Editor’s Note: This video report was produced by African Stream.
Nubians are one of the oldest peoples of the Nile Valley. They are also one of its most recently displaced. Originally from Sudan and southern Egypt, Nubians had settlements going back 7,000 years in this cradle of civilization. That is, until massive, state-driven construction projects came along, forever changing the environment—and their lives.
Foreground: Ahmed Rabee for the Forces for Freedom and Change and Transitional Military Council (TMC) Deputy Chairman Lt. Gen. Mohamed Hamadan ‘Hemeti’ on behalf of the TMC at a signing ceremony at the Corinthia Hotel in Khartoum, Sudan, in July 2019 (credit: SUNA). Background: Protest in Sudan in November 2019 (credit: Abbasher / Wikipedia / photo illustration: Toward Freedom
Editor’s Note: This article was originally published in Borkena.
Since December of 2018, the Republic of Sudan has undergone general strikes, mass demonstrations, the forced removal of longtime former President Omar Hassan al-Bashir and the failed formations of several interim administrations.
Hundreds of people have lost their lives due to the repression carried out by the military and its supporters against protests which have been led by the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) and its Popular Resistance Committees (PRC).
The FFC was spearheaded by the Sudanese Professional Association (SPA) as well as other organizations. Since December 2018, the alliance which came about as a direct result of the overall economic and political crisis in Sudan, has undergone several realignments involving the military leadership and within its own ranks.
After an extended sit-in outside the Ministry of Defense during the early months of 2019, the top military leadership staged a coup against then President al-Bashir vowing to create the conditions for the realization of a democratic dispensation inside the country which had experienced the rule of the National Congress Party (NCP), an entity formed by the military-turned civilian officials of the government that had remained in power since 1989.
However, despite the promise of reforms, the Transitional Military Council (TMC) led by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) attacked thousands of pro-democracy activists in Khartoum on June 3, 2019. It was estimated that at least 100 people died that day as 10,000 well-armed troops used live ammunition, teargas and concussion grenades to clear the demonstrators from in front of the military headquarters and the entire streets of the capital of Khartoum.
After the June 3, 2019 massacre in Khartoum, regional states coordinated by the African Union (AU) feverishly negotiated a truce between the FFC and the TMC. By August 2019, a Sovereign Council was created which outlined a 39-month transitional period where the military would serve as chair of the arrangements for the bulk of this time period which ostensibly would result in multi-party elections.
Nonetheless, the Sovereign Council consisting of FFC members and military leaders was dissolved on October 25, 2021. Interim Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok was placed under house arrest while yet another crackdown on the mass organizations proceeded. Hamdok was briefly brought back into the government after being released from detention. Soon enough, however, Hamdok resigned from the second interim administration accepting his failure to stabilize the political and security situation in Sudan.
Communist Party Announces New Anti-Military Coalition
Just recently in late July, the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), which had resigned from the FFC on November 7, 2020, citing what it perceived to be the indecisiveness of the alliance as it relates to the continued role of the military within society and government, announced the establishment of another alliance. The SCP has categorically rejected any governance role for the Sudanese Armed Forces within a future democratic administration.
Calling itself the Forces for Radical Change (FRC), the SCP-led alliance consists of various mass organizations and trade unions. The FRC is demanding the immediate establishment of a civilian government which would force the military back to its barracks.
A report published by the Middle East Monitor on July 25, stated that: “According to Sudanese media, the new alliance hopes to bring down the coup authorities to implement radical revolutionary change. SCP Political Secretary Mohamed Mokhtar Al-Khatib said that the FRC rejects ‘the military institution’s interference in politics and rejects any partnership with it.’ The alliance statement stressed the need to take decisions related to all ‘deferred issues’ and resolve them during the transitional period. Al-Khatib added that the FFC will not be part of the new alliance because it adopted a social-political approach ‘that caused the destruction of national resources.’ He claimed that the FFC still believes in an agreement with the military component and ruled out the participation of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front because it is cooperating with the military. The SCP leader did not speak about the National Consensus coalition which is seen as part of the coup.”
This new FRC grouping has called for an end to the economic underdevelopment of Sudan, a citizens-based civilian administration along with the acquisition of genuine independence which would discontinue any reliance on foreign imperialist interests. These events represent a further fracturing of those claiming to represent the democratic movement of the people which erupted during December 2018. At present there is the FFC Executive Office, the National Consensus Forces which appears to want a continued role for the military in the administrative structures of the country and the SCP-led Forces for Radical Change (FRC).
