Editor’s Note: This video report was produced by African Stream.
Nubians are one of the oldest peoples of the Nile Valley. They are also one of its most recently displaced. Originally from Sudan and southern Egypt, Nubians had settlements going back 7,000 years in this cradle of civilization. That is, until massive, state-driven construction projects came along, forever changing the environment—and their lives.
The conflict between Palestine and Israel has been raging officially for more than seven decades, making it the world’s longest-running dispute.
Jordan’s domestic and foreign policies have been affected because it shares its border with occupied Palestine and the state of Israel. However, it is clear based on recent occurrences that the landlocked country is playing an increasingly insignificant role in the dispute, even though the peace process would be incomplete without the kingdom’s input. In fact, until the 1970s, Jordan was an indispensable player, having hosted thousands of Palestinian refugees. Jordan seems to be trapped by its own security restrictions and has largely ceded the peace process to its rivals, including Egypt.
Earlier this year, during the 11-day war in Gaza, U.S. President Joe Biden spoke twice with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Meanwhile, U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris once telephoned Jordan’s King Abdullah.
Jordan also reacted late to the crisis in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in Jerusalem. For example, Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Al-Safadi took two weeks to respond to the escalating conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis. The response came in a tweet. Later, when he met with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, he only repeated his warnings that “Jerusalem was a red line” and that “Israel was playing with fire.”
Jordan and Egypt play a zero-sum game in the Arab-Israeli peace process. But in recent years, Amman has lost its historic role to Cairo. Cairo mediated between Israel and Hamas in the last Gaza war in 2014. Then in 2017, Cairo mediated a ceasefire between the two Palestinian groups, Hamas and Fatah. Egypt also was active in the prisoner exchange between Palestine and Israel in 2006. Then Egypt sought an immediate ceasefire in the last Gaza war in May. Al-Sisi ordered the opening of the Rafah crossing between Egypt and occupied Palestine, so injured Palestinians could be treated at Egyptian hospitals. The Egyptian government sent mediation teams to Hamas and Israel, intending to send fuel to Hamas’ only power plant. Al-Sisi also allocated $500 million for the reconstruction of Gaza.
Cold Peace
Jordan’s declining role in the Palestinian peace process boils down to a number of reasons. For instance, Jordan’s relationship with Israel has reached its lowest point in recent years. During Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s time in office, King Abdullah did not speak or meet with him.
But it was Israel’s plan to annex parts of the Jordan Valley and the West Bank that became the greatest factor in reducing relations between the two countries. Netanyahu’s aim with the annexation plan was to reduce the economic impact of Covid-19 inside the country and the instability in the unity government. The plan was introduced as part of the so-called “Deal of the Century” U.S. President Donald Trump had touted. Israel’s annexation plan probably was aimed at putting to rest Israel’s dream over the past few decades of occupying from the Nile River to the Euphrates River. Occupying parts of the West Bank would increase Israeli territory and would help snuff out the Palestinian liberation struggle in the West Bank.
It seems Palestinians in the West Bank are likely to change their demand from a “two-state” solution to obtaining equal rights with Israeli citizens, thereby strengthening the “one-state” solution. In the latter case, Palestinians would live side by side with Israelis, instead of under military rule. However, Jordan worries Israel will probably try to force Jordan to accept responsibility for Palestinian refugees in Jordan, as well as the Palestinians displaced by the annexation plan.
Bitter incidents have occurred in recent decades between Israel and Jordan, such as the 1997 assassination of Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal on Jordanian soil that King Abdullah was unaware of, and the shooting of the Israeli embassy guard in Amman in 2017, which Jordan considers a murder. King Abdullah has expressed hopes relations with Israel’s new government under Prime Minister Naftali Bennett will improve, so the turmoil can end. Bennett’s secret visit to Jordan, followed by the sale of water and a trade agreement between the two countries, raised hopes of improved relations. But it should not be forgotten Bennett opposes the two-state solution. In addition, the opposition in Israel—including Netanyahu—have criticized the new Israeli government. Bennett’s government and his cabinet appear afraid Netanyahu will return to power, and that is why they have been struggling to show this government is more efficient and assertive than Netanyahu’s governance of 12 years. Therefore, it is unlikely the new Israeli government will recognize Jordan’s concerns and open a place in its foreign policy to resolve its differences with the Palestinians, as Jordan has indicated it would like.
Forgotten Palestinian refugees
The relationship with the United States and its particular attitude toward the peace process are another reason why Jordan has lost weight in the dispute. Jordan opposed Trump’s “Deal of the Century” because it did not address the issue of Palestinian refugees.
