Gas-Rich Azerbaijan Unable to Meet EU’s Energy Needs As Russia-Ukraine Conflict Turns 3 Weeks Old

Nikola Mikovic March 16, 2022 Nikola Mikovic Admin, Archives, Asia

Mountains in Azerbaijan / credit: Anton Rogozin / Wikipedia

While the Russian “special military operation” in Ukraine turns three weeks old today, energy-rich Azerbaijan is trying to preserve good ties with both Moscow and Kyiv.

Although the situation worries the Caucasus nation snuggled along the western shores of the Caspian Sea, the Azerbaijani government—based in the capital of Baku—tends toward preserving its neutrality and it potentially benefits from exporting additional gas to Europe.

Immediate Impact of War

Two days before the invasion, Azerbaijan signed an alliance agreement with Russia. The two countries are now de facto allies, although their parliaments still have not ratified the deal. According to the document, Moscow and Baku intend to deepen cooperation in the energy sector and strengthen military ties. It is worth noting Russia is already an ally of Azerbaijan’s arch-enemy, Armenia, and the agreement Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Azeri counterpart, Ilham Aliyev, signed in Moscow on February 22 is expected to reinforce Moscow’s positions in the South Caucasus.

Still, Russia’s isolation in the international arena could have an impact on its relations with Azerbaijan. Baku already has suspended all flights to the Russian Federation, and fears have emerged that remittances the approximately 650,000 Azeris working in Russia send home will significantly decline. Moreover, Russia is Azerbaijan’s top import partner. If Moscow eventually limits exports of various goods, including food, Baku likely will have to strengthen economic and political ties with another ally, Turkey.

Double-Edged Sword

It is not a secret Ankara supplied Baku with sophisticated Bayraktar drones prior to the 44-day war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. This landlocked mountainous terrain is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, although it was under the control of Armenian forces for more than two decades. It is believed the Turkish-made weapons were a game changer in the war. As a result of the conflict, Baku restored its sovereignty over large portions of the mountainous territory, as well as surrounding areas, and some 2,000 Russian peacekeepers were deployed to the region. More importantly, Azerbaijan and Turkey became official allies, after Aliyev and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan signed in June the Shusha Declaration.

Azerbaijan is now an ally of both Russia and Turkey, which could be a double-edged sword for Baku. Although the Caucasus nation supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity, it has avoided condemning Russia’s actions or imposing sanctions on the Russian Federation.

“We have never taken decisions on imposing sanctions on any country,” Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister Elnur Mammadov told Toward Freedom in an interview. He pointed out he does not expect any pressure from the West for Azerbaijan to impose sanctions on Moscow.

Under the mediation of Russian President Vladimir Putin on November 26 in the southern Russia city of Sochi, the leaders of rival countries Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to ease remaining tensions after their 2019-20 war over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Armenian President Nikol Pashinyan (right) and Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev (left) flank Putin / credit: commonspace.eu — Under the mediation of Russian President Vladimir Putin on November 26 in the southern Russian city of Sochi, the leaders of rival countries Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to ease remaining tensions after their 2020 war over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Armenian President Nikol Pashinyan (right) and Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev (left) flank Putin / credit: commonspace.eu

Fueling Demand

The European Union expects Azerbaijan to increase gas supplies to the continent, especially if Moscow eventually decides to turn off the taps. Indeed, the EU will need Azerbaijan’s energy resources to cope with possible Russian gas disruptions. But the problem is the country now does not have much more gas to export.

“In 2021, we exported 8.2 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Europe,” said Orkhan Zeynalov, the head of the International Cooperation Department of Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Energy, in an interview with Toward Freedom. “This year, we’re planning to increase the export up to 9.1 billion cubic meters.”

Such a small amount will not meet European needs for energy. In the long term, however, Azerbaijan will be able to provide more gas to Europe if it manages to increase the share of renewable energy sources for electricity production. Baku aims to turn Nagorno-Karabakh into a “green energy zone,” where foreign corporations, such as United Kingdom-based BP and United Arab Emirates-based Masdar, plan to build solar power plants. In addition, Saudi Arabian utility company Acwa Power is expected to build a 240-megawatt wind turbine farm in Azerbaijan, which should reduce the amount of gas the country currently uses.

