State Construction Projects on Nile River Have Long Displaced Nubians In Egypt and Sudan

Editor’s Note: The following is the writer’s opinion and represents the first in a 2-part series on the October 25 Sudan coup. Part 2 can be read here.

The October 25 military coup d’etat in Sudan marked the collapse of the unstable and rotten compromise between the military and liberals that took place in the summer of 2019. That deal was brokered to stop the mass revolutionary process that had erupted and overthrown President Omar al-Bashir, who had been in power for 30 years. Despite the military junta’s declaration of a state of the emergency, the masses poured into the streets of the capital, Khartoum. Even Abdalla Hamdok was reinstated as prime minister by the military junta. The people in the streets who have fought and shed blood for a month to win civilian rule have met this news not with jubilation, but with rage.

What is going on in Sudan? This question constitutes the first point of contention in the international community, and this political dispute is, of course, reflected in the media. At a time when the idea is being promoted that differences in the international community over what is happening are nothing more than a reflection of the international conflict, it should be remembered that the Sudanese people are most concerned with this division.

It is often said the events in Sudan until this moment were an intense expression of an international conflict. From this correct idea, another wrong idea was adopted, which was that the Sudanese people inevitably will be victims of these international duels. To respond to this idea, the conflicting parties in Sudan must first be described.

Internal Forces Share Power

What are the features of the “old” that should be changed?

The main contradiction in Sudan is among looters, regardless of their dress and political names, and regardless of whether they are “civilians” or “militaries.” However, the poles of the current conflict were only partly an expression of this basic contradiction. When the Sudanese people took to the streets at the end of 2018, they were expressing the need for the required profound change, and with Bashir’s security committee, formed from the main military forces in the country, removed him from power. 

The Sudanese Sovereign Council is an 11-member body that was created after Bashir’s ouster through the draft constitutional declaration in August 2019 in the South Sudanese city of Juba. Members of a civilian group called Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) and leaders of the Transitional Military Council (TMC) comprised this council, a collective body that was meant to act as the head of state until November. Instead, the council was dissolved with the October 25 coup. Council leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan announced the dissolution, adding it would be replaced with a government that would be nominated.

Up to the formation of the Sudanese Sovereign Council and its recently dissolved government, Sudan began to witness political changes in the governance structures, without the required deep change. The structure of the Sudanese regime was characterized by basic general features. It is not possible to talk about an actual transformation if the Sudanese people did not perceive a change in these features, which has not happened until now. 

So what are these basic features? The Sudanese national framework is placed at the top of this list, as Sudan has lost its southern part and is living in a continuous state of armed civil conflicts in scattered areas of the country. These elements constituted a double threat to the unity of Sudan, meaning the primary challenge is Sudanese people live in an entity whose existence is threatened.

In addition to these existential dangers, Sudan was systematically looted by the West through Sudanese intermediaries, and its people were starved and impoverished, so unemployment and marginalization increased. The production process in all its forms was hampered to turn Sudan’s fertile lands into battlefields. Its workers and peasants were turned into fuel for these conflicts, and mercenaries in foreign wars.

The Sudanese have nothing to do with it. Sudan was blackmailed by placing it on the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list, and turning it into a country that lives on Western aid and loans with well-known political conditions in place. All this came in addition to disrupting political life and the absence of effective national forces caused by suppression, then plunging the country into conflict with armed forces, whose voice for long periods overshadowed the voice of the national forces.

UNSC Speaks on the Coup

How can we read the positions of the primary forces in conflict?

The dispute erupted between the civilian and military components of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council after a conflict that remained unabated even after the body was established. In fact, no clear distinctions in the positions of the “civilians” or the “militaries” emerged. Both parties contributed to the consolidation of the liberal policies that brought the conditions of the Sudanese to this point. Both parties clearly contributed to the notorious normalization agreement with the Zionist entity known as Israel, and neither provided any serious direction to establish national reconciliation to prevent the fragmentation of the country. Despite their seemingly identical positions, the military’s move on October 25 constituted a controversial point on the international scene, which indicated regional and international powers differentiate between the two components of the Sovereign Council. That led to the UN Security Council failing several times to obtain consensus on a statement on the events in Khartoum. When a statement emerged on October 28, the UNSC described what happened as “controlling the power,” not as a coup. The statement also stressed the “need to adhere to the constitutional document and the peace agreement in Juba” and called on the authorities. The military was asked to “restore the civilian-led transitional government on the basis of the Constitutional Document and other foundational documents of the transition.”

The difficulty in adopting this statement did not in any way end the divided opinions on what occurred in Sudan. Rather, it reflects the international balance of power that has impeded a correct characterization of the coup and softened rhetoric toward the military. 

Returning to the White House’s Bosom

But the most important question remains: What has caused different countries to take various positions on the military move? 

