Joe Biden (left) and Iranian President-elect Ebrahim Raisi / credit: Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies, Mehr News Agency
It was common knowledge that a U.S. failure to rejoin the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal, before Iran’s June presidential election would help conservative hard-liners to win the election. Indeed, on Saturday, June 19, conservative Ebrahim Raisi was elected as the new president of Iran.
Raisi has a record of brutally cracking down on government opponents and his election is a severe blow to Iranians struggling for a more liberal, open society. He also has a history of anti-Western sentiment and says he would refuse to meet with President Biden. And while current President Hassan Rouhani, considered a moderate, held out the possibility of broader talks after the United States returned to the nuclear deal, Raisi will almost certainly reject broader negotiations with the United States.
Could Raisi’s victory been averted if President Biden had rejoined the Iran deal right after coming into the White House and enabled Rouhani and the moderates in Iran to take credit for the removal of U.S. sanctions before the election? Now we will never know.
Trump’s withdrawal from the agreement drew near-universal condemnation from Democrats and arguably violated international law. But Biden’s failure to quickly rejoin the deal has left Trump’s policy in place, including the cruel “maximum pressure” sanctions that are destroying Iran’s middle class, throwing millions of people into poverty, and preventing imports of medicine and other essentials, even during a pandemic.
U.S. sanctions have provoked retaliatory measures from Iran, including suspending limits on its uranium enrichment and reducing cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Trump’s, and now Biden’s, policy has simply reconstructed the problems that preceded the JCPOA in 2015, displaying the widely recognized madness of repeating something that didn’t work and expecting a different result.
JCPOA talks held July 14, 2015. From left to right: Foreign ministers/secretaries of state Wang Yi (China), Laurent Fabius (France), Frank-Walter Steinmeier (Germany), Federica Mogherini (EU), Mohammad Javad Zarif (Iran), Philip Hammond (UK), John Kerry (USA) / credit: Bundesministerium für Europa, Integration und Äusseres
If actions speak louder than words, the U.S. seizure of 27 Iranian and Yemeni international news websites on June 22, based on the illegal, unilateral U.S. sanctions that are among the most contentious topics of the Vienna negotiations, suggests that the same madness still holds sway over U.S. policy.
Since Biden took office, the critical underlying question is whether he and his administration are really committed to the JCPOA. As a presidential candidate, Biden promised to simply rejoin the JCPOA on his first day as president, and Iran always said it was ready to comply with the agreement as soon as the United States rejoined it.
Biden has been in office for five months, but the negotiations in Vienna did not begin until April 6. His failure to rejoin the agreement upon taking office reflected a desire to appease hawkish advisers and politicians who claimed he could use Trump’s withdrawal and the threat of continued sanctions as “leverage” to extract more concessions from Iran over its ballistic missiles, regional activities and other questions.
Far from extracting more concessions, Biden’s foot-dragging only provoked further retaliatory action by Iran, especially after the assassination of an Iranian scientist and sabotage at Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility, both probably committed by Israel.
Without a great deal of help, and some pressure, from the United States’ European allies, it is unclear how long it would have taken Biden to get around to opening negotiations with Iran. The shuttle diplomacy taking place in Vienna is the result of painstaking negotiations with both sides by former European Parliament President Josep Borrell, who is now the European Union’s foreign policy chief.
The sixth round of shuttle diplomacy has now concluded in Vienna without an agreement. President-elect Raisi says he supports the negotiations in Vienna, but would not allow the United States to drag them out for a long time.
An unnamed U.S. official raised hopes for an agreement before Raisi takes office on August 3, noting it would be more difficult to reach an agreement after that, according to an Axios report. But a State Department spokesman said talks would continue when the new government takes office, implying that an agreement was unlikely before then.
Even if Biden had rejoined the JCPOA, Iran’s moderates might still have lost this tightly managed election. But a restored JCPOA and the end of U.S. sanctions would have left the moderates in a stronger position, and set Iran’s relations with the United States and its allies on a path of normalization that would have helped to weather more difficult relations with Raisi and his government in the coming years.
If Biden fails to rejoin the JCPOA, and if the United States or Israel ends up at war with Iran, this lost opportunity to quickly rejoin the JCPOA during his first months in office will loom large over future events and Biden’s legacy as president.
