Fergie Chambers, TF Contributor in Ukraine, and ‘Texas’ Bentley Report from Donbass Frontlines

Editor’s Note: This analysis was produced by Globetrotter.

On January 21, 2022, Vice Admiral Kay-Achim Schönbach attended a talk in New Delhi, India, organized by the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses. Schönbach was speaking as the chief of Germany’s navy during his visit to the institute. “What he really wants is respect,” Schönbach said, referring to Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. “And my god, giving someone respect is low cost, even no cost.” Furthermore, Schönbach said that in his opinion, “It is easy to even give him the respect he really demands and probably also deserves.”

The next day, on January 22, Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba summoned Germany’s ambassador to Ukraine, Anka Feldhusen, to Kyiv and “expressed deep disappointment” regarding the lack of German weapons provided to Ukraine and also about Schönbach’s comments in New Delhi. Vice Admiral Schönbach released a statement soon after, saying, “I have just asked the Federal Minister of Defense [Christine Lambrecht] to release me from my duties and responsibilities as inspector of the navy with immediate effect.” Lambrecht did not wait long to accept the resignation.

Why was Vice Admiral Schönbach sacked? Because he said two things that are unacceptable in the West: First, that “the Crimean Peninsula is gone and never [coming] back” to Ukraine and, second, that Putin should be treated with respect. The Schönbach affair is a vivid illustration of the problem that confronts the West currently, where Russian behavior is routinely described as “aggression” and where the idea of giving “respect” to Russia is disparaged.

Aggression

U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration began to use the word “imminent” to describe a potential Russian invasion of Ukraine toward the end of January. On January 18, White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki did not use the word “imminent,” but implied it with her comment: “Our view is this is an extremely dangerous situation. We’re now at a stage where Russia could at any point launch an attack in Ukraine.” On January 25, Psaki, while referring to the possible timeline for a Russian invasion, said, “I think when we said it was imminent, it remains imminent.” Two days later, on January 27, when she was asked about her use of the word “imminent” with regard to the invasion, Psaki said, “Our assessment has not changed since that point.”

On January 17, as the idea of an “imminent” Russian “invasion” escalated in Washington, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov rebuked the suggestion of “the so-called Russian invasion of Ukraine.” Three days later, on January 20, spokeswoman for Russia’s Foreign Ministry Maria Zakharova denied that Russia would invade Ukraine, but said that the talk of such an invasion allowed the West to intervene militarily in Ukraine and threaten Russia.

Even a modicum of historical memory could have improved the debate about Russian military intervention in Ukraine. In the aftermath of the Georgian-Russian conflict in 2008, the European Union’s Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, headed by Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini, found that the information war in the lead-up to the conflict was inaccurate and inflammatory. Contrary to Georgian-Western statements, Tagliavini said, “[T]here was no massive Russian military invasion underway, which had to be stopped by Georgian military forces shelling Tskhinvali.” The idea of Russian “aggression” that has been mentioned in recent months, while referring to the possibility of Russia invading Ukraine, replicates the tone that preceded the conflict between Georgia and Russia, which was another dispute about old Soviet borders that should have been handled diplomatically.

Western politicians and media outlets have used the fact that 100,000 Russian troops have been stationed on Ukraine’s border as a sign of “aggression.” The number—100,000—sounds threatening, but it has been taken out of context. To invade Iraq in 1991, the United States and its allies amassed more than 700,000 troops as well as the entire ensemble of U.S. war technology located in its nearby bases and on its ships. Iraq had no allies and a military force depleted by the decade-long war of attrition against Iran. Ukraine’s army—regular and reserve—number about 500,000 troops (backed by the 1.5 million troops in NATO countries). With more than a million soldiers in uniform, Russia could have deployed many more troops at the Ukrainian border and would need to have done so for a full-scale invasion of a NATO partner country.

Respect

The word “respect” used by Vice Admiral Schönbach is key to the discussion regarding the emergence of both Russia and China as world powers. The conflict is not merely about Ukraine, just as the conflict in the South China Sea is not merely about Taiwan. The real conflict is about whether the West will allow both Russia and China to define policies that extend beyond their borders.

Russia, for instance, was not seen as a threat or as aggressive when it was in a less powerful position in comparison to the West after the collapse of the USSR. During the tenure of Russian President Boris Yeltsin (1991-1999), the Russian government encouraged the looting of the country by oligarchs—many of whom now reside in the West—and defined its own foreign policy based on the objectives of the United States. In 1994, “Russia became the first country to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace,” and that same year, Russia began a three-year process of joining the Group of Seven, which in 1997 expanded into the Group of Eight. Putin became president of Russia in 2000, inheriting a vastly depleted country, and promised to build it up so that Russia could realize its full potential.

