EU Mediates Conflict in South Caucasus, Long Part of Russia’s Geopolitical Orbit

The arrest of journalist Roman Protasevich after his flight was diverted May 23 to the Belarusian capital of Minsk has generated more negative publicity for Belarus’ government and has raised questions about the extent of the new Cold War.

Protasevich, 26, is editor of outlawed Telegram channels that had stirred opposition to President Aleksandr Lukashenko, who has ruled Belarus since 1994. Telegram is a messaging application used on smartphones. High-profile individuals, media outlets and organizations also use it to broadcast one-way communications to their followers.

After the arrest, the Biden administration announced it would re-impose economic sanctions on state-owned companies in Belarus, and that it would add names to the list of sanctioned officials associated with “ongoing abuses of human rights and corruption.”

Dismissing Lukashenko’s claim that Protasevich’s flight contained a bomb threat, the New York Times editorialized that Lukashenko had “gone too far” in “hijacking a commercial airliner to kidnap an opposition journalist.” Aside from urging the U.S. response be “swift,” the Times referred to Lukashenko’s attempt as a “Jason Bourne plot.”

However, when former Bolivian President Evo Morales’ flight was forced to land in Vienna in 2013 because U.S. whistleblower Edward Snowden was thought to be on board, the incident was dismissed as a mistake.

Belarus is one of the last remaining socialist countries in the world and a close ally of Russia, a country the United States has targeted for decades via the first “Cold War”—when it was the former Soviet Union—and thereafter with neoliberal policies and NATO troops at its border. This puts Belarus particularly at risk for U.S. subversion.

The U.S. government has funded opposition movements against Lukashenko, who has been caricatured as a brutal dictator and a “throwback to the regional bosses of the Soviet era,” as the Times depicted him.

While some aspects of the criticism are accurate, Lukashenko has a considerable degree of popular support in Belarus because he resisted Western-imposed privatization programs in the 1990s and preserved a social safety net, resulting in low poverty and inequality levels.

The opposition movement has been depicted heroically even though it was photographed during anti-regime protests in August flying the pre-revolutionary flag, implying its goal was to reverse socialist-type economic programs.

Far-Right Links

Some of its members have ties to far right-wing networks in Europe that went unreported in the media.

A May 26 profile in the Times depicted Protasevich as a precocious young man who had bravely “resisted his country’s tyranny since he was 16” when he “first witnessed what he described as the ‘disgusting brutality’ of Mr. Lukashenko’s rule.”

His first arrest came when he watched a “clapping protest”—considered an offensive gesture in Belarus—against Lukashenko, causing him to be expelled from high school and his mother to resign as an army academy teacher.

After being forced to abandon his university studies, Protasevich became an opposition journalist in Poland, helped establish a Telegram channel to resist Lukashenko and joined forces with opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya in Lithuania.

Left out of the fawning portrait was Belarusian courts had determined the Telegram channels he had worked for, Belamova and Nexta, were “extremist” and first set up by people such as Igor Losik, who had served as consultants with the U.S. propaganda organ, Radio Free Europe.

Protasevich furthermore enlisted in a militia that fought alongside the neo-Nazi Azov battalion in eastern Ukraine against Russian backed separatists, was wounded in battle and reportedly worked for the Azov battalion’s press service.

Protasevich’s selfie in an explicitly neo-Nazi brand Sva Stone. It’s extremely unlikely that one can wear these T-shirts without being “in”. pic.twitter.com/brpsUgEpPw

— Volodymyr Ishchenko (@Volod_Ishchenko) May 26, 2021

Photographed in a T-shirt featuring far-right iconography, Protasevich is even suspected of being the young man featured with an assault rifle and military uniform on the front of Azov’s propaganda magazine, which is emblazoned with a large neo-Nazi symbol.

Media’s Anti-Russia Bias

Fitting a century-long pattern of Russophobia, the Times has led the charge for a new Cold War against Russia and has supported regime change in Belarus.

When protests broke out over a contested election last summer, the Times erroneously predicted Lukashenko’s downfall many times, and in April chose not to report on a coup as well as an assassination plot led by an opposition politician holding a U.S. passport.

The biased coverage of Belarus has extended to alternative media like Counterpunch.

On May 31, it ran an article by an anti-Lukashenko playwright, Andrei Kureichik, titled “The Taking of Roman Protasevich,” which used hyperbolic language in characterizing Belarus as a “terrorist and criminal state.” In another exaggeration, Kureichik claimed Lukashenko had established “open air concentration camps” by “employing military weapons and special equipment against peaceful civilians without restrictions or liability.”

