the National Congress Party (NCP), an entity formed by the military-turned civilian officials of the government that had remained in power since 1989.

However, despite the promise of reforms, the Transitional Military Council (TMC) led by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) attacked thousands of pro-democracy activists in Khartoum on June 3, 2019. It was estimated that at least 100 people died that day as 10,000 well-armed troops used live ammunition, teargas and concussion grenades to clear the demonstrators from in front of the military headquarters and the entire streets of the capital of Khartoum.

After the June 3, 2019 massacre in Khartoum, regional states coordinated by the African Union (AU) feverishly negotiated a truce between the FFC and the TMC. By August 2019, a Sovereign Council was created which outlined a 39-month transitional period where the military would serve as chair of the arrangements for the bulk of this time period which ostensibly would result in multi-party elections.

Nonetheless, the Sovereign Council consisting of FFC members and military leaders was dissolved on October 25, 2021. Interim Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok was placed under house arrest while yet another crackdown on the mass organizations proceeded. Hamdok was briefly brought back into the government after being released from detention. Soon enough, however, Hamdok resigned from the second interim administration accepting his failure to stabilize the political and security situation in Sudan.

Communist Party Announces New Anti-Military Coalition

Just recently in late July, the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), which had resigned from the FFC on November 7, 2020, citing what it perceived to be the indecisiveness of the alliance as it relates to the continued role of the military within society and government, announced the establishment of another alliance. The SCP has categorically rejected any governance role for the Sudanese Armed Forces within a future democratic administration.

Calling itself the Forces for Radical Change (FRC), the SCP-led alliance consists of various mass organizations and trade unions. The FRC is demanding the immediate establishment of a civilian government which would force the military back to its barracks.

A report published by the Middle East Monitor on July 25, stated that: “According to Sudanese media, the new alliance hopes to bring down the coup authorities to implement radical revolutionary change. SCP Political Secretary Mohamed Mokhtar Al-Khatib said that the FRC rejects ‘the military institution’s interference in politics and rejects any partnership with it.’ The alliance statement stressed the need to take decisions related to all ‘deferred issues’ and resolve them during the transitional period. Al-Khatib added that the FFC will not be part of the new alliance because it adopted a social-political approach ‘that caused the destruction of national resources.’ He claimed that the FFC still believes in an agreement with the military component and ruled out the participation of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front because it is cooperating with the military. The SCP leader did not speak about the National Consensus coalition which is seen as part of the coup.”

This new FRC grouping has called for an end to the economic underdevelopment of Sudan, a citizens-based civilian administration along with the acquisition of genuine independence which would discontinue any reliance on foreign imperialist interests. These events represent a further fracturing of those claiming to represent the democratic movement of the people which erupted during December 2018. At present there is the FFC Executive Office, the National Consensus Forces which appears to want a continued role for the military in the administrative structures of the country and the SCP-led Forces for Radical Change (FRC).

Mass Demonstrations for Democracy are Continuing in Sudan

Two large-scale protests were reported during June and July centered around the capital of Khartoum and its twin city of Omdurman. On June 30, four protesters were reportedly killed by the security forces during demonstrations calling for the reversal of the October 25 coup.

Later, on July 17, another demonstration was met with repression by the military and other security forces. Thousands participated in the protest actions prompting the security forces to utilize teargas and other crowd control weapons designed to disperse the crowds. Activists waved Sudanese flags and barricaded major thoroughfares in various locations in the Khartoum and Omdurman areas. Bridges leading to the cities were cordoned off by the military to prevent others from joining the demonstrations.

After the rejection of the October 25 coup, many of the FFC leaders who held positions in the Sovereign Council have expressed their reluctance to reenter another alliance with the military leadership of General al-Burhan. At the same time, the military regime has maintained its agreements with several armed opposition groupings known as the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), an amalgam of rebel organizations based in Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan states. The SRF has sided with the Sudanese military leadership since al-Burhan has pledged to address their grievances during the putative transitional process.

The SRF played a political role in encouraging the October 25 coup by staging a sit-in Khartoum demanding the dissolution of the Sovereign Council. After the coup, the SRF expressed its support for the latest putsch.