Nakhchivan Corridor

In 2021, Azerbaijan increased its gas exports by nearly 40 percent, but the country is unlikely to ever replace Russia as Europe’s major energy supplier. Still, the growing demand for Azerbaijan’s gas will almost certainly have a positive impact on the country’s budget. Baku is expected to invest money in the construction of the Nakhchivan corridor, also known as Zangezur corridor, which seems to be a top priority for the Caucasus nation.

“We are already building 110 kilometers (68 miles) of the railway, and 124 kilometers (77 miles) of the highway in the region,” Mammadov said. “Our plan is to finish the construction by the end of 2023.”

Since the end of 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war Azerbaijan and Turkey have been promoting the concept of the "Zangezur corridor," which, if implemented, would connect Azerbaijan to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region and Turkey to the rest of the Turkic world through Armenia's Syunik Province / credit: Mapeh / Wikipedia — The Nakhchivan corridor can be seen in red-and-white stripes by the city of Berdzor or Lachin. Since the end of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war Azerbaijan and Turkey have been promoting the concept of the “Zangezur corridor,” which, if implemented, would connect Azerbaijan to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region and Turkey to the rest of the Turkic world through Armenia’s Syunik Province / credit: Mapeh / Wikipedia

Why is this transportation network so important for Azerbaijan? The Nakhchivan corridor will allow the energy-rich nation a land connection with its exclave, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. At the same time, it will connect Azerbaijan with its ally, Turkey. The challenge, however, is 45 kilometers (28 miles) of the road will have to go through Armenian territory. Yerevan, unlike Baku, does not seem to be in a hurry to finish construction of the corridor, even though the railroad portion will connect Armenia with its ally, Russia, through Azerbaijan’s mainland. Yerevan, however, seems to be more interested in the construction of the North-South road corridor that will connect Armenia with Russia, through Georgia.

Georgia did not impose sanctions on Russia, even though the two nations fought a brief war in 2008. That is why the Kremlin does not see the former Soviet republic as an “enemy country,” which leaves room for normalization of relations between Moscow and Tbilisi. In the long-term, such a development would be beneficial for Armenia, given it would secure a land connection with Russia.

Although Moscow reportedly supports the project, and is actively dealing with issues on unblocking transport links in the region, it is not very probable Yerevan will complete the construction of its section of the corridor any time soon, if it all. Quite aware of that, Azerbaijan reportedly decided to bypass Armenia and connect its main territory with Nakhchivan via Iran. On March 11, Baku and Tehran signed a Memorandum of Understanding on establishing communication links in the region. Indeed, such a move could create a new geopolitical reality in the Caucasus.

But as long as the Russia-Ukraine conflict goes on, the final implementation of all the deals in the region will likely remain on hold. For the time being, both Azerbaijan and Armenia are expected to preserve good relations with Moscow, hoping the war in Ukraine will not spill over into the South Caucasus, an area the Kremlin sees at its “near abroad.”

Nikola Mikovic is a Serbia-based contributor to CGTN, Global Comment, Byline Times, Informed Comment, and World Geostrategic Insights, among other publications. He is a geopolitical analyst for KJ Reports and Enquire.

Leaders of the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) met May 16 in Moscow on its 30th anniversary / credit: CSTO

War In Ukraine Threatens Russia’s Standing Among Asian Allies

Nikola Mikovic May 23, 2022 Nikola Mikovic Admin, Archives, Asia

As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) broadens into Finland and Sweden, and the U.S.-dominated alliance continues to arm Ukraine, members of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) have refused to support Moscow’s “special military operation.” Kremlin allies such Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have continued with their neutral stance on the three-month war, while Belarus openly supports the intervention.

On May 16, CSTO member countries held a summit in Moscow, marking the 30th anniversary of the organization, which could play a significant role if the situation in Central Asia deteriorates.

According to Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, CSTO needs to consider all potential threats and pay more attention to ensuring the security of the sensitive region.