If the United States does not rejoin the JCPOA before Raisi takes office, Iran’s hard-liners will point to Rouhani’s diplomacy with the West as a failed pipe-dream, and their own policies as pragmatic and realistic by contrast. In the United States and Israel, the hawks who have lured Biden into this slow-motion train-wreck will be popping champagne corks to celebrate Raisi’s inauguration, as they move in to kill the JCPOA for good, smearing it as a deal with a mass murderer.
If Biden rejoins the JCPOA after Raisi’s inauguration, Iran’s hard-liners will claim that they succeeded where Rouhani and the moderates failed, and take credit for the economic recovery that will follow the removal of U.S. sanctions.
On the other hand, if Biden follows hawkish advice and tries to play it tough, and Raisi then pulls the plug on the negotiations, both leaders will score points with their own hard-liners at the expense of majorities of their people who want peace, and the United States will be back on a path of confrontation with Iran.
While that would be the worst outcome of all, it would allow Biden to have it both ways domestically, appeasing the hawks while telling liberals that he was committed to the nuclear deal until Iran rejected it. Such a cynical path of least resistance would very likely be a path to war.
On all these counts, it is vital that Biden and the Democrats conclude an agreement with the Rouhani government and rejoin the JCPOA. Rejoining it after Raisi takes office would be better than letting the negotiations fail altogether, but this entire slow-motion train-wreck has been characterized by diminishing returns with every delay, from the day Biden took office.
Neither the people of Iran nor the people of the United States have been well served by Biden’s willingness to accept Trump’s Iran policy as an acceptable alternative to Obama’s, even as a temporary political expedient. To allow Trump’s abandonment of an Obama-brokered agreement to stand as a long-term U.S. policy would be an even greater betrayal of the goodwill and good faith of people on all sides.
Biden and his advisers must now confront the consequences of the position their wishful thinking and dithering has landed them in, and must make a genuine and serious political decision to rejoin the JCPOA within days or weeks.
In a hugely consequential advisory, the U.S. Treasury Department quietly signaled on February 2 that it was “tweaking” sanctions against Afghanistan’s Haqqani Network, a Sunni Islamist militant organization. International banks can now transfer money to the Taliban, including its affiliated Haqqani Network, without fear of breaching sanctions.
Washington simply issued clarifications dilating on the relaxation of sanctions announced in September and December for humanitarian work in Afghanistan. The banks can now process transactions related to humanitarian operations “including clearing, settlement, and transfers through, to, or otherwise involving privately owned and state-owned Afghan depository institutions.” (Author’s emphasis.)
Significantly, the Treasury Department specifically mentioned that the relaxed regime will include the Haqqani Network as well. This means that U.S. sanctions will no longer come in the way of foreign agencies signing agreements to provide aid, general aid coordination, including import administration, and sharing of office space with the Taliban or Haqqani Network.
Logically, the next step will be to ensure that the United States would have a say in the Afghan economic policies under the Taliban. The downstream implications for the Taliban government’s fiscal management or decision-making vis-à-vis non-Western partners in development—for example, China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the TAPI (Turkmenistan/Afghanistan/Pakistan/India) gas pipeline project and others—are at once obvious.
A convincing case is being made in this direction already by the U.S. government-funded think tank, the U.S. Institute of Peace, based in Washington.
A USIP analysis says:
“Although economic and humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan continue to deteriorate, the Taliban have taken some positive steps toward financial stability by publishing a fiscally responsible three-month and raising considerable amounts of domestic revenue – especially through customs duties, which have risen with a crackdown on corruption.
The international community urgently needs to get a better idea of how much the Taliban government is collecting and where budget resources are being spent, so as to ensure that the limited aid funds for delivering essential services are well spent…
U.S. government, other donors and especially the World Bank (which could be authorized to take the lead on this) urgently need to analyze data on Afghan government revenues and expenditures and assess the implications for effective deployment of aid, especially when it comes to assistance for public service delivery as opposed to purely humanitarian aid.”
Great Sense of Urgency
There is a great sense of urgency here that the discussions between the Taliban and U.S. representatives at the recent Oslo talks (January 23-25) be followed up speedily in the broad direction of engaging the government in Kabul. (See my article, “West finding ways to work with the Taliban,” Asia Times, January 28.)