Meanwhile, another alliance of 10 Islamist groupings have put forward a proposal for the establishment of a new regime. This alliance dubbed The Broad Islamic Current consists of members of the banned former ruling National Congress Party (NCP), now known as the Islamic Movement and the State of Law and Development Party of Mohamed Ali al-Jazouli, who is a supporter of the Islamic State (IS) recently released from prison. At the founding of the Broad Islamic Current, supporters chanted slogans against the left organizations and coalitions in Sudan while expressing support for the October 25 coup and the military leadership.

Interestingly enough, the Broad Islamic Current does not include the Popular Congress Party (PCP) in its alliance. The PCP is one of the largest Islamist parties in Sudan founded by Hassan al-Turabi. The PCP grew out of a split between al-Turabi and former NCP leader and President al-Bashir in 1999. The Broad Islamic Current is seeking to take advantage of the political climate which emerged in the aftermath of the October 25 coup.

General al-Burhan delivered an address on July 4 calling once again for dialogue among all political groupings inside the country. He also commented on the role of the military in Sudan even after the holding of democratic elections. The military leader proposed what he called a “Supreme Council of the Armed Forces” which would have an undefined role in the economic and political structures within the country.

The FFC along with the FRC are saying publicly that they are not interested in further talks with the military regime. Noting that all other previous agreements between the FFC and the TMC have been broken by the military and its allies within the now reconfigured Sovereign Council, which is staffed by former rebel leaders, supporters of the rule by the armed forces and Islamist groupings which were formally associated with the government of ousted President al-Bashir.

Political analyst Osman Mirghani wrote during early July in the Sudan Tribune noting: “Simply rejecting al-Burhan speech will be a continuation of the reactive approach that has enabled the military component to always be one step ahead of the civilian forces. If these forces overcome their differences and set a clear charter, they could turn the tables by agreeing on a civilian government that would close the way for any other attempts to obstruct the transitional period and be the starting point for full civil rule after the failure of the partnership formula.”

Obviously, greater unity among the democratic forces would be a tremendous step forward in the process of genuinely transforming Sudan into a people’s state. Nonetheless, without the purging and dismantling of the military apparatus, which is supported tacitly by the United States, the State of Israel and the Gulf monarchies, any transitional process to a just and humane society will remain elusive.

Abayomi Azikiwe is the editor of Pan-African News Wire, an international electronic press service designed to foster intelligent discussion on the affairs of African people throughout the continent and the world.

Editor’s Note: This interview was originally heard on Radio Sputnik’s “By Any Means Necessary.”

 

SPEAKERS
Dr. Fred M’Membe, Sean Blackmon, Jacqueline Luqman (Toward Freedom board member)

Sean Blackmon: We’re happy to be joined for this conversation today by Dr. Fred M’Membe, president of the Socialist Party of Zambia. Dr. M’Membe, thanks so much for joining us.

Dr. Fred M’Membe: Thank you very much for inviting me on your show.

Sean Blackmon: Absolutely. And, Doctor, of course, we’ve been following on the show very closely the rapidly escalating war in Ukraine, this proxy war between U.S./NATO forces and Russia. And we’ve been keeping a close eye on the international response to this war, as you know, the U.S. and the West, its allies and junior partners, you know, try to present this image as if, you know, the whole international community is sort of a siding with them in condemnation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February of this year. But I feel like once you take a closer look at how some of these opinions and perspectives from different governments are really playing out, I think the picture is a bit more complicated. Now. Back in March, in the United Nations there was a debate over resolution fundamentally to condemn Moscow for its invasion of Ukraine. And within that vote, 35 countries abstained from it, including 17 member states of the African Union. And there have also been leaders like the Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa, that have not necessarily uh, jumped on the western bandwagon with this as well. And so we wanted to bring you want to sort of discuss this, because, from your perspective, obviously, you’re there in Zambia a country in a southern Africa, and I’m just wondering why you think we’ve seen these kinds of responses from some of these different African governments towards the war in Ukraine. And what do you think it says about the reality of geopolitics right now.

