As UN ‘Reviews’ Presence in Afghanistan, Afghans Face More Hunger and Poverty 

Editor’s Note: Aside from federal terrorism charges against animal-rights and environmental activists, African descendants are active in the Stop Cop City movement. In 2017, the FBI created the “Black Identity Extremism” domestic terrorism category for African-descended activists in the United States. Light editing helped conform the following Unicorn Riot article to TF’s style.

ATLANTA, United States—On Dec. 14, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams and other armed police officers from eight different federal, state, county, and city police agencies conducted a raid on those camping out in the Atlanta forest in hopes of preventing the construction of an 85-acre police training facility that opponents have dubbed “Cop City.”

During the raid, police shot tear gas and plastic bullets, and forced people out of the forest at gunpoint. Police in Bobcats and other heavy equipment destroyed treehouses, a communal kitchen, and other infrastructure built by those dedicated to the defense of the forest.

By the end of the two-day operation, a total of 12 people were arrested, according to police. At least six of those have been charged with a host of felonies, including state-level domestic terrorism charges, according to the Atlanta Solidarity Fund.

On Tuesday, Dec. 27, all six arrestees charged with domestic terrorism were granted bail totaling $51,000, with amounts per defendant ranging from $6,000 to $13,500. The six were also ordered to report to “pretrial services” within 48 hours, to refrain from contact with their co-defendants, and to refrain from “contact with Defend Atlanta Forest on social media.”

The Atlanta Solidarity Fund, an Atlanta-based bail fund, posted on social media their intention to bail the six out as soon as possible.

“The ‘domestic terrorism’ charges these protesters are facing are utterly baseless,” the group wrote on Twitter following the hearing. “Legal experts, including the ACLU, have warned prosecutors that there is no basis for such a case. We have been assembling a legal team to defend them every step of the way through the legal process.”

At a hearing on Dec. 15, Magistrate Judge Claire Jason denied bond to five of the arrestees charged with felonies.

“Each of you have been charged with domestic terrorism,” Jason said, appearing to read from a document on her screen. “Generally, the information that I have on the affidavit of warrant… You did participate in actions of DTAF (Defend the Atlanta Forest) a group that’s been classified by the United States Department of Homeland Security as a domestic violent extremist group.”

Those involved in the movement to defend the forest deny that the group, “Defend the Atlanta Forest,” even exists. Writing on Twitter Friday, Dec. 16, from the handle, @DefendATLForest, those running the platform explained, “’Defend the Atlanta Forest’” is the name of a movement and it is also the username of a submission-based social media platform. It is not a group. We do not organize any actions and we don’t know the people who do.”

The U.S. Department of Homeland security did not respond to questions from Unicorn Riot regarding the alleged domestic violent extremist group classification. However, arrest warrants and affidavits obtained by the Atlanta Journal-Constitution indicate that those arrested are being charged with domestic terrorism simply due to their affiliation with the “group.” The documents state that the Department of Homeland Security classifies “Defend the Atlanta Forest” as “Domestic Violent Extremists.”

Some affidavits say the offense is “16-10-24 Domestic Terrorism.” However, as of 2021, that Georgia state law does not include any references to domestic terrorism—it only pertains to “obstructing or hindering law enforcement.” Another affidavit says the offense is “16-4-10 Domestic Terrorism,” although this appears to be a mistake by prosecutors and the judge, as that section is currently repealed according to Justia.com. However, there is a domestic terrorism statute on the books in Georgia.

Cop City Opponents Aim to Stop Construction

The encampments and tree sits within the 380-acre expanse of forest have been constructed, destroyed by police, and reconstructed several times throughout the year. Those living in the trees and supporting them from afar are trying to prevent the razing of the forest and the construction of the Atlanta Police Foundation’s Public Safety Training Center, currently scheduled to open in late 2023.