Significantly, the Oslo deliberations were brusquely taken forward to the United Nations Security Council on January 26, where UN officials at Washington’s behest forcefully argued for the imperative of “engaging with the de facto authorities” in Kabul.
The UN officials are on record that their “premise is based on a presumed consensus that it is in no one’s interest to see a collapse of the current state in Afghanistan, but also that engagement with the Taliban can lead to progress along a negotiated pathway that delivers for the people of Afghanistan, the region and the rest of the world.”
And, therefore, “testing that hypothesis will be our task in the months ahead.”
India’s permanent representative to the UN, Ambassador T.S. Tirumurti, who briefed the Security Council in his capacity as chairman of the committee created pursuant to Resolution 1988 tasked with overseeing sanctions related to the Taliban (against Sirajuddin Haqqani, etc.), reportedly “explained that the goal is to facilitate conditions that promote dialogue and ultimately result in peace and stability.”
Tirumurti cautioned that the UN monitoring team has noted that the ties between the Taliban – largely through the Haqqani Network – and al-Qaeda and foreign terrorist fighters remain close and are based on ideological alignment.
Furthermore, the presence of Islamic State (ISIS) in Afghanistan remains a matter of concern, as terrorist attacks continue to be used to demonstrate power and influence.
Plainly put, the journey has begun to lift the sanctions against the Taliban leaders, including the Haqqanis. The UN officials dealing with Afghanistan are plowing the U.S. line to speed up the process.
Meanwhile, on February 2, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin testified in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Dissatisfaction in High Places
It was a classified briefing. In a statement later, Republican Senator Jim Inhofe, ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, voiced dissatisfaction:
“We still face a lot of real challenges in Afghanistan even though our troop presence is gone … I would have liked to hear more details regarding the interagency planning process, nature of the terrorist threat in Afghanistan today, and their counterterrorism plans going forward.
We need to learn from our mistakes if we want to deter [US President Vladimir] Putin’s aggression in Europe or appropriately respond to Chinese economic and military aggression.”
Evidently, the geopolitics of Afghanistan is very much on everyone’s mind in the U.S. establishment. Unsurprisingly, Russia has voiced disquiet over the unseemly hurry in Washington to hustle the world community.
In a wide-ranging interview with Tass news agency this week, Russia’s presidential envoy on Afghanistan, Ambassador Zamir Kabulov, took the bull by the horns by cautioning that while there is an urgency to render humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan—for which the unblocking of frozen funds by Washington will make a critical difference—that should not be used as a diplomatic tool.
Kabulov recalled the conditions for recognition of the Taliban government. He also warned against the probability of resistance to Taliban rule among Afghans, while also offering Russian mediation for reconciliation (see here, here and here).
Kabulov’s remarks hint at disquiet in Moscow that Washington is manipulating the Taliban faction leaders by dangling in front of them the carrot of the lifting of sanctions.
However, Washington is unlikely to pay heed. The Taliban’s alienation with Pakistan has opened a window of opportunity, which must be seized. The U.S. has already spent more than a billion dollars to split the Taliban.
The Treasury Department advisory is a hurried step, which in effect erodes the UN sanctions regime against the Haqqani Network. Only the lawmakers in the U.S. Congress have been taken into confidence.
War Profiteers
The stakes are high. Reports have appeared that Erik Prince, the Pentagon’s infamous war contractor, recently visited Dushanbe, Tajikistan. The recent unrest in Kazakhstan highlighted Afghanistan’s potential to be the staging ground for outside powers to destabilize Central Asian states that border China, Russia and Iran.
Although the Taliban have denied involvement, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has been explicit in his remarks that foreign militants, mostly from Central Asian countries, including Afghanistan and also from the Middle East, participated in the unrest in Kazakhstan. Russia has endorsed Tokayev’s allegation (see here and here).
Interestingly, it was announced on February 2 that Kabul and Doha will be connected by direct flights. The U.S. personnel handling Afghan affairs, who are based in Qatar, can now travel frequently with ease to Kabul.
On January 31, U.S. President Joe Biden also announced his decision to nominate Qatar as a “major non-NATO ally”—a singular honor that Washington once bestowed on Pakistan as a frontline state.
“It does open up a full new range of opportunities: exercises, operations and you know, perhaps, the … acquisition of capabilities as well,” Pentagon spokesman John Kirby told reporters, commenting on Biden’s decision.