Dr. Fred M’Membe: First, let me say, it is very important to understand that no war is good. It is impossible not to be moved by the outrageousness of warfare. They grow some fears of civilians who are trapped between choices that are not their own, but was make very complicated historical processes that appear to be simple. The war in Ukraine is not merely about NATO, or about ethnicity. It is about many things. Every war must end at some point. And the diplomas must restart must come in. Africa and the Russian people share a history of struggle. When the African people were fighting for their independence for their liberation, those who are condemning Russia today, we are not with them [then]. They were on the other side. They never took our site. Not that our side was wrong. Our side was right. But they never took our side. They took the side of the colonialists. They took the side of the side of apartheid, they took their side of racist superiority against the forces of liberation, African liberation. We’ll never forget that. They want us to forget that, but it’s not easy to forget that. Because it’s not very long ago. Zimbabwe only became independent in 1980. Namibia only became independent in 1990. This is not very long ago, in terms of historical processes. We know who stood with the apartheid regime in South Africa. We know who stood with the racist regime in Rhodesia, now, Zimbabwe. We know who sided with the colonialists in Angola, in Mozambique, in the Cape Verde. We know all these things. So the African people have a sense of history as well. It’s not possible for Africans to condemn Russia, given where we are coming from together. And the Russian war is a complicated process. Let’s not be simplistic about it, Let’s understand where this process is coming from. Since 1990, there has been an attempt to expand the NATO forces in Eastern Europe, up to Russia. There was some cooperation, initially, even from Russia itself, under Boris Yeltsin, there was some engagement. But all that has changed. And it is important to understand that long history and the Africans understand that. We are able to analyze things for ourselves, we are able to see things for ourselves, we are able to come to our own conclusions. And also we understand the decisions and actions of our enemies, and also the decisions and actions of our friends. We are even able to understand the mistakes of our friends, and to separate them or single them out to identify them from the actions and decisions of our enemies. We know who our friends are. The Russian people have stood on our side. Russia has never had colonies in Africa—that must be understood. Despite helping to liberate us, Russia has never taken control of any African country. Russia has never colonized any country that they helped to liberate. Russia has not exploited an African country. We do not know of any country in Africa that can claim it was a colony of Russia, [claim that] it has been exploited and humiliated by Russia. This history is very clear to us. And this is not easy for us to be swayed by propaganda against Russia. We don’t want the war in Ukraine to continue as Africans. War is bad. War is not good for the poor. War is not good for the workers. War in itself is a crime. War produces crimes. Peace must always be a priority. We Africans want the war in Ukraine to end. But that won’t to end without taking into account the security concerns of Russia, and indeed, the security concerns of Ukraine itself. And even the security concerns of Europe itself. It shouldn’t be the security of one section, or one region or one country, the security of all must be considered. The security of Ukraine must be considered, the security of Russia must be considered. And indeed the security of Europe. Emphasizing on just one side of the equation, it won’t work. You cannot have security for Europe, you cannot have security for Ukraine without taking into account the security concerns of Russia. Similarly, you cannot have the security concerns of Russia addressed without taking into account the security concerns of Ukraine, the security concerns of Europe. We all need our security. As we pursue our own security interests, we also must take into account the security concerns of others. This is what is lacking in the issue of Ukraine. Russia has legitimate security concerns. And it just didn’t walk into Ukraine. From 2004, they have been actively pursuing these issues. But instead of addressing them, the opposite has happened. NATO has been expanding its lines, NATO has been trying to consolidate its positions in Eastern Europe, up to the Russian border. What did you expect Russia to do, sit idle and watch? Its security concerns not being addressed? Its security being violated? Its security being threatened? Would the USA or Europe accept that situation? Who in the world would accept that to happen?