Mass Demonstrations for Democracy are Continuing in Sudan
Two large-scale protests were reported during June and July centered around the capital of Khartoum and its twin city of Omdurman. On June 30, four protesters were reportedly killed by the security forces during demonstrations calling for the reversal of the October 25 coup.
Later, on July 17, another demonstration was met with repression by the military and other security forces. Thousands participated in the protest actions prompting the security forces to utilize teargas and other crowd control weapons designed to disperse the crowds. Activists waved Sudanese flags and barricaded major thoroughfares in various locations in the Khartoum and Omdurman areas. Bridges leading to the cities were cordoned off by the military to prevent others from joining the demonstrations.
After the rejection of the October 25 coup, many of the FFC leaders who held positions in the Sovereign Council have expressed their reluctance to reenter another alliance with the military leadership of General al-Burhan. At the same time, the military regime has maintained its agreements with several armed opposition groupings known as the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), an amalgam of rebel organizations based in Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan states. The SRF has sided with the Sudanese military leadership since al-Burhan has pledged to address their grievances during the putative transitional process.
The SRF played a political role in encouraging the October 25 coup by staging a sit-in Khartoum demanding the dissolution of the Sovereign Council. After the coup, the SRF expressed its support for the latest putsch.
Meanwhile, another alliance of 10 Islamist groupings have put forward a proposal for the establishment of a new regime. This alliance dubbed The Broad Islamic Current consists of members of the banned former ruling National Congress Party (NCP), now known as the Islamic Movement and the State of Law and Development Party of Mohamed Ali al-Jazouli, who is a supporter of the Islamic State (IS) recently released from prison. At the founding of the Broad Islamic Current, supporters chanted slogans against the left organizations and coalitions in Sudan while expressing support for the October 25 coup and the military leadership.
Interestingly enough, the Broad Islamic Current does not include the Popular Congress Party (PCP) in its alliance. The PCP is one of the largest Islamist parties in Sudan founded by Hassan al-Turabi. The PCP grew out of a split between al-Turabi and former NCP leader and President al-Bashir in 1999. The Broad Islamic Current is seeking to take advantage of the political climate which emerged in the aftermath of the October 25 coup.
General al-Burhan delivered an address on July 4 calling once again for dialogue among all political groupings inside the country. He also commented on the role of the military in Sudan even after the holding of democratic elections. The military leader proposed what he called a “Supreme Council of the Armed Forces” which would have an undefined role in the economic and political structures within the country.
The FFC along with the FRC are saying publicly that they are not interested in further talks with the military regime. Noting that all other previous agreements between the FFC and the TMC have been broken by the military and its allies within the now reconfigured Sovereign Council, which is staffed by former rebel leaders, supporters of the rule by the armed forces and Islamist groupings which were formally associated with the government of ousted President al-Bashir.
Political analyst Osman Mirghani wrote during early July in the Sudan Tribune noting: “Simply rejecting al-Burhan speech will be a continuation of the reactive approach that has enabled the military component to always be one step ahead of the civilian forces. If these forces overcome their differences and set a clear charter, they could turn the tables by agreeing on a civilian government that would close the way for any other attempts to obstruct the transitional period and be the starting point for full civil rule after the failure of the partnership formula.”
Obviously, greater unity among the democratic forces would be a tremendous step forward in the process of genuinely transforming Sudan into a people’s state. Nonetheless, without the purging and dismantling of the military apparatus, which is supported tacitly by the United States, the State of Israel and the Gulf monarchies, any transitional process to a just and humane society will remain elusive.
Abayomi Azikiwe is the editor of Pan-African News Wire, an international electronic press service designed to foster intelligent discussion on the affairs of African people throughout the continent and the world.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees staff with refugees from Sudan in Chad / credit: UNHCR/Colin Delfosse
Over 700,000 people have been internally displaced in Sudan since April 15, when an armed conflict began between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), according to the UN’s International Organization for Migration (IOM).
The IOM spokesperson, Paul Dillon, said at a press briefing in Geneva on May 9 that the number has doubled in the prior week after IOM had previously estimated on May 3 that 334,053 had been displaced, 72 percent of them in West Darfur and South Darfur States.
In the states of South Darfur, North Darfur, and Central Darfur, clashes between the SAF and RAF began soon after they started fighting in Khartoum, killing many civilians, as Mohammed Alamaldin, a civil society activist from West Darfur’s capital Genena, told Peoples Dispatch.
