The conflict between Palestine and Israel has been raging officially for more than seven decades, making it the world’s longest-running dispute.
Jordan’s domestic and foreign policies have been affected because it shares its border with occupied Palestine and the state of Israel. However, it is clear based on recent occurrences that the landlocked country is playing an increasingly insignificant role in the dispute, even though the peace process would be incomplete without the kingdom’s input. In fact, until the 1970s, Jordan was an indispensable player, having hosted thousands of Palestinian refugees. Jordan seems to be trapped by its own security restrictions and has largely ceded the peace process to its rivals, including Egypt.
Earlier this year, during the 11-day war in Gaza, U.S. President Joe Biden spoke twice with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Meanwhile, U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris once telephoned Jordan’s King Abdullah.
Jordan also reacted late to the crisis in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in Jerusalem. For example, Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Al-Safadi took two weeks to respond to the escalating conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis. The response came in a tweet. Later, when he met with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, he only repeated his warnings that “Jerusalem was a red line” and that “Israel was playing with fire.”
Jordan and Egypt play a zero-sum game in the Arab-Israeli peace process. But in recent years, Amman has lost its historic role to Cairo. Cairo mediated between Israel and Hamas in the last Gaza war in 2014. Then in 2017, Cairo mediated a ceasefire between the two Palestinian groups, Hamas and Fatah. Egypt also was active in the prisoner exchange between Palestine and Israel in 2006. Then Egypt sought an immediate ceasefire in the last Gaza war in May. Al-Sisi ordered the opening of the Rafah crossing between Egypt and occupied Palestine, so injured Palestinians could be treated at Egyptian hospitals. The Egyptian government sent mediation teams to Hamas and Israel, intending to send fuel to Hamas’ only power plant. Al-Sisi also allocated $500 million for the reconstruction of Gaza.
Cold Peace
Jordan’s declining role in the Palestinian peace process boils down to a number of reasons. For instance, Jordan’s relationship with Israel has reached its lowest point in recent years. During Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s time in office, King Abdullah did not speak or meet with him.
But it was Israel’s plan to annex parts of the Jordan Valley and the West Bank that became the greatest factor in reducing relations between the two countries. Netanyahu’s aim with the annexation plan was to reduce the economic impact of Covid-19 inside the country and the instability in the unity government. The plan was introduced as part of the so-called “Deal of the Century” U.S. President Donald Trump had touted. Israel’s annexation plan probably was aimed at putting to rest Israel’s dream over the past few decades of occupying from the Nile River to the Euphrates River. Occupying parts of the West Bank would increase Israeli territory and would help snuff out the Palestinian liberation struggle in the West Bank.
It seems Palestinians in the West Bank are likely to change their demand from a “two-state” solution to obtaining equal rights with Israeli citizens, thereby strengthening the “one-state” solution. In the latter case, Palestinians would live side by side with Israelis, instead of under military rule. However, Jordan worries Israel will probably try to force Jordan to accept responsibility for Palestinian refugees in Jordan, as well as the Palestinians displaced by the annexation plan.
Bitter incidents have occurred in recent decades between Israel and Jordan, such as the 1997 assassination of Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal on Jordanian soil that King Abdullah was unaware of, and the shooting of the Israeli embassy guard in Amman in 2017, which Jordan considers a murder. King Abdullah has expressed hopes relations with Israel’s new government under Prime Minister Naftali Bennett will improve, so the turmoil can end. Bennett’s secret visit to Jordan, followed by the sale of water and a trade agreement between the two countries, raised hopes of improved relations. But it should not be forgotten Bennett opposes the two-state solution. In addition, the opposition in Israel—including Netanyahu—have criticized the new Israeli government. Bennett’s government and his cabinet appear afraid Netanyahu will return to power, and that is why they have been struggling to show this government is more efficient and assertive than Netanyahu’s governance of 12 years. Therefore, it is unlikely the new Israeli government will recognize Jordan’s concerns and open a place in its foreign policy to resolve its differences with the Palestinians, as Jordan has indicated it would like.
Forgotten Palestinian refugees
The relationship with the United States and its particular attitude toward the peace process are another reason why Jordan has lost weight in the dispute. Jordan opposed Trump’s “Deal of the Century” because it did not address the issue of Palestinian refugees.
Trump may have left the White House and his “Deal of the Century” may have been forgotten, but the deal has made a long-term impact on Jordan’s security. The plan is in Israel’s interest, as Tel Aviv rejects the right of Palestinians to form a state in the West Bank and gives Jordan weight as an alternative to Palestinian refugees. Trump’s plan allowed the 2.5 million Palestinian refugees living in Jordan to settle permanently in the kingdom, and that is Jordan’s red line.