Trump may have left the White House and his “Deal of the Century” may have been forgotten, but the deal has made a long-term impact on Jordan’s security. The plan is in Israel’s interest, as Tel Aviv rejects the right of Palestinians to form a state in the West Bank and gives Jordan weight as an alternative to Palestinian refugees. Trump’s plan allowed the 2.5 million Palestinian refugees living in Jordan to settle permanently in the kingdom, and that is Jordan’s red line.
A close race is underway to increase the role of nations in the peace process. Jordan must re-double its efforts so that it does not lag behind other Arab countries. While Egypt considers the Gaza Strip as it plans its security, Jordan must emphasize the role of the West Bank in its national security. Jordan currently has no ties to Hamas after expelling the group in 1999 for fear of the Muslim Brotherhood infiltrating the country. Meanwhile, Egypt, despite ideological differences, contacted Hamas and was able to use its influence in the 11-day Gaza ceasefire.
Jordan needs to better understand the geopolitical realities of the region and improve its relations with other countries, such as Iran, Turkey, Iraq and Syria, so it can renew its capabilities in the long-standing conflict.
Dr. Mohammad Salami holds a Ph.D. in international relations. He is a specialist in Middle Eastern policy, particularly that of Syria, Iran, Yemen and the Persian Gulf region. His areas of expertise include politics and governance, security and counterterrorism. Dr. Salami is an analyst and columnist for various media outlets. He can be followed on Twitter at @moh_salami and he can be reached via email at mo.salami@hotmail.com.
Editor’s Note: The following is the writer’s analysis of Russia-Sudan relations.
Russia’s ambitious plans to establish a naval base in Sudan could soon be thwarted. The northeast African country is reportedly trying to “blackmail” Moscow by demanding a review of a deal allowing construction of a Russian naval facility on Sudan’s Red Sea coast.
In November 2020, the Kremlin announced plans to build a seaport technical facility in the city of Port Sudan, guaranteeing Russia’s first substantial military foothold in Africa since the former Soviet Union was dismantled. The two countries reached a deal that would allow Russia’s navy a 25-year lease in Port Sudan, housing up to four ships and 300 soldiers, in exchange for weapons and military equipment for the northeast African country.
But now, a Russian state news agency, RIA Novosti, reports Sudan wants to re-negotiate the deal. One Russian publication went so far as to call it “blackmail.” In exchange for providing the land for a naval base to Russia, Khartoum reportedly has asked Moscow to arrange payments to the country’s central bank during the first five years of the lease, with the option of extending the deal to 25 years.
The Kremlin has not yet responded to the proposal, although Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov said the two countries’ militaries continue negotiations on the creation of a naval logistics base for Russian warships in the Red Sea. Sudan’s officials, on the other hand, strongly deny their country has been trying to “blackmail” Moscow.
“It is not true. This news is not true. This is groundless news. The Sudanese side is not asking for any payments in connection with the military base agreement,” said Onur Ahmad Onur, charge d’affaires of Sudan’s embassy in Moscow.
Whether or not Sudan really asked Russia for financial compensation, the Kremlin’s struggle to improve its positions in northeast Africa is unlikely to be an easy one. Back in June, it became obvious Russia could face many obstacles in its attempts to establish a material-technical support facility in the strategically important region located between the Gulf of Aden in the south and the Suez Canal in the north. Such a facility could provide material support in the form of ships and soldiers and technical support in the form of command, control, communication, computer and intelligence operations.
On June 1, Sudanese Armed Forces Chief of Staff Muhammad Usman al-Hussein announced the revision of the agreement. About three weeks later, the Sudanese Minister of Defense Yasin Ibrahim Yasin traveled to Moscow to discuss Russian-Sudanese military cooperation with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Shoigu.
In an interview with Russian state-owned news agency RIA Novosti, Al-Mahdi openly stressed Sudan needs Russia’s help regarding the country’s dispute with neighboring Ethiopia, which is building the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)—a hydroelectric-power gravity dam on the Blue Nile River.
“Thanks to its good relations with Ethiopia, Russia can try to convince the Ethiopian side to listen to the voice of reason and come to an agreement that will not do harm to Sudan, as was the case when the dam was first filled,” Al-Mahdi said.