After the military overthrew Bashir in 2019, Sudan entered a period of anxiety that drastically changed its relationship with the world. The most noticeable of which was Sudan’s official and gradual return to the bosom of the “Western House”—a term used for the White House. This involved re-opening the door for loans, lifting sanctions, and removing Sudan from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list, among other things. 

All this prompted observers to search for the price Sudan had to pay in exchange for this “Western amnesty.” At first glance, it seemed to be normalization of relations with the Zionist entity, Israel. However, events today indicate normalization was only the public aspect of the cost to Sudan. The military component was the first to brag about relations with the Zionist entity. However, the West seems very concerned about the military’s unique power and the exclusion of the civilian component. The primary explanation for all this appears to lie in the obscured part of the price Sudan paid to the Washington. Although it is difficult to be certain about this issue, we can conclude the West is more comfortable with the Sudanese Sovereign Council’s civilian component headed by the now resigned Abdalla Hamdok, who grew up within the same Western institution and is considered close to it. The civilian component would build relations with the West and Washington at the expense of Russia and China, for example. Hence, removing Sudan from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism and other facilities came as an opportunity to restore these relations and push relations with Russia and China to a kind of apathy, in addition to some indicators coming from Egypt.

Questions raised about Hamdok’s position on the Renaissance Dam, which is being built in Ethiopia and threatens to cut off water access to Egypt, expresses Washington’s tacit satisfaction with the Sudanese army’s move. It seems the list goes on to include differences in attitudes of the civilian and military components on the nature of Sudan’s relationship with the world. Although some of those attitudes are still unknown, but we can expect to hear of them soon.

The door to interpretations is very wide, but it will not be long before the players reveal their secrets as positions and alignments cannot be hidden for long. Power today is in the hands of the Sudanese army, which is subject to external and internal pressures. From this particular angle, it can win over the Sudanese people’s support in confronting external pressures. Sudan needs to alter its position in the global conflict to be in the place that meets the interests of its people. That is, inevitably away from the Western camp and Washington.

Kribsoo Diallo is a Cairo-based Pan-Africanist researcher in political science related to African affairs. He has written for many African magazines and newspapers, and Diallo has contributed to translated editions of papers and articles in Arabic and English for several research centers within the African continent.

The conflict between Palestine and Israel has been raging officially for more than seven decades, making it the world’s longest-running dispute.

Jordan’s domestic and foreign policies have been affected because it shares its border with occupied Palestine and the state of Israel. However, it is clear based on recent occurrences that the landlocked country is playing an increasingly insignificant role in the dispute, even though the peace process would be incomplete without the kingdom’s input. In fact, until the 1970s, Jordan was an indispensable player, having hosted thousands of Palestinian refugees. Jordan seems to be trapped by its own security restrictions and has largely ceded the peace process to its rivals, including Egypt.

Earlier this year, during the 11-day war in Gaza, U.S. President Joe Biden spoke twice with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Meanwhile, U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris once telephoned Jordan’s King Abdullah.

Jordan also reacted late to the crisis in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in Jerusalem. For example, Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Al-Safadi took two weeks to respond to the escalating conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis. The response came in a tweet. Later, when he met with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, he only repeated his warnings that “Jerusalem was a red line” and that “Israel was playing with fire.”

Jordan and Egypt play a zero-sum game in the Arab-Israeli peace process. But in recent years, Amman has lost its historic role to Cairo. Cairo mediated between Israel and Hamas in the last Gaza war in 2014. Then in 2017, Cairo mediated a ceasefire between the two Palestinian groups, Hamas and Fatah. Egypt also was active in the prisoner exchange between Palestine and Israel in 2006. Then Egypt sought an immediate ceasefire in the last Gaza war in May. Al-Sisi ordered the opening of the Rafah crossing between Egypt and occupied Palestine, so injured Palestinians could be treated at Egyptian hospitals. The Egyptian government sent mediation teams to Hamas and Israel, intending to send fuel to Hamas’ only power plant. Al-Sisi also allocated $500 million for the reconstruction of Gaza.

 

Cold Peace

Jordan’s declining role in the Palestinian peace process boils down to a number of reasons. For instance, Jordan’s relationship with Israel has reached its lowest point in recent years. During Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s time in office, King Abdullah did not speak or meet with him.

But it was Israel’s plan to annex parts of the Jordan Valley and the West Bank that became the greatest factor in reducing relations between the two countries. Netanyahu’s aim with the annexation plan was to reduce the economic impact of Covid-19 inside the country and the instability in the unity government. The plan was introduced as part of the so-called “Deal of the Century” U.S. President Donald Trump had touted. Israel’s annexation plan probably was aimed at putting to rest Israel’s dream over the past few decades of occupying from the Nile River to the Euphrates River. Occupying parts of the West Bank would increase Israeli territory and would help snuff out the Palestinian liberation struggle in the West Bank.