A close race is underway to increase the role of nations in the peace process. Jordan must re-double its efforts so that it does not lag behind other Arab countries. While Egypt considers the Gaza Strip as it plans its security, Jordan must emphasize the role of the West Bank in its national security. Jordan currently has no ties to Hamas after expelling the group in 1999 for fear of the Muslim Brotherhood infiltrating the country. Meanwhile, Egypt, despite ideological differences, contacted Hamas and was able to use its influence in the 11-day Gaza ceasefire.
Jordan needs to better understand the geopolitical realities of the region and improve its relations with other countries, such as Iran, Turkey, Iraq and Syria, so it can renew its capabilities in the long-standing conflict.
Dr. Mohammad Salami holds a Ph.D. in international relations. He is a specialist in Middle Eastern policy, particularly that of Syria, Iran, Yemen and the Persian Gulf region. His areas of expertise include politics and governance, security and counterterrorism. Dr. Salami is an analyst and columnist for various media outlets. He can be followed on Twitter at @moh_salami and he can be reached via email at [email protected].
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta in Jerusalem on February 23, 2016. The two leaders signed a joint statement on water that focuses on cooperation on water and agricultural issues and establishes a joint bilateral committee / credit: GPO
The decision by the African Union Commission, on July 22, to grant Israel observer status membership in the AU was the culmination of years of relentless Israeli efforts aimed at co-opting Africa’s largest political institution. Why is Israel so keen on penetrating Africa? What made African countries finally succumb to Israeli pressure and lobbying?
To answer the above questions, one has to appreciate the new Great Game under way in many parts of the world, especially in Africa, which has always been significant to Israel’s geopolitical designs. Starting in the early 1950s to the mid-70s, Israel’s Africa network was in constant expansion. The 1973 war, however, brought that affinity to an abrupt end.
What Changed Africa
Ghana, in West Africa, officially recognized Israel in 1956, just eight years after Israel was established atop the ruins of historic Palestine. What seemed like an odd decision at the time – considering Africa’s history of western colonialism and anti-colonial struggles—ushered in a new era of African-Israeli relations. By the early 1970s, Israel had established a strong position for itself on the continent. On the eve of the 1973 Israeli-Arab war, Israel had full diplomatic ties with 33 African countries.
“The October War”, however, presented many African countries with a stark choice: siding with Israel – a country born out of Western colonial intrigues – or the Arabs, who are connected to Africa through historical, political, economic, cultural and religious bonds. Most African countries opted for the latter choice. One after the other, African countries began severing their ties with Israel. Soon enough, no African state, other than Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland, had official diplomatic relations with Israel.
Then, the continent’s solidarity with Palestine went even further. The Organization of African Unity – the precursor to the African Union – in its 12th ordinary session held in Kampala in 1975, became the first international body to recognize, on a large scale, the inherent racism in Israel’s Zionist ideology by adopting Resolution 77 (XII). This very Resolution was cited in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379, adopted in November of that same year, which determined that “Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination”. Resolution 3379 remained in effect until it was revoked by the Assembly under intense U.S. pressure in 1991.
Since Israel remained committed to that same Zionist, racist ideology of yesteryears, the only rational conclusion is that it was Africa, not Israel, that changed. But why?
First, the collapse of the Soviet Union. That seismic event resulted in the subsequent isolation of pro-Soviet African countries which, for years, stood as the vanguard against U.S., Western and, by extension, Israeli expansionism and interests on the continent.
Second, the collapse of the unified Arab front on Palestine. That front has historically served as the moral and political frame of reference for the pro-Palestine, anti-Israel sentiments in Africa. This started with the Egyptian government’s signing of the Camp David Agreement, in 1978-79 and, later, the Oslo Accords between the Palestinian leadership and Israel, in 1993.
Covert and overt normalization between Arab countries and Israel continued unabated over the last three decades, resulting in the extension of diplomatic ties between Israel and several Arab countries, including African-Arab countries, like Sudan and Morocco. Other Muslim-majority African countries also joined the normalization efforts. They include Chad, Mali and others.
Third, the ‘scramble for Africa’ was renewed with a vengeance. The neocolonial return to Africa brought back many of the same usual suspects—Western countries, which are, once more, realizing the untapped potential of Africa in terms of markets, cheap labor and resources. A driving force for Western re-involvement in Africa is the rise of China as a global superpower with keen interests in investing in Africa’s dilapidated infrastructure. Whenever economic competition is found, military hardware is sure to follow. Now several Western militaries are openly operating in Africa under various guises—France in Mali and the Sahel region, the United States’ many operations through U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), and others.