Khartoum fears Ethiopia’s apparent determination to fill the GERD would “threaten the lives of half the population in central Sudan.” In addition, the two countries have a decades-old border dispute, and some analysts claim Sudan and Ethiopia are on the verge of a wide-scale confrontation. It is worth noting Russia and Ethiopia signed a military cooperation agreement in July, and Kremlin officials claim the deal “does not have any destabilizing character.” However, Sudan recently seized Russian-made weapons—72 boxes of arms and night-vision binoculars—that were reportedly smuggled to Khartoum from Ethiopia. This was seen as an “attempt to destabilize the country.” It is entirely possible Russia is trying to balance between the two regional rivals, although Moscow could attempt to indirectly pressure Sudan to give the green light for the establishment of the Russian naval base in the Red Sea.
At this point, it remains uncertain if the Sudanese parliament will ratify the agreement on the Russian base in Port Sudan. Some Russian experts think the construction of a Russian military facility on the Red Sea is unlikely.
“Russia is not going to pay Sudan to host a base in Port Sudan,” said Dmitry Zakharov, head of the Eurasian Institute of Youth Initiatives. “Due to the unthinkable corruption in the African country, the Russian government has no desire to invest in such a project.”
Unlike the Kremlin, the United States seems willing to provide limited financial assistance to Sudan. On August 29, Sudan’s Ministry of Finance and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) signed an agreement for a $5.5 million development grant to support “democratic transition” and to promote economic growth. This is part of a total estimated amount of $200 million to be granted by 2024.
Overall, it is Russia, rather than Sudan, that seeks to strengthen its geopolitical positions in the strategically important region. Thus, the coming days and weeks will show if Russia will adopt a more proactive approach regarding this sensitive issue. One thing is for sure: The naval base on the Red Sea would be just the first step in Russia’s ambitions plans to return to Africa, a region that has ceased to be in Moscow’s geopolitical orbit in the post-Soviet years.
Nikola Mikovic is a Serbia-based contributor to CGTN, Global Comment, Byline Times, Informed Comment, and World Geostrategic Insights, among other publications. He is a geopolitical analyst for KJ Reports and Global Wonks.
Editor’s Note: The following is the writer’s opinion and represents the first in a 2-part series on the October 25 Sudan coup. Part 2 can be read here.
The October 25 military coup d’etat in Sudan marked the collapse of the unstable and rotten compromise between the military and liberals that took place in the summer of 2019. That deal was brokered to stop the mass revolutionary process that had erupted and overthrown President Omar al-Bashir, who had been in power for 30 years. Despite the military junta’s declaration of a state of the emergency, the masses poured into the streets of the capital, Khartoum. Even Abdalla Hamdok was reinstated as prime minister by the military junta. The people in the streets who have fought and shed blood for a month to win civilian rule have met this news not with jubilation, but with rage.
What is going on in Sudan? This question constitutes the first point of contention in the international community, and this political dispute is, of course, reflected in the media. At a time when the idea is being promoted that differences in the international community over what is happening are nothing more than a reflection of the international conflict, it should be remembered that the Sudanese people are most concerned with this division.
It is often said the events in Sudan until this moment were an intense expression of an international conflict. From this correct idea, another wrong idea was adopted, which was that the Sudanese people inevitably will be victims of these international duels. To respond to this idea, the conflicting parties in Sudan must first be described.
Internal Forces Share Power
What are the features of the “old” that should be changed?
The main contradiction in Sudan is among looters, regardless of their dress and political names, and regardless of whether they are “civilians” or “militaries.” However, the poles of the current conflict were only partly an expression of this basic contradiction. When the Sudanese people took to the streets at the end of 2018, they were expressing the need for the required profound change, and with Bashir’s security committee, formed from the main military forces in the country, removed him from power.
The Sudanese Sovereign Council is an 11-member body that was created after Bashir’s ouster through the draft constitutional declaration in August 2019 in the South Sudanese city of Juba. Members of a civilian group called Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) and leaders of the Transitional Military Council (TMC) comprised this council, a collective body that was meant to act as the head of state until November. Instead, the council was dissolved with the October 25 coup. Council leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan announced the dissolution, adding it would be replaced with a government that would be nominated.
Up to the formation of the Sudanese Sovereign Council and its recently dissolved government, Sudan began to witness political changes in the governance structures, without the required deep change. The structure of the Sudanese regime was characterized by basic general features. It is not possible to talk about an actual transformation if the Sudanese people did not perceive a change in these features, which has not happened until now.