No mention was made of Protasevich’s ties to the Azov battalion in the article, nor about foreign backing of the anti-Lukashenko movement. The latter was confirmed by Russian pranksters Vovan and Lexus, who tricked Nina Ognianova, a National Endowment for Democracy (NED) senior European program officer, into admitting the NED had trained and funded the leaders of the protest movement that was working to overthrow Lukashenko.

These words apply very well to corporate media outlets—and sometimes even to the alternative press—when it comes to their coverage of Belarus, where it is in the things not mentioned that the untruth lies.

Jeremy Kuzmarov is Managing Editor of CovertAction Magazine and author of four books on U.S. foreign policy including, Obama’s Unending Wars (Clarity Press, 2019) and The Russians Are Coming, Again (Monthly Review Press, 2018), with John Marciano.

Armenia, a landlocked Caucasus nation-state of around 3 million people appears in a hopeless position. Following defeat in the 44-day war against Azerbaijan last autumn, the country remains stuck in the Russian geopolitical orbit, and has been forced to make painful concessions to its arch enemy, Azerbaijan.

On June 20, Armenia held parliamentary elections that led to the victory of the Civil Contract Party, whose leader is Acting Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Although he is seen by many Armenians as a traitor, given he failed to preserve Armenian control over Nagorno-Karabakh—a mountainous territory in Azerbaijan that ethnic Armenians have controlled since 1994—Pashinyan’s party won 54 percent of the vote. The opposition Armenia Alliance, led by former President Robert Kocharyan, garnered a distant second with 21 percent. Why did Armenians vote for the person who signed the de facto capitulation to Azerbaijan on November 10?

Choosing Between Traitor and Old Guard

From the perspective of an average Armenian voter, the choice they had was either “traitor” Pashinyan, who came to power in 2018 following the so-called “Velvet Revolution,” or Kocharyan, who represents the overthrown corrupted old guard. 

According to Armenian analyst David Arutyunov, the opposition did not offer any practical alternative for resolving the issues of demarcation, a burning question in the country. Indeed, in May, Armenian authorities accused Azerbaijan’s army of advancing more than 3 kilometres (2 miles) into southern Armenia. They claimed the Azeri state was trying to lay siege on Lake Sev Lich (Black Lake), shared by the two countries. In other words, Armenia had lost control not only over most of Nagorno-Karabakh, but also over certain parts of the Republic of Armenia.

As Arutyunov points out, Azerbaijan likely will keep pressuring Armenia until the end in order to get as many concessions as possible in the process of resolving the border demarcation.

Some Armenian officials have announced Russian border guards will be deployed to those areas where Azerbaijani units allegedly advanced. At this point, however, it is highly uncertain how the border will be protected after demarcation—will the Russian troops permanently stay there, or will Armenia and Azerbaijan continue to guard borders on their own? As a result of the 44-day war, some 2,000 Russian peacekeeping troops were deployed to Nagorno-Karabakh to protect the region’s capital, Stepanakert, and the surrounding area, which is the only portion of the territory that is still de facto under Armenian control. From the Armenian perspective, Russian peacekeepers are seen as the only guardian of the remaining Armenian population in the region. Moreover, Armenia has become so dependent on Moscow, it expects the Kremlin to protect not just ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, but the borders of the Republic of Armenia, too.

Russia’s Responsibility

Russia, on the other hand, is obligated to defend Armenia. The Caucasus country is a member of the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which is often described as a Russian version of NATO, having come into being after the former Soviet Union came apart. Other CSTO members include Belarus, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. However, during the war, Russia refused to provide help to its nominal ally, Armenia. According to Key Article 4 of the Treaty, “If one of the State Parties is subjected to aggression by any state or group of states, this will be considered aggression against all States Parties to this Treaty.” The problem for Armenia is that in 2020, Azerbaijan did not attack Armenia itself, but Armenian-backed forces in Nagorno-Karabakh. That is why Moscow hesitated to directly intervene. But in May 2021, following the border incidents, Pashinyan wrote a letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin, asking for military assistance. To this day, however, no such aid has been provided.

Meanwhile, Azeri President Ilham Aliyev and his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, have signed a protocol of alliance in a bid to further strengthen their ties. “In the event of a third state’s threat to the independence or territorial integrity of any of the parties, the parties will provide necessary assistance to each other,” the protocol stipulates.