Tellingly, Washington does not only serve as Israel’s benefactor in Palestine and the Middle East, but worldwide as well, and Israel is willing to go to any length to exploit the massive leverage it holds over the U.S. government. This stifling paradigm, which has been at work in the Middle East region for decades, is also at work throughout Africa. For example, last year the U.S. administration agreed to remove Sudan from the state-sponsored terror list in exchange for Khartoum’s normalization with Israel. In truth, Sudan is not the only country that understands – and is willing to engage in—this kind of ‘pragmatic’—read under-handed—political barter. Others also have learned to play the game well. Indeed, by voting to admit Israel to the AU, some African governments expect a return on their political investment, a return that will be exacted from Washington, not from Tel Aviv.
Unfortunately, albeit expectedly, as Africa’s normalization with Israel grew, Palestine became increasingly a marginal issue on the agendas of many African governments, who are far more invested in realpolitik – or simply remaining on Washington’s good side—than honoring the anti-colonial legacies of their nations.
Netanyahu the Conqueror
However, there was another driving force behind Israel’s decision to ‘return’ to Africa than just political opportunism and economic exploitation. Successive events have made it clear that Washington is retreating from the Middle East and that the region was no longer a top priority for the dwindling U.S. empire. For the United States, China’s decisive moves to assert its power and influence in Asia are largely responsible for the U.S. rethink. The 2012 U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, its ‘leadership from behind’ in Libya, its non-committal policy in Syria, among others, were all indicators pointing to the inescapable fact that Israel could no longer count on the blind and unconditional U.S. support alone. Thus, the constant search for new allies began.
For the first time in decades, Israel began confronting its prolonged isolation at the UNGA. U.S. vetoes at the UN Security Council may have shielded Israel from accountability to its military occupation and war crimes; but U.S. vetoes were hardly enough to give Israel the legitimacy that it has long coveted. In a recent conversation with former UN human rights envoy, Richard Falk, the Princeton Professor Emeritus explained to me that, despite Israel’s ability to escape punishment, it is rapidly losing what he refers to as the ‘legitimacy war’.
Palestine, according to Falk, continues to win that war, one that can only be achieved through real, grassroots global solidarity. It is precisely this factor that explains Israel’s keen interest in transferring the battlefield to Africa and other parts of the Global South.
On July 5, 2016, then Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, kick-started Israel’s own ‘scramble for Africa’ with a visit to Kenya, which was described as historic by the Israeli media. Indeed, it was the first visit by an Israeli prime minister in the last 50 years. After spending some time in Nairobi, where he attended the Israel-Kenya Economic Forum alongside hundreds of Israeli and Kenyan business leaders, he moved on to Uganda, where he met leaders from other African countries including South Sudan, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Tanzania. Within the same month, Israel announced the renewal of diplomatic ties between Israel and Guinea.
The new Israeli strategy flowed from there. More high-level visits to Africa and triumphant announcements about new joint economic ventures and investments followed. In June 2017, Netanyahu took part in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), held in the Liberian capital, Monrovia. There, he went as far as rewriting history.
“Africa and Israel share a natural affinity,” Netanyahu claimed in his speech. “We have, in many ways, similar histories. Your nations toiled under foreign rule. You experienced horrific wars and slaughters. This is very much our history.” With these words, Netanyahu attempted, not only to hide Israel’s colonial intentions, but also rob Palestinians of their own history.
Moreover, the Israeli leader had hoped to crown his political and economic achievements with the Israel-Africa Summit, an event that was meant to officially welcome Israel, not to a specific African regional alliance, but to the whole of Africa. However, in September 2017, the organizers of the event decided to indefinitely postpone it, after it was confirmed to be taking place in Lome, capital of Togo, on October 23-27 of that same year. What was seen by Israeli leaders as a temporary setback was the result of intense, behind-the-scenes lobbying of several African and Arab countries, including South Africa and Algeria.
Premature ‘Victory’
Ultimately, it was a mere temporary setback. The admission of Israel into the 55-member African bloc in July is considered by Israeli officials and media pundits as a major political victory, especially as Tel Aviv has been laboring to achieve this status since 2002. At the time, many obstacles stood in the way, like the strong objection raised by Libya under the leadership of Muammar Ghaddafi and the insistence of Algeria that Africa must remain committed to its anti-Zionist ideals, and so on. However, one after the other, these obstacles were removed or marginalized.