However, in his own state, community members—including youth, women, and elders—had managed to secure a local agreement between SAF and RSF “to wait until the winner is determined in Khartoum.”
The locally negotiated truce lasted for a little over a week before forces clashed on April 24. Amid the ensuing insecurity, the armed conflict between West Darfur’s ethnic militias escalated, killing over 250 and wounding 300 civilians between April 27 and May 3, according to Alamaldin. On May 12 and May 13 alone, 280 were killed and over 160 were injured.
Vian Ramo, a 30-year-old Yazidi, stands in the camp for displaced people in Duhok in Iraqi Kurdistan. She, along with her husband and children, have been displaced since ISIS drove them out of their hometown of Sinjar in 2014 / credit: Alessandra Bajec
DUHOK, Iraqi Kurdistan—On a warm afternoon, 30-year-old Vian Ramo walked along an unpaved road inside an informal housing settlement in Sharya, a town in the Duhok province. Wearing a denim shirt, black T-shirt and pants, alongwith a little smile on her face, her wide-open hazel eyes had her looking alert and slightly disoriented.
She has been displaced with her husband and two children, ages 6 and 9, ever since 2014. That is when the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) seized Sinjar, a town inside a district of the same name that is home to the ethno-religious Yazidi minority group in northern Iraq. That forced 300,000 Yazidis to flee their homes en masse, facing genocide from the extremist group.
“That night, our neighbors suddenly woke us up saying ‘They [ISIS] are coming to attack us,’” the 30-year-old recounted to Toward Freedom about the day when the group invaded their town after capturing Mosul just two months prior. “I saw many dead bodies then. ISIS forces were in front of us. We left everything behind, jumped in our car and escaped.”
After driving toward the Syrian border in an attempt to take refuge, the four family members ran into unidentified militants who opened fire, pushing them back. Then their car got a flat tire, prompting them to walk to the mountains, north of Sinjar. They stayed for five days without food, water and adequate clothing.
From there, they made another escape through a safe corridor opened by fighters of the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the Syrian Kurdish forces and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters. One neighbor gave them a ride in his sport-utility vehicle into Syria to then re-enter Iraq and seek safety in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) in the north.
“It’s very difficult for us seeing our people driven out once more,” Ramo sighed, referring to the recent wave of displacement caused by fighting in Sinjar. “It takes us back to those dark, unsettling days.”
In August 2014, the Islamic State swept through northern Iraq, launching a genocidal campaign involving murder, abduction, rape and enslavement, resulting in some 300,000 Yazidis being displaced from their heartland of Sinjar, which spans 2,928 square kilometers (1,131 square miles) in northern Iraq. ISIS considers Yazidis to be apostates—or those who had renounced or abandoned a religion—for following a faith that is similar to Zoroastrianism, a monotheistic religion that originated in Iran.
Yazidis are an ethno-religious community indigenous to Kurdistan, which includes parts of Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran. They have settled predominantly in northern Iraq. Many Yazidis claim they are a religious sub-group of the Kurds, while others reject the Kurdish identity, identifying themselves as a separate ethno-religious group. Yazidis have endured persecution at the hands of Arabs, Persians, Turks and Sunni Kurds for their often-misinterpreted beliefs. Though their original language is related to the Iranic language of Kurdish, many also speak Arabic, given their proximity to Arab neighborhoods and Ba’athist Arabization campaigns. They share a strong connection to their lands in northern Iraq, especially around their main temple in Lalish, the holiest site of the Yazidi faith.
A housing complex in the Iraqi Kurdistan settlement of Sharya, where Yazidi people displaced from Sinjar live / credit: Alessandra Bajec
‘When You Have Nothing, You Always Think About Tomorrow’
After staying early on in different unfinished buildings in the Duhok area, Ramo now lives with her family in a one-room concrete house they rent in an informal settlement in Sharya. The structure originally contained no kitchen and the bathroom is outside. The family created a kitchen inside the house using a lightweight panel as a ceiling. Her husband doesn’t have a degree and works as a day laborer. She had never graduated because they fled Sinjar when she was still in high school. That keeps her from finding work, too.
Being on a low, unstable income—and having both kids in school—makes it hard for the couple to make ends meet.
Sometimes, they don’t have enough food to feed their children. Occasionally, they had borrowed money from their neighbors to buy proper clothes for the two and paid them back when they were able.