In the aftermath of the collapse of the Western credit markets in 2007-2008, Putin began to speak about the new buoyancy in Russia. In 2015, I met a Russian diplomat in Beirut, who explained to me that Russia worried that various Western-backed maneuvers threatened Russia’s access to its two warm-water ports—in Sevastopol, Crimea, and in Tartus, Syria; it was in reaction to these provocations, he said, that Russia acted in both Crimea (2014) and Syria (2015).

The United States made it clear during the administration of President Barack Obama that both Russia and China must stay within their borders and know their place in the world order. An aggressive policy of NATO expansion into Eastern Europe and of the creation of the Quad (Australia, India, Japan and the United States) drew Russia and China into a security alliance that has only strengthened over time. Both Putin and China’s President Xi Jinping recently agreed that NATO’s expansion eastward and Taiwan’s independence were not acceptable to them. China and Russia see the West’s actions in both Eastern Europe and Taiwan as provocations by the West against the ambitions of these Eurasian powers.

That same Russian diplomat to whom I spoke in Beirut in 2015 said something to me that remains pertinent: “When the U.S. illegally invaded Iraq, none of the Western press called it ‘aggression.’”

Vijay Prashad is an Indian historian, editor and journalist. He is a writing fellow and chief correspondent at Globetrotter. He is the chief editor of LeftWord Books and the director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research. He is a senior non-resident fellow at Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China. He has written more than 20 books, including The Darker Nations and The Poorer Nations. His latest book is Washington Bullets, with an introduction by Evo Morales Ayma.

Editor’s Note: The following is the writer’s analysis.

The United States has been accusing Russia of preparing to invade Ukraine, while it continues to build a U.S. military presence in the Black Sea. Warmongering and fearmongering rhetoric began to dominate the public discourse, as media, politicians and military experts have been warning of an “imminent” Russian invasion that could have grave consequences for global peace and security. But does the Kremlin really intend to fight a war against the NATO-backed eastern European country?

According to reports, Moscow has deployed thousands of troops and military equipment to western Russia’s regions that border Ukraine. At the same time, U.S. navy ships Mount Whitney and Arleigh Burke recently entered the Black Sea, while the 9th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron’s B-1B Lancers soared over eastern Europe during a NATO fighter integration mission through the region.

Moreover, a Russian Aeroflot airliner flying from Tel Aviv to Moscow was forced to change altitude over the Black Sea because a NATO CL-600 reconnaissance plane crossed its designated flight path. These actions would be the equivalent of Russian naval ships and fighter jets entering the Gulf of Mexico. 

As usual, though, the Kremlin’s reaction was weak.

“Just because an air incident over the Black Sea’s international waters has been prevented, this does not mean the U.S. and NATO can further put lives at risk with impunity,” said Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said.

❗️ Maria #Zakharova: @usairforce actions have posed risks to civil aviation.

Just because an air incident over the Black Sea’s Int waters has been prevented, this does not mean the US and NATO can further put people’s lives at #risk with impunity.

🔗 https://t.co/mHgrPfSV9f pic.twitter.com/wKBBlPViVk

— MFA Russia 🇷🇺 (@mfa_russia) December 5, 2021

However, such a statement is unlikely to provoke fear in NATO’s headquarters. 

Crossing Russia’s Red Line

Russian President Vladimir Putin has pointed out the deployment of certain offensive missile capabilities on Ukrainian soil is Moscow’s “red line.”

Yet, the United States has demonstrated it does not take Russia’s threats and boundaries seriously.  

“I don’t accept anybody’s red lines,” U.S. President Joe Biden said on December 4. 

The two leaders then held a “virtual summit” on December 7. Shortly after their discussion, the U.S. Congress removed sanctions against Nord Stream 2, Russian sovereign debt and 35 Russians from the draft defense budget. Such actions demonstrate the two leaders have reached certain deals not only on Ukraine, but on energy issues as well. However, tensions between Moscow and Washington, which seem to be an integral part of a new Cold War era, are expected to remain high for the foreseeable future.

What’s the Possibility of War?

Ahead of the talks between Putin and Biden, the Russian leader clarified his call for new security guarantees.