Taken together, the regional states will be worried that the United States’ nascent engagement with the Taliban behind the fig leaf of humanitarian aid, which gathered momentum at the Oslo talks, enables the return of U.S. intelligence personnel to Afghanistan on the pretext of “counter-terrorism” operations.
M.K. Bhadrakumar is a former Indian diplomat.Follow M.K. Bhadrakumar on Twitter: @BhadraPunchline
Russian troops march in the 2015 Moscow Victory Day Parade / credit: Vitaly V. Kuzmin
Editor’s Note: The following is the writer’s analysis.
The United States has been accusing Russia of preparing to invade Ukraine, while it continues to build a U.S. military presence in the Black Sea. Warmongering and fearmongering rhetoric began to dominate the public discourse, as media, politicians and military experts have been warning of an “imminent” Russian invasion that could have grave consequences for global peace and security. But does the Kremlin really intend to fight a war against the NATO-backed eastern European country?
According to reports, Moscow has deployed thousands of troops and military equipment to western Russia’s regions that border Ukraine. At the same time, U.S. navy ships Mount Whitney and Arleigh Burke recently entered the Black Sea, while the 9th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron’s B-1B Lancers soared over eastern Europe during a NATO fighter integration mission through the region.
The USS Arleigh Burke ship sailed through the Black Sea on November 25 / credit: U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa
Moreover, a Russian Aeroflot airliner flying from Tel Aviv to Moscow was forced to change altitude over the Black Sea because a NATO CL-600 reconnaissance plane crossed its designated flight path. These actions would be the equivalent of Russian naval ships and fighter jets entering the Gulf of Mexico.
As usual, though, the Kremlin’s reaction was weak.
“Just because an air incident over the Black Sea’s international waters has been prevented, this does not mean the U.S. and NATO can further put lives at risk with impunity,” said Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said.
Just because an air incident over the Black Sea’s Int waters has been prevented, this does not mean the US and NATO can further put people’s lives at #risk with impunity.
However, such a statement is unlikely to provoke fear in NATO’s headquarters.
Crossing Russia’s Red Line
Russian President Vladimir Putin has pointed out the deployment of certain offensive missile capabilities on Ukrainian soil is Moscow’s “red line.”
Yet, the United States has demonstrated it does not take Russia’s threats and boundaries seriously.
“I don’t accept anybody’s red lines,” U.S. President Joe Biden said on December 4.
U.S. President Joe Biden (left) and Russian President Vladimir Putin (right) convened a virtual summit December 7, 2021, to discuss Ukraine, NATO’s eastward expansion, the Iran nuclear deal and resetting diplomatic relations / credit: Twitter/WhiteHouse and President of Russia
The two leaders then held a “virtual summit” on December 7. Shortly after their discussion, the U.S. Congress removed sanctions against Nord Stream 2, Russian sovereign debt and 35 Russians from the draft defense budget. Such actions demonstrate the two leaders have reached certain deals not only on Ukraine, but on energy issues as well. However, tensions between Moscow and Washington, which seem to be an integral part of a new Cold War era, are expected to remain high for the foreseeable future.
Map of Europe, with Belarus, Russia and Ukraine highlighted / credit: BBC
What’s the Possibility of War?
Ahead of the talks between Putin and Biden, the Russian leader clarified his call for new security guarantees.
Putin said Russia would seek “concrete agreements that would rule out any further eastward expansion of NATO and the deployment of weapons systems posing a threat to Russia.” Even if the United States provides such guarantees—which does not seem very probable given that such a move would be interpreted as a concession to Putin and a sign of weakness—it is not probable Washington would implement the deal.
U.S. officials already have declined to rule out dispatching U.S. forces to eastern Europe, although at this point it is highly uncertain if the U.S. troops could be deployed to Ukraine. Ukraine’s Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov has called on the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom to dispatch their military personnel to the former Soviet republic, even though the eastern European nation is not part of NATO.
“Those troops should be stationed in places where Russia can see them,” Reznikov stressed. Meanwhile, Denis Pushilin, leader of the Russia-backed self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic that declared independence from Ukraine in 2014, said he would request Russia’s assistance in case the situation in the region escalates.