“We’re barely coping. All Yazidis here suffer from poverty,” the longtime displaced woman complained. “When you have nothing, you always think about tomorrow and how you’re going to pay the rent and bills.” She wishes one day she can resume and finish her studies, then do a degree in nursing or pharmacy and find a secure job.
On the other hand, going back to Sinjar is not an option for Ramo right now.
“ISIS bombed our home—we don’t have a place to stay there,” she said. “If there was reconstruction and security, it would be okay for us to return.”
Then she added without hesitation, her voice sinking low, “There’s no sign that Sinjar will be safe any time soon.”
Fighters of the Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS) in 2017 / credit: Flickr
Thousands Displaced Amid Years of Fighting
Heavy clashes occurred May 2 and May 3 in Sinjar between the Iraqi army and the Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS) forces as well as Ezidxane Security Forces in the Sinune sub-district of Sinjar over their ties with PKK. That escalation led to a displacement of more than 10,000 people from the district, this being the second or third time they have been pushed out of their homes. In total, 300,000 Yazidi IDPs have fled to Iraqi Kurdistan since 2014.
Since May 2, dozens of people in the Sinjar district have held demonstrations, demanding both an end to the fighting and for armed groups to evacuate towns, as the unstable security situation in the area prevents families from returning to their homeland.
Two-thirds of Sinjar’s population have been stuck in limbo, many of them reluctant to return from camps in KRI, even after ISIS was defeated. Meanwhile, others have gone back in recent years, despite the security risks and challenges they are confronted with at home, such as damaged infrastructure, minimal services, limited livelihood opportunities and little government support.
Amid the chaos, a group of Yazidi women can be found learning skills at the Enterprise & Training Center (ETC) run by the Free Yezidi Foundation (FYF)—a non-profit, humanitarian civil-society organization—in Khanke town, near Duhok. The center mainly teaches crafts, artisan textile production, carpet weaving, and baking skills, along with basic business management and business mathematics. About 100 Yezidi women are trained each year in baking, for instance.
Sitting among the women was Amira Salah, who had just taken part in a knitting session. The 34-year-old came forward quietly, dressed in black pants along with a blue blouse dotted with pink polka dots. She limped with a limb disabled since birth to a different room at the other end of the building.
She and her family are among the thousands of Yazidis who were pushed out of their place of origin in 2014. Their apartment building in Sinjar was destroyed during the ISIS invasion.
“Our home is in ruins until now,” the young woman uttered, lowering her head and skipping instead to recount about her arrival in Khanke, making it obvious to this reporter she was not keen to talk about the ordeal she and her loved ones experienced when the Islamic State attacked the area of Sinjar.
After taking shelter in different places around Khanke, Salah has lived with her mother and two sisters in Khanke camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) for the last three years.
Like in all camps, living conditions in Khanke are dire. Water supply is inadequate, running every two or three days. Power outages are common, with IDPs staying without electricity for one, two or three days in a row. Dwelling in a 4-meter by 2-meter (13-foot by 6.5-foot) nylon tent, the family is exposed to extreme temperatures in summer as well as in winter.
Only primary healthcare is provided, so the 34-year-old—who has difficulty walking—must find medical assistance outside the camp, which can be unaffordable. “I have to travel to Duhok to get better service and for regular checkups,” she said. “The same goes for one of my sisters who has a speech impairment and my mum who suffers stomach-related issues.”
Managing such a precarious situation for an extended period has been proving for the family of four. “We, Yazidi people, have been helping each other because nobody has helped us during all this time,” Salah emphasized.
Illiterate and unable to access basic education at her age, she recently completed a knitting course at FYF’s training center. From time to time, she now takes home a small amount from selling knitted toys and animals, just to contribute to her family. She is looking for any kind of work she can do to help out more. Her youngest sister, 25, working as a nurse, is the only one at home who has a regular job, earning around $400 a month.
At the moment, Salah ruled out the possibility of returning to her hometown. “I don’t expect Sinjar to be rebuilt, so that people can go back,” she said. Then, without hesitation, she wished aloud, “If only security was restored… at least!”
Then Salah concluded in a gloomy tone, “Sinjar is in such a state that makes you want to stay here.”
A map showing Iraqi Kurdistan / credit: The Crisis Group
Post-ISIS, Return and Reconstruction In Limbo
Eight years after the brutal rule of ISIS, much of Sinjar remains in rubble. It lacks schools and hospitals, infrastructure, and other basic services. Thus, jobs are nowhere to be found.