Turkey’s Role

Even before the two countries became formal allies, Turkey supplied Azerbaijan with modern, sophisticated weapons, including the Turkish-made Bayraktar drones that proved to be a game changer in the Nagorno-Karabakh War. Russia promises to arm Armenia, although it remains unclear what prevented the Kremlin from selling modern weapons to its ally before the war broke out. Over the years, Russia aimed to preserve good relations with both Azerbaijan and Armenia and at the same time to keep playing the role of the regional arbiter. However, indications suggest the Kremlin prioritized lucrative business and energy ties with Azerbaijan than its nominal alliance with Armenia.

Although the Armenian leadership may have felt because of Moscow’s unwillingness, it hardly has a choice but to keep playing the Russian card. The country depends on Russia economically, politically and militarily.

According to the Moscow-brokered peace deal, signed in November between Pashinyan and Aliyev, Azerbaijan will be able to cross to its exclave Nakhchivan—bordering Armenia, Turkey and Iran—through Armenian territory, and the Russian Federal Security Service will secure roads. Such an action could undermine remnants of Armenia’s sovereignty in the south, primarily in the area bordering Iran.

Azerbaijan, on the other hand, has insisted on the construction of the Nakhchivan corridor, also known as Zangezur Corridor, which would effectively connect the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic with mainland Azerbaijan. Given that Azerbaijan, as the clear victor, has an upper hand to the defeated Armenia, sooner or later Armenia will have to agree to the Azeri terms and conditions regarding this transregional project. Thus, it is not surprising that Pashinyan, celebrating his election victory, said, “All agreements will be fulfilled.” His room for political maneuvers vis-à-vis Azerbaijan is rather limited.

In the short term—at least until 2025, when the 5-year mandate of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh expires—Russia will remain the dominant regional actor. In the mid and long term, Turkey is expected to improve its positions in the Caucasus, and possibly build a military base not far from the Russian border. Azerbaijan already benefited from its military ties with Turkey, while Armenia proved to be collateral damage in a wider geopolitical game played by Russia and Turkey. 

And the game is far from over.

Nikola Mikovic is a Serbia-based contributor to CGTN, Global Comment, Byline Times, Informed Comment, and World Geostrategic Insights, among other publications. He is a geopolitical analyst for KJ Reports and Global Wonks.

The Asian Clean Energy Forum (ACEF) 2021, a meeting of hundreds of civil society organizations and others interested in clean energy policy, was underway on June 15 in Manila, The Philippines, when one session came to a halt.

An Asian-led network of over 250 civil society organizations from around the world called NGO Forum on ADB decided to disengage from a session it was co-hosting alongside the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The session in question was about ADB’s draft energy policy. ADB is a multilateral bank that finances development projects, specifically involving fossil fuel energy across Asia.

“The focus of the ACEF discussions were topics like energy transition and of course these are important,” said Lidy Nacpil, coordinator of the Asian Peoples’ Movement on Debt and Development (APMDD), a member organization of the NGO Forum on ADB. “But we believe their approach to transition is not fast enough and not ambitious enough considering what we need to prevent climate catastrophe.”

In May 2020, the ADB released a draft of its energy policy. Titled “Energy Policy: Supporting Low Carbon Transition in Asia and the Pacific,” the document is a revision of the bank’s 2009 energy policy. The draft signals a shift away from coal financing, but it allows for financing of natural gas projects. And so, given a nod for continued financing of fossil fuel projects in an era of climate change, ADB’s energy policy has been criticized. Whether the bank will actually engage with such criticism though is another question.

“ADB has opened up consultations with civil society groups, but the meetings for these consultations are very brief,” Nacpil said. “There isn’t enough space for dialogue and debate about important passages in the energy draft, like the usage of false solutions like carbon capture and storage.”

Scientists have criticized technologies like carbon capture and storage for being “expensive, energy intensive, risky and unproven.”

The reasons for disengaging from the clean-energy forum included the lack of transparency, inclusivity and meaningful consultation with civil society in the ADB energy-policy review process. For many civil society organizations from across central, southern and southeast Asia, they did not experience anything but a one-sided push aimed at informing rather than engaging with participants.

NGO Forum on ADB added the ADB Sustainable Development and Climate Change Department (SDCC) has not provided any information about the timeline for consultations or the process by which inputs provided by groups like NGO forum on ADB will be taken into account before the draft is finalized.