The facility carries a price tag of $90 million for its initial phase. In September 2021, Atlanta’s city council approved a proposal to construct the facility within a huge swath of forested land in unincorporated DeKalb County, southeast of Atlanta, some of which is owned by the city of Atlanta.

​​Other sections of the forest are also in danger of destruction. Last year, film company executive Ryan Milsap, former owner of Blackhall Studios (recently rebranded Shadowbox Studios), was given forty acres of forested land called Intrenchment Creek Park just west of the planned police facility in a controversial land swap. Opponents of Milsap responded to an escalation he made on July 30 by setting a work truck on fire.

Milsap has stated publicly that he plans to raze the forest to build 1.2 million square feet of sound stage, which would make it the largest film studio in the state.

“I want to be clear, the people that the police are attacking with plastic bullets with chemical weapons, as recently as yesterday, these people were not involved in threatening anybody,” said Marlon Kautz of the Atlanta Solidarity Fund at a press conference on Wednesday. “They were not involved in endangering anybody. They were sitting passively in trees trying to express a political position. And for sitting in trees, trying to conduct a non-violent protest, they were attacked by police, arguably tortured with chemical weapons.”

On Tuesday night, in the midst of the raid, activists called for a protest at the Dekalb County Jail where those who had already been arrested were held. They beat drums, shouted, and chanted so that those held behind the jail’s walls could hear them. In response, detainees in the jail banged on windows, waved, and even lit a fire.

This is not the first time people have been arrested and charged with crimes for protesting against the project, but it is the first time authorities have charged protestors with domestic terrorism. The first arrests associated with the movement came in September 2021 when activists were protesting outside the homes of several City Council members in the midst of the council’s vote to approve the Cop City project. The protests were held at City Council members’ homes because the meeting took place remotely.

A Trend Continues: Leftist Activists Get Pinned with Terrorism Charges

There is a longstanding precedent for terrorism charges being used against animal rights and environmental activists. According to a 2019 study by The Intercept, of the 70 federal prosecutions of animal and environmental activists they identified, the government sought terrorism enhancements in 20. Overall, the use of terrorism charges has risen dramatically in recent years, peaking in 2020. The rate of federal terrorism prosecutions has increased 388 percent since 2017.

Watch our mini documentary – Defending the Atlanta Forest: Behind the Movement to Stop Cop City

Although the FBI is involved in the repression of the movement to save the forest, those arrested Tuesday face state-level terrorism charges, brought by the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI).

However, activists associated with the campaign to save the forest have raised doubts over whether these charges will actually stick.

“The GBI knows that these charges will not hold up in court, and they are not intended to: The point is to raise the stakes of protesting,” said a spokesperson for the Defend the Atlanta Forest campaign in a press release. “Their goal is to create a chilling effect across the city, scaring off anyone concerned about police militarization and the climate crisis from taking action.”

Despite the rhetoric currently being wielded by the GBI and other law enforcement agencies, which seek to portray the movement to defend the forest as a militant fringe group, the Cop City project remains wildly unpopular among a broad segment of Atlantans, including those who will be forced to live closest to it. Even a local preschool has gotten involved in the fight to save the forest.

Activists say police are escalating the level of violence and repression they are using against the movement as its success and popularity grows. Kautz, of the Atlanta Solidarity Fund, told reporters Wednesday:

“When the Stop Cop City movement began, police tried to use intimidation to dissuade activists. And when that didn’t work, they began making baseless arrests, which the Atlanta Solidarity Fund has documented and is providing legal support to defend people in those cases.”

Kautz continued:

“When the baseless arrests failed to discourage people from speaking out about the problems that they saw with Cop City, we got to where we are now, with the police using open brutality to try to suppress them. “Are we going to end up in a situation where the police are murdering protesters in order to advance, not public safety, but their particular political agenda? Are we going to end up in a situation where the police are murdering protesters in order to advance, not public safety, but their particular political agenda? No, they’re going to be learning urban warfare tactics to harass our communities, to surveil us, to prevent us from doing things like gathering here today and letting the public know what’s going on.”