Ukraine War Overshadows Central Asian Conflict

Reports suggest Tajikistani forces recently launched an anti-terrorist operation against anti-government militants in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province, which borders Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and China. Prior to those clashes, the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) group reportedly fired rockets from Afghanistan into Tajikistan.

The area in blue represents the Gorno-Badakhshan region / credit: Panonian / Wikipedia

“Given the current security situation in northern Afghanistan, I anticipate that these reported rocket attacks will not be the last cross-border attacks from IS-K,” Brent Hierman, a professor of international studies and political science at Virginia Military Institute, told Toward Freedom. “Since the Tajikistani government fully denies the event, we are left with a pretty unclear picture of what may have occurred and what IS-K was targeting. However, it is the case that IS-K is trying to recruit Central Asians—especially Tajiks and Uzbeks—while also undermining Taliban claims on northern Afghanistan.”

In his view, Russian security concerns with regard to Tajikistan are overshadowed by its war in Ukraine.

However, a potential destabilization of Tajikistan could have a serious impact on Russia, given Moscow’s military base.

“Russian forces in Tajikistan, which used to be called the 201st Motor Rifle division, have long been used to secure the country’s southern border. Some of the troops stationed there have been sent to the war in Ukraine, although it is unclear how many,” said Heirman, emphasizing that Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan is more vulnerable now as a consequence.

At the same time, Tajik authorities are faced with hostilities in Gorno-Badakhshan, which complicates the situation. Heirman, however, does not expect CSTO to intervene in Tajikistan, even though some Kyrgyz experts believe the Moscow-led military bloc could soon deploy troops to the Central Asian nation.

“For more than a decade, Tajik authorities have been attempting to centralize control, and especially gain dominance over access to profitable revenue sources in Gorno-Badakhshan. The recent events are rooted in this effort,” Heirman stressed, pointing out that clashes in the region have a domestic source, although the government has framed them as terror threats.

The Kazakhstan Question

It is worth remembering that the violent mass protests in Kazakhstan, which broke out in early January, also had a domestic source. Nevertheless, CSTO deployed some 2,000 troops to the energy-rich country, and helped Tokayev stay in power. It is widely believed that what happened in Kazakhstan was a coup attempt. Now, some Chinese experts claim that the CSTO will soon have to deal with the emerging threats of terrorism and color revolutions. How likely is another “color revolution” attempt in Kazakhstan?

“If Chinese analysts believe there will be an emerging threat of terrorism, I would assume this would be a Western-sponsored terror threat,” Hrvoje Moric, a global perspectives teacher at Nazarbayev Intellectual Schools in Kazakhstan, told Toward Freedom. “The United States and Europe together with Gulf countries have been arming, training, and financing terrorists for decades. There is a new lawsuit implicating U.S.-ally Qatar as a sponsor of ISIS. This is a recent example, but is really nothing new.”

Moric, who has lived in Kazakhstan for three years, believes that the Kremlin’s ally will remain in Moscow’s geopolitical orbit, and will not abandon the Russia-led Eurasian Union and CSTO. Moreover, he expects Kazakhstan to participate in potential CSTO missions abroad.

CSTO’s Role in Ukraine

Moscow claims that Ukrainian forces have attacked Russian territory on several occasions, destroying oil depots and other important infrastructure facilities in the Russian Federation. According to Article 4 of the CSTO Treaty, “an act of aggression (an armed attack that threatens security, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty) against one of the member states will be considered as a collective act of aggression on all member states of the CSTO.”

Why has CSTO never reacted to protect Russia?

“From a legal point of view, Russia did not declare the war. It didn’t even declare mobilization or martial law. Thus, it is difficult for Russia to apply to CSTO,” Benyamin Poghosyan, chairman of the Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies in Yerevan, Armenia, told Toward Freedom. “Besides legal issues, there are also political ones. If Russia applies to CSTO for help, it will admit that it is not able to overcome Ukraine resistance, which will constitute a severe blow to the Russian image.”

In May 2021, Armenia formally asked CSTO to intervene against Azerbaijan’s alleged incursion. The Kremlin, however, ignored Yerevan’s requests. As a result, during the recent CSTO summit, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, openly criticized the bloc, and even accused its allies of selling weapons to Azerbaijan.