Jacqueline Luqman: You know, what you just said that that brief encapsulation of the history of solidarity really, that the Russian people and that the Russian government has had with the African liberation struggles over the decades is so important, I think to this conversation, because I think in some ways, we in the United States, even though we who are our Pan Africanist, understand and know a little bit of that history, most people do not so most people don’t understand and don’t know, they’re ignorant of the struggle against colonialism on the African continent. So they’re ignorant of the abuses, and they’re ignorant of their relationship with Russia and the continent. And in that context, do you think that the it’s that ignorance of this relationship that you just explained, that makes it difficult for us in the United States to understand why African nations are refused to condemn Russia and also why we have a difficult time, pulling back from literally cheering this war to continue In order to “support” Ukraine, as our government tells us, without having any consideration for the lives of the people who are caught in the middle of this war, as you said, who do who did not choose it, and who did not ask for it, most of whom are working class and poor people on the continent of Africa.

Dr. Fred M’Membe: Sometimes, it’s not only the issue of ignorance, sometimes the issue of arrogance, and the problem sometimes even racist attitudes. What is good for the goose is good for the gander. What’s good for America is also good for others. America would not tolerate what it wants Russia to tolerate on its borders. If Russia was to move into Mexico today or into Canada, and they do what the Americans and the Europeans are trying to do in Ukraine, I don’t think they would tolerate that. We have the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Cuba is 90 miles away from Florida. But when the Soviet Union placed missiles there, there was a big crisis, which had to be resolved amicably. Why should Russia feel secure? With Ukraine, becoming a NATO member, and placing missiles on his border? These are issues that need to be guaranteed. What we need is adherence to the Minsk agreements. What is needed is security guarantees for Russia and Ukraine, which would also require Europe to develop an independent relationship with Russia that is not shaped by U.S. interests. There will also be need to have a reversal of Ukraine’s ultra-nationalist laws, and they return it to a much more plurinational… national compact. If in some sense negotiations and agreements regarding these essential matters do not materialize, it is likely that the dangerous weapons will face each other across the divides. And additional countries may be drawn into this conflict with a potential to spiral out of control. We don’t want this conflict to get out of control. There is a need for negotiations to end this war. And the negotiations, in our view center around the three principal issues. They’re returning to the Minsk agreements, security guarantees for Russia and Ukraine, reversal of ultra-traditionalist laws. This is not demanding too much. Of course, these are not simple issues. But there are issues that need to be addressed.

Sean Blackmon: For sure. And you know, last question, Dr. M’Membe is, you know, we’re in a time from the standpoint of a U.S. imperialism, as it sees itself engaging in great power conflict, both with Russia and China and the African continent seems like, it’s sort of poised to become a real battlefield for this new Cold War. And so, for the African continent for all of its linguistic and cultural and ethnic and geographic diversity, how do you see sort of the role of the continent in the coming period as we continue to see efforts to, you know, bring about a world order that isn’t controlled from Washington.

Dr. Fred M’Membe: For our diversity, for the difference [uninteligible] among us, one thing that we all need is peace. We need peace to develop, we need peace to move people out of poverty. We don’t want to be drawn in[to] any Cold War, or any other war. We don’t want war. We have had enough. We have been humiliated for over 600 years. We were hunted as slaves traded as slaves. We were colonized. We moved from classical colonialism, neocolonialism. All these humiliating things. We have had enough of our torture, we have have had enough crucifixion. It’s time for Africa also to have its resurrection. And that resurrection cannot come under a Cold War. That’s why our position is of non-alignment. We have the right to pursue our own interests, while others also have the right to pursue their own interests. But one thing that is in common is we need a peaceful world. All our people need a peaceful world. The Americans need to live in peace, the Europeans need to live in peace. The Africans need peace. The Russians need peace, all need peace. Everything that threatens peace threatens all of us. It threatens our peaceful existence here. And it also threatens our progress. War is destructive. It destroys wealth. It destroys production, it increases poverty, it increases despair. It brings suffering it brings pain. We don’t need this. We have had enough. We want to develop and developing peace. And we don’t want to be shackled to wars that are not ours. These are not wars that are ours or benefit us. But we are there to try and offer solutions because every war, no matter how small it is, it has got ripple effects. It affects not only the primary people involved in it, but there are also secondary implications. We don’t want war.

Sean Blackmon: Absolutely. Well, we thank you so much, Dr. M’Membe, for joining us today. We’re going to leave it there and move to a break here on “By Any Means Necessary
on Radio Sputnik in Washington, D.C.