Days after the Taliban drove into Kabul on August 15, its representatives started making inquiries about the “location of assets” of the central bank of the nation, Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), which are known to total about $9 billion. Meanwhile, the central bank in neighboring Uzbekistan, which has an almost equivalent population of approximately 34 million people compared to Afghanistan’s population of more than 39 million, has international reserves worth $35 billion. Afghanistan is a poor country, by comparison, and its resources have been devastated by war and occupation.

The DAB officials told the Taliban that the $9 billion are in the Federal Reserve in New York, which means that Afghanistan’s wealth is sitting in a bank in the United States. But before the Taliban could even try to access the money, the U.S. Treasury Department has already gone ahead and frozen the DAB assets and prevented its transfer into Taliban control.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) had recently allocated $650 billion Special Drawing Rights (SDR) for disbursement around the world. When asked if Afghanistan would be able to access its share of the SDRs, an IMF spokesperson said in an email, “As is always the case, the IMF is guided by the views of the international community. There is currently a lack of clarity within the international community regarding recognition of a government in Afghanistan, as a consequence of which the country cannot access SDRs or other IMF resources.”

Financial bridges into Afghanistan, to tide the country over during the 20 years of war and devastation, have slowly collapsed. The IMF decided to withhold transfer of $370 million before the Taliban entered Kabul, and now commercial banks and Western Union have suspended money transfers into Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s currency, the Afghani, is in a state of free fall.

 

When Aid Vanishes

Over the last decade, Afghanistan’s formal economy struggled to stay afloat. Since the U.S.-NATO invasion of October 2001, Afghanistan’s government has relied on financial aid flows to support its economy. Due to these funds and strong agricultural growth, Afghanistan experienced an average annual growth rate of 9.4 percent between 2003 and 2012, according to the World Bank. These figures do not include two important facts: first, that large parts of Afghanistan were not in government control (including border posts where taxes are levied), and second, that the illicit drug (opium, heroin, and methamphetamine) trade is not counted in these figures. In 2019, the total income from the opium trade in Afghanistan was between $1.2 billion and $2.1 billion, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). “The gross income from opiates exceeded the value of the country’s officially recorded licit exports in 2019,” stated a February 2021 UNODC report.

During the past decade, aid flow into Afghanistan has collapsed “from around 100 percent of GDP in 2009 to 42.9 percent of GDP in 2020.” The official economic growth rate between 2015 and 2020 fell to 2.5 percent. The prospects for an increase in aid seemed dire in 2020. At the 2020 Afghanistan Conference, held in Geneva in November, the donors decided to provide annual disbursements rather than aid in four-year packages. This meant that the Afghan government would not be able to sufficiently plan their operations. Before the Taliban took Kabul, Afghanistan had begun to recede from the memory of those countries that had invaded it in 2001-2002.

 

A Country of Poverty

During the past 20 years, the United States government spent $2.26 trillion toward its war and occupation of Afghanistan. European countries spent nothing close to what the United States spent (Germany spent $19.3 billion by the end of 2018, of which $14.1 billion was to pay for the deployment of the German armed forces).

The money coming from all the donors into Afghanistan’s burgeoning aid economy had some impact on the social lives of the Afghans. Conversations with officials in Kabul over the years are sprinkled with data about increased access to schools and sanitation, improvements in the health of children and greater numbers of women in Afghanistan’s civil service. But it was always difficult to believe the numbers.

In 2016, Education Minister Assadullah Hanif Balkhi said that only 6 million Afghan children attended the country’s 17,000 schools, and not 11 million as reported earlier (41 percent of Afghanistan’s schools do not have buildings). As a result of the failure to provide schools, the Afghan Ministry of Education reports that the total literacy rate in the country was 43 percent in 2020, with 55 percent being the literacy rate for men and 29.8 percent being the literacy rate for women. Donors, aid agencies, and the central government officials produced a culture of inflating expectations to encourage optimism and the transfer of more funds. But little of it was true.