Indeed, a potential deployment of NATO troops in Ukraine would prevent a Russian intervention, given Moscow would be unlikely to confront NATO troops. Russia’s policy makers are quite aware any incursion into Ukrainian territory would result in severe anti-Russia sanctions, which could potentially include actions against Russian oligarchs and energy producers, as well as disconnect Russia from the SWIFT international payment system used by banks around the world. On the other hand, given the United States has the upper hand vis-à-vis Moscow, it is entirely possible some sanctions will be imposed, even if Russia does not invade Ukraine. The West also can deploy troops to Ukraine to prevent what they would call a potential Russian invasion, and there is very little the Kremlin can do about it.
Map of the Donbass War, involving two self-proclaimed republics splitting off from Ukraine beginning in 2014. This maps shows 2014 areas of fighting, and which sides had de facto control of particular regions / credit: ZomBear/Marktaff
Hypothetically, Russia could recognize the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic and Lugansk People’s Republic, and build military bases on their territories, but such a move is unlikely to have an impact on Ukraine’s goal to restore sovereignty over the coal-rich region. From the legal perspective, the Donbass, as well as Crimea, is part of Ukraine, and no foreign actors would condemn Ukrainian attempts to return the regions under its jurisdiction. Still, unless its gets the green light from Washington, Kiev is unlikely to launch any large-scale military actions against Russia, or Russia-backed forces. Moscow, for its part, is expected to continue preserving the status quo. Supporters of the notion that Russia is keen on invading Ukraine fail to explain what the Kremlin’s motive for such an action would be.
Energy Deals
However, Moscow achieved its goals in 2014 when it incorporated Crimea, which has significant offshore gas and oil reserves into the Russian Federation. That year Russia tacitly supported the creation of the Donbass republics that reportedly have 34.4 billion tons of coal reserves. Since Moscow, through its proxies, already controls the Donbass coal production and export, capturing the other energy-poor regions of Ukraine would represent nothing but an additional cost for Russia.
Nonetheless, Western and Ukrainian media continue to spread rumors of an “imminent” Russian invasion. Ukrainian military officials claim Russia could start its campaign against the former Soviet republic in February—in the middle of winter when troops are up to their knees in snow. Meanwhile, Oleksiy Arestovych, the head of the Office of the Ukrainian President, recently suggested his country could “fire missiles at the Russian Federation, in case the Kremlin starts a full-scale war against Ukraine.”
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, on the other hand, openly said in case of a potential conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Minsk will support its ally, Moscow. At the same time, Belarus announced joint military exercises with Russia along its border with Ukraine. Plus, Lukashenko promised to visit Crimea soon, which would be Belarus’ de facto recognition of the Kremlin’s incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation.
His visit, whenever it comes, undoubtedly will have a serious impact on relations between Belarus and Ukraine. Kiev fears Belarus could take part in what they perceive would be a Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the country’s authorities have taken Lukashenko’s threat very seriously. According to reports, citizens of Ukraine already started preparing to defend the Ukrainian capital against an invasion, whether it may come from Russia or Belarus.
One thing is for sure: Unless Kiev starts a massive military campaign in the Donbass, or engages in a serious provocation against Russia, the Kremlin is unlikely to start a war against Ukraine. And even if a war breaks out, Russia’s actions are expected to be very calculated, limited and carefully coordinated with its Western partners, as part of moves toward a “stable and more predictable relationship” between Moscow and Washington.
Nikola Mikovic is a Serbia-based contributor to CGTN, Global Comment, Byline Times, Informed Comment, and World Geostrategic Insights, among other publications. He is a geopolitical analyst for KJ Reports and Enquire.
Paul Sankara, consultant, activist and brother of assassinated Burkina Faso leader Thomas Sankara; Eugene Puryear, community organizer and host at BreakThrough News; Erica Caines, a Black Alliance for Peace Coordinating Committee member, co-editor of Hood Communist and founder of Liberation Through Reading; and Nebiyu Asfaw, co-founder of both the Ethiopian American Development Council and the #NoMore Movement discussed connecting African peoples’ struggles across the continents at the first-ever African Peoples’ Forum. The event was held December 11 at the Eritrean Civic & Cultural Center in Washington, D.C. Journalist Hermela Aregawi and activist Yolian Ogbu moderated.