Last month, U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry visited India in an effort to bolster the United States’ bilateral and multilateral climate efforts ahead of the 26th Conference of Parties (COP26), which will be held in Glasgow in just a few weeks. Countries that signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) will attend the conference to deliberate as well as negotiate actions needed to combat the climate crisis.

Kerry’s visit to India also marked the launch of Climate Action and Finance Mobilization Dialogue (CAFMD). CAFMD is part of the U.S.-India Agenda 2030 Partnership Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and U.S. President Joe Biden announced in April at the Leaders Summit on Climate. The talks took place within the context of India’s membership within an alliance colloquially referred to as “The Quad.” The alliance comprises Australia, Japan, India and the United States, and is aimed at countering a growing China in the Indo-Pacific region.

Soon after Kerry’s visit to India, Quad leaders met at the White House for discussions on a host of issues, including climate change. They agreed to work on climate targets aimed at 2030 and pursue enhanced actions in the 2020s.  

But what tools are available to India—and other developing countries—to support them as they face climate-change impacts like eroding coastlines and droughts? And how will such tools be made available? 

Mobilizing finance is considered key to helping developing countries meet their emission-reduction targets and adapt to climate-change impacts. At COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, developed countries committed to a goal of jointly mobilizing $100 billion per year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries.

But while COP15 set a clear target of $100 billion, it allowed flexibility in terms of what forms of financial support qualify as climate finance. The Paris Agreement, the successor to the Copenhagen Accord, reiterated the $100 billion per year commitment, but it also allows a wide range of financial instruments.

Developing Countries’ Perspective

Developed and developing countries have different perspectives on climate finance. Chandra Bhushan, a public policy expert and founder/CEO of International Forum for Environment, Sustainability & Technology (iFOREST), explained when developing countries speak of climate-finance requirements, they largely mean public grants from developed countries. But when developed countries talk about climate finance, they mean “everything from loans to grants to bilateral and multilateral funding,” Bhushan said. 

Bilateral funding refers to financial support from one country to another. Multilateral funding involves agencies such as the World Bank, which derives its source of funding from multiple countries.

India’s official position on climate finance is only grants and grant-equivalent elements of other instruments, like loans and guarantees, ought to be recognized as climate finance. For example, in a recent interview to CarbonCopy, Rajni Ranjan Rashmi, a former principal negotiator for India at the UN climate change negotiations, said it is “logical” to include only the grant portion, or the concessional part, of the loans in the definition of climate finance.

Publicly available information about CAFMD does not reveal what exactly “financial mobilization” would entail. This reporter filed a Right to Information (RTI) request with the Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change (MoEFCC) for minutes of meetings held between Kerry and the ministry. However, the request was denied.

Bhushan also expressed skepticism, noting how pre-COP launches of dialogues, like CAFMD, are not uncommon. But he said their progress is rarely tracked to ascertain achievements.

Unpacking “Finance Mobilization”

In general, “finance mobilization” can happen on both concessional and commercial terms. Arjun Dutt, program lead at Council on Energy, Environment and Water (CEEW) said concessional capital typically is channeled through grants and soft loans to market segments that are not commercially viable to catalyze investment. And as for finance on commercial terms, Dutt noted it typically flows into sectors that have achieved commercial viability and large-scale deployment, such as utility-scale renewable energy.

Elaborating on what India needs, Dutt said if the world wants India to decarbonize at an accelerated pace and commit to net-zero goals, the country “would likely require greater international [climate-finance] flows on both concessional and commercial terms.”

Through financial instruments such as guarantees, concessional capital could help lower the risk of loan defaults with new clean-energy technologies, which could catalyze more private-sector investments, Dutt explained. And as for commercial international capital, it would be needed because of the sheer scale of India’s decarbonization requirements.

Pays to note, in her meeting with Kerry, Indian Minister of Finance and Corporate Affairs Nirmala Sitaraman also underscored a need for enhanced climate finance for developing countries, or funding beyond the $100 billion commitment made at the Copenhagen summit.

Recently, even African nations called for a 10-fold increase to the $100 billion climate finance target.