Putin said Russia would seek “concrete agreements that would rule out any further eastward expansion of NATO and the deployment of weapons systems posing a threat to Russia.” Even if the United States provides such guarantees—which does not seem very probable given that such a move would be interpreted as a concession to Putin and a sign of weakness—it is not probable Washington would implement the deal.

U.S. officials already have declined to rule out dispatching U.S. forces to eastern Europe, although at this point it is highly uncertain if the U.S. troops could be deployed to Ukraine. Ukraine’s Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov has called on the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom to dispatch their military personnel to the former Soviet republic, even though the eastern European nation is not part of NATO.

“Those troops should be stationed in places where Russia can see them,” Reznikov stressed. Meanwhile, Denis Pushilin, leader of the Russia-backed self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic that declared independence from Ukraine in 2014, said he would request Russia’s assistance in case the situation in the region escalates.

Indeed, a potential deployment of NATO troops in Ukraine would prevent a Russian intervention, given Moscow would be unlikely to confront NATO troops. Russia’s policy makers are quite aware any incursion into Ukrainian territory would result in severe anti-Russia sanctions, which could potentially include actions against Russian oligarchs and energy producers, as well as disconnect Russia from the SWIFT international payment system used by banks around the world. On the other hand, given the United States has the upper hand vis-à-vis Moscow, it is entirely possible some sanctions will be imposed, even if Russia does not invade Ukraine. The West also can deploy troops to Ukraine to prevent what they would call a potential Russian invasion, and there is very little the Kremlin can do about it.

Hypothetically, Russia could recognize the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic and Lugansk People’s Republic, and build military bases on their territories, but such a move is unlikely to have an impact on Ukraine’s goal to restore sovereignty over the coal-rich region. From the legal perspective, the Donbass, as well as Crimea, is part of Ukraine, and no foreign actors would condemn Ukrainian attempts to return the regions under its jurisdiction. Still, unless its gets the green light from Washington, Kiev is unlikely to launch any large-scale military actions against Russia, or Russia-backed forces. Moscow, for its part, is expected to continue preserving the status quo. Supporters of the notion that Russia is keen on invading Ukraine fail to explain what the Kremlin’s motive for such an action would be.

Energy Deals

However, Moscow achieved its goals in 2014 when it incorporated Crimea, which has significant offshore gas and oil reserves into the Russian Federation. That year Russia tacitly supported the creation of the Donbass republics that reportedly have 34.4 billion tons of coal reserves. Since Moscow, through its proxies, already controls the Donbass coal production and export, capturing the other energy-poor regions of Ukraine would represent nothing but an additional cost for Russia.

Nonetheless, Western and Ukrainian media continue to spread rumors of an “imminent” Russian invasion. Ukrainian military officials claim Russia could start its campaign against the former Soviet republic in February—in the middle of winter when troops are up to their knees in snow. Meanwhile, Oleksiy Arestovych, the head of the Office of the Ukrainian President, recently suggested his country could “fire missiles at the Russian Federation, in case the Kremlin starts a full-scale war against Ukraine.”

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, on the other hand, openly said in case of a potential conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Minsk will support its ally, Moscow. At the same time, Belarus announced joint military exercises with Russia along its border with Ukraine. Plus, Lukashenko promised to visit Crimea soon, which would be Belarus’ de facto recognition of the Kremlin’s incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation.

His visit, whenever it comes, undoubtedly will have a serious impact on relations between Belarus and Ukraine. Kiev fears Belarus could take part in what they perceive would be a Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the country’s authorities have taken Lukashenko’s threat very seriously. According to reports, citizens of Ukraine already started preparing to defend the Ukrainian capital against an invasion, whether it may come from Russia or Belarus.

One thing is for sure: Unless Kiev starts a massive military campaign in the Donbass, or engages in a serious provocation against Russia, the Kremlin is unlikely to start a war against Ukraine. And even if a war breaks out, Russia’s actions are expected to be very calculated, limited and carefully coordinated with its Western partners, as part of moves toward a “stable and more predictable relationship” between Moscow and Washington.

Nikola Mikovic is a Serbia-based contributor to CGTN, Global Comment, Byline Times, Informed Comment, and World Geostrategic Insights, among other publications. He is a geopolitical analyst for KJ Reports and Enquire.

In an emergency United Nations Security Council meeting held on August 16, following the Taliban’s seizure of Kabul, Nebenzia Vassily Alekseevich—the Russian representative—said the main players and wider international community must pool their efforts to help Afghanistan achieve national reconciliation. He pointed to the important role played by his own country, and by China and Pakistan, as well as the potential contribution of Iran.