This reporter sent questions to Bruno Carrasco, director general and chief compliance officer of the ADB SDCC regarding the lack of transparency and a need for Engagement, but received no comment.

Grassroots Voices Left Out

“The name ‘Asian Clean Energy Forum’ is a misnomer. ACEF is neither Asian nor clean,” said Vidya Dinker, national president of the Indian Social Action Forum (INSAF) and coordinator of Growthwatch, a research and advocacy group in India. INSAF is another member of NGO Forum on ADB. “It’s a networking event for ADB to reach out to people who they think will broaden their reach and business.”

In a press briefing held on June 18, Hasan Mehedi from the Coastal Livelihood and Environmental Action Network (CLEAN) Bangladesh, said, “ADB is continuing to finance fossil fuels including Liquified Fossil Gas and Waste to Energy while global scientific communities warn about any further investment for fossil fuels.” But Mehedi said ADB has yet to reach out to the project-affected communities on the ground. “Without consulting the affected communities and local civil society, how can ADB finalize such an important policy which has a direct impact on local communities and on the environment?”

Nacpil noted a need to “overhaul” ADB as an institution. The reasons, she explained, includes “neoliberal paradigm and strategies,” “undemocratic governance system” and the “use of loans as leverage to reshape Asian economies, according to its private sector and market driven growth framework.”

Filipino climate campaigners biked their way to @ADB_HQ in Manila to call on governments and financial institutions to end support for fossil fuels, and undertake urgent climate actions. This action comes in line w/ this year’s #ClimateWeekAP. #FossilFuelFreeAsia @UNFCCC https://t.co/p0ePeNPwTw pic.twitter.com/lEoyx1o5T0

— APMDD (@AsianPeoplesMvt) July 9, 2021

Demands for Loan Cancellation

In a statement submitted as part of the Fossil Free ADB campaign, APMDD said “financing of fossil fuel projects has largely been in the form of loans. In addition to the grave impacts and implications of its fossil fuel financing on people, communities and on the climate, we are also deeply concerned that ADB’s fossil fuel financing has also exacerbated the debt burdens of its member countries. It is only fitting that the ADB Energy Policy Review also address the loans involved in its fossil fuel financing.”

The @ADB_HQ pledges full alignment to the Paris Agreement goals by 2023 to 2025 but its energy policy draft’s still open to financing gas and other harmful projects.#GasIsNotATransitionFuel#StopFinancingFossilFuels#NoToFalseSolutions pic.twitter.com/DFVu6wbo6v

— APMDD (@AsianPeoplesMvt) July 12, 2021

The Fossil Free ADB campaign is aimed at ensuring a “no fossil fuels” ADB energy policy. It is organized by a group of civil society organizations, researchers and activists, including NGO Forum on ADB, Asian Peoples’ Movement on Debt and Development (APMDD), 350.org and the Consortium for Energy, Environment and Demilitarization.

APMDD called on ADB to adopt a policy and take action that will address accountability for impacts of ADB-financed coal projects and ways to ease the debt burden created by ADB lending, especially lending to harmful projects.

“In their draft energy policy, they acknowledge coal projects have been problematic and that’s why we need to shift to clean energy now,” Nacpil explained. “But they are not taking into consideration the economic impacts of the projects they have funded, the kind of financial burden these projects have brought to countries.”

Rayyan Hassan, executive director of NGO Forum on ADB, said that with ADB’s coal ban having yet to be implemented, it is logical to consider calls for decommissioning old plants and the loans associated with them. Examples of such plants include the Masinloc and Visayas thermal power plants in The Philippines, the Tata Mundra coal plant in India, and Jamshoro coal plant in Pakistan.

In response to questions about debt relief, Dr. Yongping Zhai, chief of the energy sector group at ADB said that for ADB, “offering any form of debt relief to any of its borrowing member countries will compromise its preferred creditor status, which underpins ADB’s strong credit ratings. Our strong credit rating is critical for ADB to offer low-cost funding to all borrowing member countries, in support of their development efforts.”

“Yongping Zhai is speaking as a banker, not a development banker who is concerned about member countries’ debt burdens,” Dinker said.

As of now, the draft energy policy does not specify if any debt relief will be provided in relation to fossil fuel projects. It remains to be seen if this undergoes a change as deliberations with civil society groups and activists move ahead. The draft is up for submission to ADB’s board of directors later this year.

Rishika Pardikar is a freelance journalist in Bangalore, India.