Meanwhile, it is shocking to note that there was barely any construction of infrastructure to advance basic needs during these 20 years. Afghanistan’s power company—Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS)—reports that only 35 percent of the population has access to electricity and that 70 percent of the power is imported at inflated rates.

Half of Afghanistan lives in poverty, 14 million Afghans are food insecure, and 2 million Afghan children are severely hungry. The roaring sound of hunger was combined—during these past 20 years—with the roaring sound of bombers. This is what the occupation looked like from the ground.

 

The Taliban’s Anti-Corruption Crusade

In a 2013 New York Times article, a U.S. official said, “The biggest source of corruption in Afghanistan was the United States.” Dollars flowed into the country in trunks to be doled out to politicians to buy their loyalty. Contracts to build a new Afghanistan were given freely to U.S. businessmen, many of whom charged fees that were higher than their expenditure inside Afghanistan.

Afghanistan’s President Ashraf Ghani, who fled into exile hours before the Taliban took control of Kabul, took office making a lot of noise about ending corruption. When he fled the country, press secretary of the Russian embassy in Kabul Nikita Ishchenko told RIA Novosti, his people drove four cars filled with money to the airfield. “They tried to stuff another part of the money into a helicopter, but not all of it fit. And some of the money was left lying on the tarmac,” according to a Reuters report. Corruption at the top spilled down to everyday life. Afghans reported paying bribes worth $2.25 billion in 2020—37 percent higher than in 2018.

Part of the reason for the Taliban’s rapid advance across Afghanistan over the course of the past decade lies in the failure of the U.S.-NATO-backed governments of both Hamid Karzai (2001-2014) and Ashraf Ghani (2014-2021) to improve the situation for Afghans. Surveys regularly found Afghans saying that they believed corruption levels were lower in Taliban areas; similarly, Afghans reported that the Taliban would run schools more effectively. Within Afghanistan, the Taliban portrayed themselves as more efficient and less corrupt administrators.

None of this should allow anyone to assume that the Taliban have become moderate. Their agenda regarding women is identical to what it was at its founding in 1994. In 1996, the Taliban drove into Kabul with the same argument: they would end the civil war between the mujahideen, and they would end corruption and inefficiency. The West had 20 years to advance the cause of social development in Afghanistan. Its failure opened the door for the return of the Taliban.

The United States has begun to cut off Afghanistan from its own money in U.S. banks and from financial networks. It will use these means to isolate the Taliban. Perhaps this is a means to force the Taliban into a national government with former members of the Karzai-Ghani governments. Otherwise, these tactics are plainly vindictive and will only backfire against the West.

This article was produced by Globetrotter.

Vijay Prashad is an Indian historian, editor and journalist. He is a writing fellow and chief correspondent at Globetrotter. He is the chief editor of LeftWord Books and the director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research. He is a senior non-resident fellow at Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China. He has written more than 20 books, including The Darker Nations and The Poorer Nations. His latest book is Washington Bullets, with an introduction by Evo Morales Ayma.

Editor’s Note: Toward Freedom uses “West Asia” to describe what is referred to as the “Middle East,” a term with colonial roots.

Striking from the Margins edited by Aziz Al-Azmeh, Nadia Al-Bagdadi, Harout Akdedian and Harith Hasan (London, United Kingdom: Saqi Books, 2021)

The tumultuous state of West Asia has been a contentious topic within many academic and social circles for centuries. Over the past half-century many academics, politicians and strategists have put forth initiatives, programs and policies focused on reconstructing the region. 

For far too long, Western countries have seen West Asia as an underdeveloped expanse of land and resources controlled and governed through antiquated religious and social policies. What separates Striking from the Margins from other discourses on the region is its commitment to addressing the misconceptions that often keep people from understanding the relationship between West Asian countries and the Western ones that occupy and use their territory mostly for economic benefits.