The town lies in disputed mountainous lands in northwestern Iraq between the jurisdictions of the central Iraqi government and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). Sinjar’s security situation remains complex due to the presence of different competing armed groups, including the Iraqi military, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the local YBS force and Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).
Although the federal government and the KRG signed an agreement in October 2020 to preserve security in Sinjar—with Iraqi forces working in coordination with KRG forces—little progress has been made toward implementing it. Moreover, members of the Yazidi community criticized the deal for not including their input.
On top of it, Turkey frequently conducts ground and air offensives in Sinjar against alleged locations of the PKK, which Ankara has labeled a terrorist organization for claiming it has a right to inhabit the southeast portion of Turkey. A U.S. State Department report published early this month stated the presence of PKK-affiliated armed forces—as well as Turkish airstrikes—prevents Yazidi IDPs from going back to the affected areas.
An International Crisis Group report released at the end of May showed the Sinjar agreement has failed to stabilize the area, and that leaving the situation as it is will attract more violence and displacement.
In a meeting with representatives from Sinjar town, a week after May’s confrontations, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi said the Sinjar agreement should be implemented. The premier also called on relevant authorities to accelerate the completion of procedures for establishing the Sinjar Reconstruction Fund.
Despite Iraqi forces and the YBS group reaching a ceasefire in early May, Yazidis fear fighting could resume at any time unless a radical solution is found to bring security to the contested district.
A local official affiliated with the KRG declined to discuss the situation of Sinjar after several attempts, and a spokesperson for the Joint Operations Command from the Iraqi Ministry of Defense could not be reached for comment.
Zaid Hamu, 33, displaced from Sinjar since 2014, at a garage in Khanke in Iraqi Kurdistan / credit: Alessandra Bajec
‘Camp Life Is Miserable’
Hewan Omer, FYF Country Director in Iraq, pointed out lack of safety is the most crucial deterrent against the return of Sinjaris. “There is no governmental entity that locals can rely on. Only militias fighting against each other. People don’t feel safe in Sinjar,” she told Toward Freedom, adding that, because of the ongoing insecurity, many in the community cannot find some reassurance that a genocide will not be repeated.
Hinting at non-functional public water and electrical networks, the country director expressed disappointment about the government inaction in the area, which has hindered Yazidis from rebuilding their lives after years of tragedy, destruction and insecurity.
“We haven’t seen any tangible steps taken to improve security or restore basic services, to incentivize the return of displaced families,” she said.
Khalida Nawaf, ETC’s manager at FYF in Khanke, implied widespread concern exists among Yazidis that the underlying cycle of violence may produce some terrible events again. “None of us can forget that black day when ISIS assaulted Sinjar,” she told Toward Freedom. “Nothing’s been done on the ground, Sinjar is unsafe. We fear another August 3, 2014, could happen.”
Nawaf estimated about 80 percent of Sinjaris have mental health issues as a result of the violence they experienced.
A prominent Yezidi civil-society organization, FYF provides humanitarian support to Yazidi civilians, with a special focus on trauma recovery and psychological services, economic empowerment, community reintegration, and education.
Nawaf noted that both the KRG and the government in Baghdad should coordinate efforts to provide security in the area, proceed with the reconstruction of civilian houses and infrastructure, increase educational establishments, and ensure public services operate normally.
Hanging out in front of a garage in Khanke was Zaid Hamu, 33. He donned a white T-shirt and black trousers, along with a baseball cap.
With his spouse and four kids—between the ages of 18 months and 10 years—the Yazidi man continues to live in displacement after they ran from the ISIS aggression in 2014. “It’s been so long. Eight years!” he exclaimed, talking to Toward Freedom. Then the conversation turned to his fellow Sinjaris, who crossed into Kurdistan last month in the wake of fresh clashes. “Things are going from bad to worse.”
At the time he and his family fled their home in Sinjar, most villagers left in the early morning. He recounted they headed on foot to the southern side of the mountains. They spent nine days there until a corridor was cleared for the evacuation of Yazidi civilians into Syria, enabling them to reach the neighboring Kurdish region and settle in the Khanke IDP camp.
“Our house is still there, but looks like an empty wreck,” the young man said in a bitter tone. “ISIS fighters ransacked it and took everything.”
Like many Yazidis, Hamu is displaced in his own country. A former interpreter for an NGO, he is currently jobless while his wife takes care of the children, meaning no income whatsoever.