“Russia does not view Azerbaijan as an enemy, and is interested in increasing its influence in Baku,” Poghosyan explains. “Simultaneously, Russia competes with Turkey in Azerbaijan. Ankara significantly increased its influence in the country as a result of the 2020 Karabakh war. Moscow understands very well that any military clashes with Azerbaijan will ruin its relations with Baku, and will turn Azerbaijan into another Georgia for Russia.”

In 2008, Russia fought a brief war against neighboring U.S.-backed Georgia. Back then, Russian CSTO allies de facto supported the Kremlin’s actions in the Caucasus nation.

The coming months will show if Russia can manage to consolidate its position in the CSTO, with its nominal allies “picking a side,” or if the organization will remain a club whose members share very few common interests.

On September 10, sections of the second Nord Stream 2 pipeline laid from the German shore and Danish waters were connected in a so-called above-water tie-in in the Baltic Sea. The opposing pipe strings were lifted from the seabed by the lay barge, Fortuna, and the pipe ends were cut and fitted together. The welding to connect the two lines took place on a platform located above the water on the side of the vessel. Then the connected pipeline was lowered to the seabed as one continuous string / credit: Nord Stream 2 / Axel Schmidt

Pipeline Politics Hits Multipolar Realities: Nord Stream 2 and the Ukraine Crisis

John Foster February 16, 2022 John Foster Admin, Archives, Europe

Editor’s Note: This analysis originally appeared in Counterpunch.

Amid escalating tensions between U.S./NATO and Russia, all eyes are on Ukraine, but Nord Stream 2, a pipeline built to bring Russian gas under the Baltic Sea directly to Germany, is an integral part of the story.

U.S. Under Secretary for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland asserted (January 27), “If Russia invades Ukraine one way or another … we will work with Germany to ensure it (the pipeline) does not move forward.” Delayed by U.S. threats and sanctions, Nord Stream 2 highlights why countries are challenging U.S. leadership.

Since the 1960s when Europe first began importing Russian gas, Washington perceived Russian energy as a threat to U.S. leadership and Europe’s energy security. More recently, with fracking, the United States has become the world’s largest gas producer and a major exporter of LNG (liquefied natural gas). It wants to muscle in on Europe’s huge market, displacing Russian gas. With Nord Stream 2 completed and filled while it awaits German regulatory approval, the stakes are high.

Soon after pipeline construction began in 2018, the United States passed a law threatening sanctions on the Swiss ship laying the pipe. The Swiss pulled out and two Russian vessels completed the line despite sanctions. The United States threatened German contractors too, but Germany stood firm.

In 2021, with construction almost complete, German Chancellor Angela Merkel visited the White House, insisting on Nord Stream 2. U.S. President Joe Biden gave way. He wanted to mend relations with Germany—the European Union’s most powerful country.

Nord Stream 2, like its predecessor Nord Stream 1, began as a joint venture (51% Russia’s Gazprom, 49% Royal Dutch Shell as well as Austrian, French and German companies). Then Poland’s government agency responsible for monopoly regulation forced European partners to relinquish their share, creating another delay. The European companies gave up their shareholding but remained as equivalent financial investors in the pipeline.

Upon the Europeans relinquishing their shareholding, Gazprom became the sole pipeline owner. It is also the world’s largest gas supplier, with a gas pipeline monopoly in Russia. Gazprom wants to deliver its own gas via its pipeline to Europe. The EU, on the other hand, has maintained since 2009 that pipeline operators, in order to encourage market competition, cannot own the gas they carry. After construction of Nord Stream 2 began, the EU extended its rules to new marine pipelines originating abroad.

Nord Stream 2 was the only pipeline affected. While those pipelines completed prior to May 2019 were exempt, its completion was delayed by U.S. sanctions on pipelaying. Gazprom claimed discrimination and appealed. In August, a German court rejected the appeal. Gazprom then appealed to Germany’s Supreme Court.

German industrialists are desperate for Russian gas. Germany has only 17 days of gas supply in storage. Volatile short-term spot prices have compounded their woes. EU gas imports have increasingly shifted from long-term contracts with prices indexed to crude oil toward short-term deals by multiple traders in spot markets.