So what are these basic features? The Sudanese national framework is placed at the top of this list, as Sudan has lost its southern part and is living in a continuous state of armed civil conflicts in scattered areas of the country. These elements constituted a double threat to the unity of Sudan, meaning the primary challenge is Sudanese people live in an entity whose existence is threatened.
In addition to these existential dangers, Sudan was systematically looted by the West through Sudanese intermediaries, and its people were starved and impoverished, so unemployment and marginalization increased. The production process in all its forms was hampered to turn Sudan’s fertile lands into battlefields. Its workers and peasants were turned into fuel for these conflicts, and mercenaries in foreign wars.
The Sudanese have nothing to do with it. Sudan was blackmailed by placing it on the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list, and turning it into a country that lives on Western aid and loans with well-known political conditions in place. All this came in addition to disrupting political life and the absence of effective national forces caused by suppression, then plunging the country into conflict with armed forces, whose voice for long periods overshadowed the voice of the national forces.
UNSC Speaks on the Coup
How can we read the positions of the primary forces in conflict?
The dispute erupted between the civilian and military components of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council after a conflict that remained unabated even after the body was established. In fact, no clear distinctions in the positions of the “civilians” or the “militaries” emerged. Both parties contributed to the consolidation of the liberal policies that brought the conditions of the Sudanese to this point. Both parties clearly contributed to the notorious normalization agreement with the Zionist entity known as Israel, and neither provided any serious direction to establish national reconciliation to prevent the fragmentation of the country. Despite their seemingly identical positions, the military’s move on October 25 constituted a controversial point on the international scene, which indicated regional and international powers differentiate between the two components of the Sovereign Council. That led to the UN Security Council failing several times to obtain consensus on a statement on the events in Khartoum. When a statement emerged on October 28, the UNSC described what happened as “controlling the power,” not as a coup. The statement also stressed the “need to adhere to the constitutional document and the peace agreement in Juba” and called on the authorities. The military was asked to “restore the civilian-led transitional government on the basis of the Constitutional Document and other foundational documents of the transition.”
The difficulty in adopting this statement did not in any way end the divided opinions on what occurred in Sudan. Rather, it reflects the international balance of power that has impeded a correct characterization of the coup and softened rhetoric toward the military.
Returning to the White House’s Bosom
But the most important question remains: What has caused different countries to take various positions on the military move?
After the military overthrew Bashir in 2019, Sudan entered a period of anxiety that drastically changed its relationship with the world. The most noticeable of which was Sudan’s official and gradual return to the bosom of the “Western House”—a term used for the White House. This involved re-opening the door for loans, lifting sanctions, and removing Sudan from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list, among other things.
All this prompted observers to search for the price Sudan had to pay in exchange for this “Western amnesty.” At first glance, it seemed to be normalization of relations with the Zionist entity, Israel. However, events today indicate normalization was only the public aspect of the cost to Sudan. The military component was the first to brag about relations with the Zionist entity. However, the West seems very concerned about the military’s unique power and the exclusion of the civilian component. The primary explanation for all this appears to lie in the obscured part of the price Sudan paid to the Washington. Although it is difficult to be certain about this issue, we can conclude the West is more comfortable with the Sudanese Sovereign Council’s civilian component headed by the now resigned Abdalla Hamdok, who grew up within the same Western institution and is considered close to it. The civilian component would build relations with the West and Washington at the expense of Russia and China, for example. Hence, removing Sudan from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism and other facilities came as an opportunity to restore these relations and push relations with Russia and China to a kind of apathy, in addition to some indicators coming from Egypt.
Questions raised about Hamdok’s position on the Renaissance Dam, which is being built in Ethiopia and threatens to cut off water access to Egypt, expresses Washington’s tacit satisfaction with the Sudanese army’s move. It seems the list goes on to include differences in attitudes of the civilian and military components on the nature of Sudan’s relationship with the world. Although some of those attitudes are still unknown, but we can expect to hear of them soon.
The door to interpretations is very wide, but it will not be long before the players reveal their secrets as positions and alignments cannot be hidden for long. Power today is in the hands of the Sudanese army, which is subject to external and internal pressures. From this particular angle, it can win over the Sudanese people’s support in confronting external pressures. Sudan needs to alter its position in the global conflict to be in the place that meets the interests of its people. That is, inevitably away from the Western camp and Washington.
Kribsoo Diallo is a Cairo-based Pan-Africanist researcher in political science related to African affairs. He has written for many African magazines and newspapers, and Diallo has contributed to translated editions of papers and articles in Arabic and English for several research centers within the African continent.
Copyright Toward Freedom 2019