The Disconnect Between East and West

One of the reasons such a disconnect exists between those living in West Asia and the Western countries, whose tax dollars finance the implementation of interventionist policies, is due to a lack of understanding regarding West Asian governance. While the United States’ two-party system is imperfect, it offers an often-predictable outcome that effectively reinforces the country’s status quo as a leading economic power across the globe. On the other hand, many countries in West Asia face a more challenging set of circumstances to develop their economies. For example, in the early 2000s Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s government was not only dealing with warring Shi’i and Sunni factions seeking power within Iraq, but also Islamists and U.S. troops fighting to control the region. Research done by Greek political scientist Stathis Kalyvas shows a combination of sectarian conflict along with “a short war between U.S. troops and Shi’i militias” led to Iraq experiencing “a collapse of state capacity.” (pg. 37) Such a collapse has continued to make it difficult for the country to rebuild and develop. This book effectively outlines the circumstances that have kept certain West Asian countries from modernizing.

Striking from the Margins is not a dissertation that seeks to “fix” the region. Instead, the authors push for a reconceptualization along with reasonable policy changes that would be more economically beneficial to those regions. Understanding the type of social, religious and economic pressures West Asian countries face is pivotal to building stronger and more equitable partnerships between those countries and Western ones. In the book, two of the authors, Aziz Al-Azmeh and Nadia Al-Bagdadi, effectively highlight the hypocrisy of interventionism, along with its role in destabilizing West Asia. They offer a diligent overview of state formation in the region.

In writing that “the modern state in the Mashreq arose from the needs of internal reform arising in response to global, arguably colonial pressures from outside and from internal processes of modernization, starting with the Ottoman reforms of the 19th century” (pg. 8), the authors offer a concise historical context regarding state formation in the region. But when they go on to state that “the most artificial state” and yet the strongest in West Asia is Israel (pg. 8), the blatant contradiction between regional support and global impact becomes evident. On one hand, powerful states in the region historically gained their legitimacy through a combination of regional support, resource management and tribal warfare. However, the most powerful country in the region, Israel, is not supported by neighboring countries like Egypt, Syria and Lebanon. It instead maintains legitimacy through a “client state” relationship with the United States. Thus, Israel possesses an imbalanced stronghold over the region when it comes to warfare. When discussing West Asia and the constant demands for reform in the region, it is important to explore the role Israel and the United States have played in maintaining the economic status quo.

Religious Fundamentalism and Global Capitalism

In lieu of adequate research most people tend to assume that religious fundamentalism is the leading factor stifling the development of West Asian countries. However, research suggests economic inequalities are the leading cause of instability in the region. Kalyvas writes “$1,000 less in per capita income is associated with 41 percent greater annual odds of civil war onset, on average.” (pg. 30) The Gulf Cooperation Council consists of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Together, they represent a regional, intergovernmental, political and economic union designed to integrate multiple economies and bolster infrastructure across member countries. The issue is such integration comes at a significant cost for the “migrant workers [who] have been fundamental to patterns of urban growth and capital accumulation in the Gulf.” (pg. 57) Hanieh explains “a large number of temporary migrant workers… from South Asia and, to a lesser degree, the Arab world… make up more than half of the Gulf’s total population of 56 million.” (pg. 57) Even though these workers account for more than 59 percent of the labor force within the Gulf, they have been denied labor, political and civil rights. Much of the political and economic capital used to support growth across the region is not helping the people who need it the most.

In closing, several competing entities influence the economic, social and political infrastructure of West Asia. The most important are the countries in the region, specifically those that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council, as well as non-member countries like the United States, who have a vested interest in the maintenance and development of certain programs and countries in the region. The value of Striking from the Margins is its subtle refusal to put forth a heavy-handed, neoliberal proposal on how to “reform” West Asia. Instead, it offers proper context for readers to take a step back, thoughtfully assess the situation and envision new ways to embark on such a difficult development process.

Timothy Harun is a writer and actor based in Los Angeles. He holds a B.A. in journalism from Hampton University.