In a recent statement, Israel’s new Foreign Minister, Yair Lapid, celebrated Israel’s Africa membership as an “important part of strengthening the fabric of Israel’s foreign relations”. According to Lapid, the exclusion of Israel from the AU was an “anomaly that existed for almost two decades”. Of course, not all African countries agree with Lapid’s convenient logic.
According to TRT news, citing Algerian media, 17 African countries, including Zimbabwe, Algeria and Liberia, have objected to Israel’s admission to the Union. In a separate statement, South Africa expressed outrage at the decision, describing the “unjust and unwarranted decision of the AU Commission to grant Israel observer status in the African Union” as “appalling”. For his part, Algerian Foreign Minister, Ramtane Lamamra, said that his country will “not stand idly by in front of this step taken by Israel and the African Union without consulting the member states.”
Despite Israel’s sense of triumphalism, it seems that the fight for Africa is still raging, a battle of politics, ideology and economic interests that is likely to continue unabated for years to come. However, for Palestinians and their supporters to have a chance at winning this battle, they must understand the nature of the Israeli strategy through which Israel depicts itself to various African countries as the savior, bestowing favors and introducing new technologies to combat real, tangible problems. Being more technologically advanced as compared to many African countries, Israel is able to offer its superior ‘security’, IT and irrigation technologies to African states in exchange for diplomatic ties, support at the UNGA and lucrative investments.
Consequently, Palestine’s Africa dichotomy rests partly on the fact that African solidarity with Palestine has historically been placed within the larger political framework of mutual African-Arab solidarity. Yet, with official Arab solidarity with Palestine now weakening, Palestinians are forced to think outside this traditional box, so that they may build direct solidarity with African nations as Palestinians, without necessarily merging their national aspirations with the larger, now fragmented, Arab body politic.
While such a task is daunting, it is also promising, as Palestinians now have the opportunity to build bridges of support and mutual solidarity in Africa through direct contacts, where they serve as their own ambassadors. Obviously, Palestine has much to gain, but also much to offer Africa. Palestinian doctors, engineers, civil defense and frontline workers, educationists, intellectuals and artists are some of the most highly qualified and accomplished in the Middle East. True, they have much to learn from their African peers, but also have much to give.
Unlike persisting stereotypes, many African universities, organizations and cultural centers serve as vibrant intellectual hubs. African thinkers, philosophers, writers, journalists, artists and athletes are some of the most articulate, empowered and accomplished in the world. Any pro-Palestine strategy in Africa should keep these African treasures in mind as a way of engaging, not only with individuals but with whole societies.
Israeli media reported extensively and proudly about Israel’s admission to the AU. The celebrations, however, might also be premature, for Africa is not a group of self-seeking leaders bestowing political favors in exchange for meager returns. Africa is also the heart of the most powerful anti-colonial trends the world has ever known. A continent of this size, complexity, and proud history cannot be written off as if a mere ‘prize’ to be won or lost by Israel and its neocolonial friends.
Editor’s Note: This video report was produced by African Stream.
Nubians are one of the oldest peoples of the Nile Valley. They are also one of its most recently displaced. Originally from Sudan and southern Egypt, Nubians had settlements going back 7,000 years in this cradle of civilization. That is, until massive, state-driven construction projects came along, forever changing the environment—and their lives.
Residents of the Palestinian neighborhood, Jabal al-Mukaber, protested on March 20 the proposed demolition of their homes to make way for an expansion of a highway that would connect Israeli settler neighborhoods / credit: Jessica Buxbaum
Correction: The majority of homes to be razed were built after 1967. A previous version of this article stated otherwise.
EAST JERUSALEM—For the fifth week in a row, residents of Jabal al-Mukaber, a Palestinian neighborhood in Occupied East Jerusalem, demonstrated outside city hall against a municipal plan to demolish their homes.
Banging drums, blaring fog horns and blowing whistles, protesters demanded on March 20 that the municipality freeze 62 home demolition orders. Residents received these notices in January as part of a plan to expand the American Road, a highway cutting through Jabal al-Mukaber and largely viewed as a bypass serving illegal Israeli settlements throughout Jerusalem.
“This is a political target by the municipality to push the residents of Jabal al-Mukaber to take their stuff and live outside of Jerusalem,” said Mohamed Nas, who received a demolition order.
A map depicting the American Road as well as its proposed expansion / credit: The Middle East Eye
East Jerusalem’s ‘Urban Renewal’ Plan
The American Road was first proposed in 1996. It is named after a much narrower road U.S. contractors had abandoned midway through construction because the Six-Day War had begun in 1967. By the 2019, plans were underway to turn the rural road into an urban highway. The latest $250 million construction began in 2020.