Climate Finance’s Track Record

Developed countries have largely failed in fulfilling their climate finance obligations, a September 2021 report shows. Out of 23 developed countries that have a responsibility to provide climate finance, only Germany, Norway and Sweden have been paying their fair share of the annual $100 billion goal. More specifically, it states that the United States has the biggest shortfall in paying its fair share of climate finance, based on historical emissions and national income.

And closer examination of delivered climate finance reveals other issues. According to a report by Oxfam, the share of grants in global public climate finance was only 27 percent in 2019, whereas loans—both concessional and otherwise—totaled 71 percent. The remaining 2 percent comprised finance mobilized from private sources. Oxfam referred to this reliance on loans to fulfill climate-finance obligations “an overlooked scandal.”

Recently, a climate negotiator from a developing country, who anonymously wrote for The Guardian, pointed out how climate finance in the form of loans is creating a debt trap for countries in the Global South, where the COVID-19 pandemic has hit economies.

Interest rates on concessional loans are unequal, too. “The rate of interest in developed countries is around 2 percent and in India, it is around 14 percent,” said Bhushan of iFOREST. “So, if the United States gives a loan for 6 percent, will you consider it as a loan given on concessional terms?”

Funding Mitigation Versus Adaptation

Climate finance usually aids two solutions: Mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation refers to efforts aimed at reducing greenhouse-gas emissions like investments in renewable energy technologies or even making existing energy generation more efficient. Adaptation means remodeling and reorganizing society and the physical environment to address risks posed by climate change. Climate adaptation includes enhancing the resilience of coastal communities with nature-based solutions like restoration of mangroves and providing food security with climate-resilient agricultural practices.

Here, too, disparities exist between the needs of developing countries and what the developed world actually delivers.

Little doubt remains that climate change disproportionately impacts the Global South, given pre-existing conditions like food insecurity and lack of adequate healthcare. And so, countries in this region need as much financial support, if not more, for adaptation as they do for undertaking mitigation measures to arrest the global temperature rise. Even the Paris Agreement recognizes developing countries need equal amounts of funding towards mitigation and adaptation. But funding flows largely towards mitigation.

Oxfam points out 66 percent of global public climate finance supported mitigation while only 25 percent went toward adaptation. “Profitability drives the flow of money,” Dutt said, noting how climate finance goes toward mitigation efforts—like enhancing deployment in the renewable energy sector—and not to adaptation. But this is where public finance—or that which is provided by taxpayer money—can flow.

It also is unclear if developing countries have undertaken climate-change impact assessments and drafted clear policies aimed at mitigation, which could then be implemented using international climate financing.

Developing Homegrown Climate Technology

Article 4.5 of the UNFCCC states developed countries have undertaken a commitment to 

“take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to environmentally sound technologies and knowledge to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties, to enable them to implement the provisions of the Convention.” 

But little clarity is available on what “practicable” entails, what “as appropriate” means and what “environmentally sound technologies” encompass.

More rudimentary questions exist about whether developing countries like India need technology transfers.

“Renewable energy technologies like modules and inverters are produced at a mass scale across the world and even in India. These technologies are well-understood,” Dutt said. The only challenge, Dutt added, is India has not been able to produce renewable-energy equipment at globally competitive rates.

Expressing similar concerns, Bhushan spoke of how technologies like solar photovoltaic (PV) panels have hundreds of parts and algorithms that could have hundreds of intellectual property rights (IPRs). “Many of these IPRs are from developing countries themselves,” he noted. These IPRs are then packaged together and sold to companies to manufacture solar PV modules and panels. “Technology transfer is not like giving a formula to someone to produce a chemical. It is a combination of hundreds of formulas, many owned by Indians themselves,” Bhushan said. “The bottomline is, if you have money, you can buy whatever technology you want.” And so, the issue is not about freeing technology, like with the COVID-19 vaccines.

India has largely handled its own mitigation pathway because the country has access to renewable-energy technologies—both imported and domestically produced. Bhushan said talk of technology transfer is largely rhetoric without substantive demands detailing what exactly developing countries need.

Rishika Pardikar is a freelance journalist in Bangalore, India.