Alekseevich’s stress on regional cooperation is important. It echoes past attempts to solve the Afghan problem in a peaceful manner. From 1996 to 2000, Central Asia had witnessed the fomentation of Islamic radicalism in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, with the Taliban taking full control of Afghanistan. The free flow of weapons and drug trafficking worsened this murky state of affairs. Russia remained concerned about the formation of inter-jihadist linkages between the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT), which aimed to topple the regime of Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan. China experienced internal turmoil in the Xinjiang region—bordering Afghanistan—which witnessed ethnic extremism and anti-government violence; Islamic separatists were using arms smuggled from abroad.

 

Closer Eurasian Ties

In the turbulent context Asia faced in the late 1990s, regional states formed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). SCO is the largest grouping in the world in terms of geographical coverage and population, with its territory spanning three-fifths of the Eurasian landmass and nearly half of the human population, encompassing China, Russia, Pakistan, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Afghanistan, Belarus, and Mongolia subsequently participated as observer states.

In July 2001, the SCO stated that the “cradle of terrorism, separatism and extremism is the instability in Afghanistan.” Member nations agreed to work together to contain the Taliban and the various political Islamists in the area. The process would be protracted, but potentially effective. None of the countries wished the consolidation and expansion of the Taliban; their national interests hung in the balance. Further, they commanded sway over a country whose only benefactor was a Pakistan deeply wedded to China.

 

The U.S. Invasion’s Impact

The 9/11 attacks and the subsequent U.S. invasion of Afghanistan shifted the needle of the regional compass toward the United States; China, Russia, and the SCO were pushed aside. All of the Central Asian states—except Turkmenistan—signed military cooperation and base access agreements with the United States; the Central Asian states saw the security and economic benefits of the sudden U.S. engagement with the region as a bonanza.

While both Moscow and Beijing endorsed the U.S.-led invasion in Afghanistan, an important precondition for the support was the understanding that U.S. and NATO bases in Central Asia would be short-term. With the prolonged stay, the countries developed an increasingly mutual irritation toward Washington. To neutralize Western influence, they attempted to revive the SCO process.

At the SCO foreign ministers’ meeting in Beijing on January 7, 2002, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers put forward proposals to improve the organization’s anti-terrorism and security capabilities, maintaining the group should assume responsibility for regional security. These plans fell on deaf ears as Central Asian states were busy welcoming the U.S. empire.

In 2005, however, the SCO called for the United States to withdraw from bases in Central Asia. The statement read:

“Considering that the active phase of the military anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan has finished, member states… consider it essential that the relevant participants in the anti-terrorist coalition set deadlines for the temporary use [of military bases in the region].”

This was the first indication that the military directives of Western powers would not unilaterally dictate the regional Afghan strategy. Afghanistan soon signed a protocol establishing the SCO-Afghanistan contact group. In 2012, Afghanistan became an observer in the SCO. Three years later, Kabul endorsed the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RAT) of the SCO, later applying for full membership in the group. These arrangements have continued to this day, providing an alternative to belligerent tactics. On July 14, 2021, the Contact Group met in Tajikistan’s capital of Dushanbe where, inter alia, it was demanded that Taliban pledge a clean break with terrorist outfits.

 

What’s at Stake for China and Russia?

Regional agendas for Afghanistan will likely be sustained because the SCO heavyweights—China and Russia—continue to have a stake in the happenings of Kabul. Moscow is worried about a) the emboldenment effect that Taliban’s battlefield victory would have for its historically explosive Muslim regions; and b) the possible relocation of U.S. troops to the countries neighboring Afghanistan, which would weaken the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in Central Asia.

Beijing is anxious that religious militancy in Afghanistan will fuel a domestic Islamist insurgency by invigorating the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)—an ethnic Uighur extremist group responsible for past terror attacks in China and which seeks to transform Xinjiang region into an independent Islamic state. This could negatively affect China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative, also known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—a project to build a network of overland road and rail routes, oil and gas pipelines, and other infrastructure projects from West China through Central Asia to Europe.

As the Taliban retakes control of Afghanistan, China and Russia won’t make timid pleas to Washington to place forces on the ground in the country. The militarist path has been deemed a flawed move by both sides. In the coming days, the Sino-Russian bloc will likely prioritize political solutions, thereby promoting a more proactive position for the SCO and emphasizing the importance of regional frameworks.