The American Road recently was widened by 52 feet. But now plans are underway to expand the highway by another 105 feet, where the 62 houses slated for demolition are located.
An estimated 800 housing units also are being threatened with demolition to develop both sides of the highway, mostly for commercial and office use.
Sari Kronish, an architect with Israeli planning rights organization Bimkom, explained the municipality is hoping to turn the area around the American Road into an urban center. But without an adequate proportion reserved for residential use, the municipality’s urban renewal scheme fails in addressing the neighborhood’s main issue—a lack of housing.
“Equitable housing solutions are what drive the market,” Kronish said. “If we compare it to other places in the country, you have a minimum of 50 percent housing here.”
According to Kronish, residential building rights are included in this development plan, but do not allow for legalizing existing homes. Therefore, the houses in Jabal al-Mukaber will need to be razed and rebuilt into 8-floor units to meet the municipality’s new standards.
While only 62 homes in Jabal al-Mukaber have received official demolition orders, residents say municipal building plans suggest a total of 862 homes on about 94 acres are at risk of demolition because of the highway’s outlined development and proposed commercial center.
“Projects of urban renewal and evacuation and construction are being led, in cooperation and in dialogue with the residents,” said a municipality spokesperson, referencing reaching a joint compromise with the Bashir family in Jabal al-Mukaber.
However, the municipality did not respond when asked to elaborate on this agreement. Nas said any proposed settlements in Jabal al-Mukaber are false.
Israeli forces try to disperse Palestinian residents as a Palestinian building, located in Zif village, is demolished by Israel allegedly for being “unlicensed,” in Hebron, West Bank on February 15 / credit: Mamoun Wazwaz / Anadolu Agency
Denying the Right to Build
In a statement to Toward Freedom, the municipality said they will not permit illegal construction in the city. The majority of homes in Jabal al-Mukaber, and throughout East Jerusalem, lack building permits.
According to Jerusalem municipality data obtained by settlement watchdog group, Peace Now, only 16 percent of Jerusalem’s Palestinian neighborhoods received building permits from 1991 to 2018, compared to 38 percent of construction permits approved for Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem. The extreme difficulty Palestinians experience in getting construction permits forces many to build without the necessary approvals or live in homes deemed illegal.
Not only do Palestinians face a labyrinth of bureaucratic procedures when building, but a lack of available land as well. Palestinians in East Jerusalem can only build on 17 percent of the land, while 35 percent is labeled as green spaces or conservation areas. In Jabal al-Mukaber, nearly 70 percent of the land is designated as “open space.”
Mohammad Mashal, 71, received his first demolition notice in 1994. He’s paid 200,000 shekels, or $62,000, in fines over nearly three decades. Mashal consistently applied for a permit, but was always rejected. Just last month, he received another demolition order as part of the 62 cases slated for demolition.
Ahmad Akmasri, 25, explained his father built their home before 1967 and decided to extend it in 2006. In 2010, the family started applying for a permit. But, until now, no building rights have been issued.
“We’re talking about 12 years in which we paid up to 100,000 shekels [$31,000] in fees, applications for the engineers, lawyers, all of what you can imagine, and it’s still not yet done,” Akmasri said.
Akmasri’s family is also embroiled in a separate building obstacle due to the Kaminitz Law. Passed by the Israeli parliament in 2017, it allows officials unlimited power in cracking down on unauthorized building, specifically in granting extensions on demolition orders. In addition to the 62 demolition cases in Jabal al-Mukaber, 70 other cases are related to the Kaminitz Law, including Akmasri’s family. With this new legislation, the family faces yet another fine after being unable to secure an extension in 2020 over administrative issues spurred by the coronavirus pandemic.
Raed Bashir, the lawyer representing the neighborhood, submitted repeated objections to the municipal court against the demolition orders—all of which were rejected. But the movement remains steadfast as Bashir plans to submit next month an objection to Israel’s Supreme Court.
Mousa Jumah, 61, received a demolition notice about a decade ago.
“We have no rest in our life,” he said, describing a tense environment not unlike the atmosphere of the March 20 protest. “We are under pressure, and pressure leads to explosion.”
Amid the beating of drums and marching demonstrators inching closer and closer to barricaded city hall doors, Jumah captured the sentiment under the loud chanting: A sense of perpetual uncertainty.
“We have no future,” Jumah said. “We are wasted in this world.”
Jessica Buxbaum is a Jerusalem-based freelance journalist reporting on Palestine and the Israeli occupation. You can follow her on Twitter at @jess_buxbaum.