In 2020, spot prices were roughly half those of Gazprom’s long-term contracts. They surged as much as sevenfold in 2021, reflecting a mix of factors. On the demand side, economic revival from the pandemic boosted demand for gas in Asia as well as Europe. On the supply side, green sources of energy diminished in central Europe because of cloudy windless days. With the decommissioning of coal and nuclear power stations, utilities turned to natural gas.

European politicians blamed Russia for high gas prices, but Gazprom affirmed it was supplying the amounts stipulated in its long-term contracts. Gazprom wants long-term contracts to underpin the huge capital costs of gasfield and pipeline investments.

Russia is a petro-state. It’s the world’s single largest exporter of natural gas, and the second largest oil exporter—just behind Saudi Arabia. Pipelines and sea routes to market are vital to its economy. Russia wants to sell oil and gas in Asia and Europe, and they want to buy it. Nord Stream 2 makes commercial sense. It incurs no transit fees. The route to market is much shorter than aging pipelines via Ukraine. For its part, Ukraine depends on transit fees from gas shipped through these pipelines.

Nord Stream 2 remains controversial, bitterly opposed by Poland and Ukraine who presume it will reduce volumes and transit fees on pipelines through their countries. Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic and others want it. Germany, which carries huge weight in the EU, sees gas as a transition fuel after phasing out nuclear and coal.

Numerous hurdles during and since construction have delayed Nord Stream 2’s certification. The most recent forced its Swiss operating company to form a German subsidiary for the pipeline section in German waters. Upon eventual certification, Germany will become Europe’s main entry point for Russian gas.

The current crisis between Russia and United States/NATO has been brewing for many years. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO expanded membership to Eastern Europe. NATO facilitates U.S. leadership, keeping European countries on its side against Russia. From a Russian viewpoint, NATO is provocative and threatening.

Part of the agreement underpinning the USSR’s dissolution was Western assurance that it would not expand into Russia’s sphere of influence, a pledge NATO most recently violated by stationing troops, ships and planes along Russia’s borders. The West accuses Russia of interference in Ukraine. Russia points to a 2014 Western-inspired coup in Ukraine and legitimate grievances of Russian-speakers in the breakaway Donbass republics. I document the two narratives in my book Oil and World Politics.

In December, Russia presented draft treaties to the United States and NATO, demanding a complete overhaul of Europe’s security architecture. Russia stressed the principle of indivisible and equal security for all countries, as agreed by all 56 members of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) at Istanbul (1999) and reaffirmed at Astana (2010). Members expressly agreed not to strengthen their security at the expense of other members’ security. The United States is a signatory.

President Putin warned that if the West continued its aggressive policies (NATO’s expansion and missile deployment in eastern Europe), Russia would take ‘military-technical’ reciprocal measures. He said, “they have pushed us to a line that we can’t cross.”

Russia’s initiative put the cat among the pigeons. A succession of high-level meetings occurred between Russia and the United States, NATO and OSCE. Washington presented written responses (January 26), seeking to narrow the debate to Ukraine and alleging the Russians were poised to invade it. Russia insisted repeatedly it would not initiate an invasion but would support Donbass if the latter were attacked.

The United States escalated tensions by repeating claims of an upcoming Russian invasion, even as Ukraine’s leaders expressed doubts. Washington threatened sanctions of unprecedented severity, including major Russian banks, high-tech goods, the SWIFT financial messaging system, and Nord Stream 2.

France and Germany balked because the sanctions would backfire on their economies. They appeared unconvinced Russia intended to attack unless provoked. A flurry of high-level bilateral discussions with Russia followed.

Significantly, representatives of France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine (Jan 26) confirmed support for the 2015 Minsk II agreement and an unconditional ceasefire. Minsk II requires Ukraine to negotiate with the two Donbass republics on autonomy within a federalized Ukraine but, thus far, no negotiations have been held.

The EU imports 40 percent of its gas from Russia. For Russia, the routes through Ukraine and Poland are unreliable, because of hostility in both countries. Ukraine has a long-term deal with Gazprom for gas transit until 2024. Ukraine earns big transit fees, roughly $2 billion USD per year, and desperately wants to keep them. For its internal market, Ukraine buys Russian gas indirectly from Poland, Romania and Slovakia.