“Camp life is miserable,” he uttered. IDPs deal with unbearably hot summers and freezing winters inside tented dwellings. A consistent supply of water and electricity can’t be counted on. The father of four also criticized the quality of education, saying the school where his kids are enrolled is ill-equipped, with overcrowded classrooms. Rotational learning restricts pupils to only attend three days a week.
Then again, restarting his life in Sinjar is unthinkable. “It’s not safe there. There aren’t even the most basic services,” the 33-year-old decried. He held the Iraqi government responsible for doing nothing to secure the area or incentivize the return of displaced Yazidi to their native land.
Looking to seek asylum, he hopes to see himself in any other country. “Nothing holds me here. I’ve had enough,” Hamu said, his face appearing worn out. “I want a better future for my family.”
Map of the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI) / credit: ResearchGate
Harsh Living Conditions in Camps
An estimated 300,000 Yazidis remain displaced in Iraq’s Kurdistan region. According to the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) in Iraq, fewer than 136,000 individuals are scattered across 15 IDP camps in the governorates (provinces) of Duhok and Nineveh, while another 195,000 live independently in the area.
Inside camps, the majority still live in tents, which makes them vulnerable to harsh weather conditions and fire hazards. They often have little to no access to running water, electricity, heating and sanitation.
Minimal health services are provided, while non-basic medical treatment only is available a few miles away in Duhok. However, many are unable to cover transportation costs to get there.
Schools in IDP camps typically suffer from overcrowding, a lack of basic facilities and qualified teaching staff, which means many schools have to run multiple shifts. Understaffing is supplemented by untrained community members, working as volunteers or for a small stipend, further compromising educational standards.
IDPs rely on the minimum food assistance provided by the KRG and humanitarian organizations. The World Food Program (WFP) distributes food aid in the form of monthly food baskets or cash transfers ranging between 10,000-20,000 Iraqi dinar per month (USD $7 to $14) for each person. However, because of funding gaps, the impact of climate change on global food production, and inflation’s impact on food prices, WFP has stopped financial assistance to all displaced people starting this month. That is, except for in the case of families that can demonstrate their poverty.
For the majority of IDPs who reside outside camps in informal settlements and in urban areas, humanitarian assistance is even less available. They face difficulties in accessing employment that would enable them to meet their basic costs of living, and many can only find casual work, putting large numbers at risk of eviction and/or forcing them to relocate to IDP camps, according to the UNHCR.
FYF’s Omer explained that low education levels, missing documentation, and lack of work experience in sectors other than construction and agriculture limit their prospects. IDPs generally operate fruit and vegetable shops, work on construction sites, or do seasonal farm work for a wage of 7,000 Iraqi dinar (USD $4.8) per day.
View around the town center of Shingal in Sinjar in the summer of 2019 / credit: Levi Clancy / Wikipedia
Obstacles to Returning Home
Throughout the ISIS occupation, 80 percent of public infrastructure and 70 percent of civilian homes in Sinjar were destroyed, according to a report by the UNHCR and REACH, a nonprofit organization that analyzes data on crises, disasters, and displacement.
Last year, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) provided cash assistance to 1,400 families to facilitate the return process.
Beyond that, international organizations have done little to help communities return, whether by repairing basic infrastructure, supporting the local government to ensure provision of essential services, or assisting families in finding sustainable solutions to live in better conditions.
A recent Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) report found ongoing challenges in accessing housing, land and property rights. Damaged infrastructure, lack of habitable housing, insecurity, and property disputes inhibit displaced families’ return and increase social tensions in Sinjar.
According to the study, 64 percent of IDPs from Sinjar claimed their homes were heavily damaged. For 70 percent, lack of housing and rent increases are the primary source of social conflict among those who have returned. The study relayed 92 percent of returnees reported continued access to their property. In contrast, 99 percent of those who applied for government compensation have not received any funding for damaged property.
NRC urged Baghdad and the KRG to prioritize the rehabilitation of infrastructure and the restoration of services to allow for safe housing, land, and property, alongside public infrastructure. It also called on international development donors to invest in strengthening access to housing, land and property rights to support families in finding solutions for a life back in Sinjar.
“As long as no concrete action is taken in their place of origin, and the situation gets better, most displaced Yazidis are bound to stay here,” FYF’s Omer said, exhaling deeply.
Alessandra Bajec is a freelance journalist specializing in West Asia and North Africa. Between 2010 and 2011, she lived in Palestine. Then she was based in Cairo from 2013 to 2017. Since 2018, Bajec has lived in Tunis.