Whatever happens with Western sanctions, Russia has a strategic new market in China. Russia’s Power of Siberia pipeline began exporting gas from east Siberia to northeast China two years ago. The two countries have agreed to build a second line, Power of Siberia 2. It will bring gas from the Yamal peninsula in the Russian Arctic to China’s northeast. That means Yamal gas will be able to flow to China as easily as to Europe.

The current situation is dangerous and could easily escalate. Nord Stream 2 is critically important but national security trumps all. Security can only be achieved if it is universal. U.S. efforts to contain Russia and maintain leadership over Europe are not working. The world has become multi-polar and Nord Stream 2 is a fulcrum at the centre of the current crisis.

John Foster, international petroleum economist, is author of Oil and World Politics: the Real Story of Today’s Conflict Zones (Lorimer Books). He held positions with the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, BP and Petro-Canada. His blog johnfosterwrites.com and former TF guest editor Charlotte Dennett’s FollowthePipelines.com examine new issues.

Over 11,000 Yemeni Children Have Been Killed or Injured Since 2015, Reports UNICEF

Peoples Dispatch December 13, 2022 Peoples Dispatch Admin, Archives, West Asia

Editor’s Note: This article originally appeared in Peoples Dispatch.

More than 11,000 Yemeni children have been killed or injured since the escalation of fighting in Yemen in 2015, the United Nations International Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reported on Sunday, December 11. The Saudi-led international coalition intervened in the conflict in Yemen in 2015.

Commenting on the number of children killed or maimed in the Yemen war, Catherine Russell, executive director of the UNICEF, noted that this was at best a conservative figure and that “the truce toll of this conflict is likely to be far higher.”

Russell was on a visit to the country where the Saudi-led international coalition, backed by the United States and its European allies such as the United Kingdom and France, is waging a war against the Houthi forces who control capital Sanaa since March 2015. The war has killed hundreds of thousands of people and devastated what was already the poorest country in the Arab world.

Saudi Arabia accuses the Houthis of being an Iranian proxy, responsible for displacing Yemen’s rightful government in 2014-15. The Houthis have denied the Saudi allegations and claimed that they are fighting against the corrupt ruling classes of their country, who do not serve the people but act as facilitators of international loot of Yemeni resources.

Russell called for the immediate resumption of the UN-mediated ceasefire which had ended in October this year. In April this year, for the first time in seven years of war, both the warring sides had agreed to a two-month ceasefire. The ceasefire was extended twice, and the country experienced a rare six months of relative peace. However, both parties refused to extend the ceasefire beyond October after the UN failed to devise substantial grounds for its indefinite extension.

Millions on the Verge of Death

Russell noted that in the period since the ceasefire ended, 62 Yemeni children have been killed and “hundreds of thousands more remain at risk of death from preventable diseases or starvation.”

According to the UNICEF, around 11 million Yemeni children are directly affected by the war and around 2.2 million of them are extremely malnourished. A quarter of these 2.2 million children are below the age of five and extremely susceptible to deadly diseases such as cholera and measles, among others.

UNICEF also noted that regular immunization in the country has been badly affected due to the war, with over 28 percent children missing their routine vaccinations.

The Saudi-led coalition, apart from waging its ground and air offensive in populated areas, has also imposed a crippling air, sea and land blockade of the country since 2015, preventing the supply of essentials including food, fuel, and medicine. The blockade has been identified as the main reason for the large-scale starvation in Yemen, which has pushed millions to the verge of death due to hunger and lack of medicines and healthcare equipment.

Underlining the causes of their refusal to extend the UN-mediated ceasefire, the Houthis highlighted the failure to address the central issue of the Saudi blockade which would have “alleviated the suffering of Yemeni people.” Throughout the period of the ceasefire, the Houthis had been raising the issue of insufficient easing of the blockade and had accused the Saudi-backed forces of violating the norms of the truce.

The scale of destruction caused by the war and the blockade has forced the UN to categorize Yemen as “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.”

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