It seems Palestinians in the West Bank are likely to change their demand from a “two-state” solution to obtaining equal rights with Israeli citizens, thereby strengthening the “one-state” solution. In the latter case, Palestinians would live side by side with Israelis, instead of under military rule. However, Jordan worries Israel will probably try to force Jordan to accept responsibility for Palestinian refugees in Jordan, as well as the Palestinians displaced by the annexation plan.

Bitter incidents have occurred in recent decades between Israel and Jordan, such as the 1997 assassination of Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal on Jordanian soil that King Abdullah was unaware of, and the shooting of the Israeli embassy guard in Amman in 2017, which Jordan considers a murder. King Abdullah has expressed hopes relations with Israel’s new government under Prime Minister Naftali Bennett will improve, so the turmoil can end. Bennett’s secret visit to Jordan, followed by the sale of water and a trade agreement between the two countries, raised hopes of improved relations. But it should not be forgotten Bennett opposes the two-state solution. In addition, the opposition in Israel—including Netanyahu—have criticized the new Israeli government. Bennett’s government and his cabinet appear afraid Netanyahu will return to power, and that is why they have been struggling to show this government is more efficient and assertive than Netanyahu’s governance of 12 years. Therefore, it is unlikely the new Israeli government will recognize Jordan’s concerns and open a place in its foreign policy to resolve its differences with the Palestinians, as Jordan has indicated it would like.

 

Forgotten Palestinian refugees

The relationship with the United States and its particular attitude toward the peace process are another reason why Jordan has lost weight in the dispute. Jordan opposed Trump’s “Deal of the Century” because it did not address the issue of Palestinian refugees.

Trump may have left the White House and his “Deal of the Century” may have been forgotten, but the deal has made a long-term impact on Jordan’s security. The plan is in Israel’s interest, as Tel Aviv rejects the right of Palestinians to form a state in the West Bank and gives Jordan weight as an alternative to Palestinian refugees. Trump’s plan allowed the 2.5 million Palestinian refugees living in Jordan to settle permanently in the kingdom, and that is Jordan’s red line.

A close race is underway to increase the role of nations in the peace process. Jordan must re-double its efforts so that it does not lag behind other Arab countries. While Egypt considers the Gaza Strip as it plans its security, Jordan must emphasize the role of the West Bank in its national security. Jordan currently has no ties to Hamas after expelling the group in 1999 for fear of the Muslim Brotherhood infiltrating the country. Meanwhile, Egypt, despite ideological differences, contacted Hamas and was able to use its influence in the 11-day Gaza ceasefire.

Jordan needs to better understand the geopolitical realities of the region and improve its relations with other countries, such as Iran, Turkey, Iraq and Syria, so it can renew its capabilities in the long-standing conflict.

Dr. Mohammad Salami holds a Ph.D. in international relations. He is a specialist in Middle Eastern policy, particularly that of Syria, Iran, Yemen and the Persian Gulf region. His areas of expertise include politics and governance, security and counterterrorism. Dr. Salami is an analyst and columnist for various media outlets. He can be followed on Twitter at @moh_salami and he can be reached via email at [email protected].

Editor’s Note: This article was originally published by Peoples Dispatch.

Tensions simmering between Sudan’s army and the powerful paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) boiled over into armed clashes on the morning of Saturday, April 15, following disagreements over the integration of the autonomous RSF into the army’s command chain.

The issue of integration was a key aspect of a deal that Sudan’s ruling junta was to sign with right-wing civilian forces to share power with the latter. The left in Sudan has been critical of the proposed deal, questioning the sincerity of the parties. Speaking to Peoples Dispatch a few hours before the fighting broke out, the Sudanese Communist Party’s Foreign Relations Secretary, Saleh Mahmoud, said “Both the forces, the army and the RSF, have a mutual interest in escalating armed conflict, so that it can be used as a reason to not hand over power to the civilian forces.”

According to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the air force carried out strikes destroying RSF’s Tiba and Soba base in Khartoum State on Saturday. Heavy gunfire began in the morning in several cities, including in the vicinity of the Presidential Palace and the airport in the capital Khartoum city.

Earlier, the RSF, which is led by the ruling military junta’s deputy chairman, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, aka Hemeti, claimed to have taken control of the Presidential Palace, the seat of the junta’s chairman and army chief, General Abdel Fattah al Burhan.

Later, however, after continued fighting, the SAF claimed that the RSF troops had left their weapons behind and fled the the presidential palace area to hide in the residential areas. The army has called on the residents to stay home.

The RSF had also claimed to have taken control of the airports in Khartoum and in El-Obeid, over 400 km southwest of Khartoum in the state of North Kordofan. It also claimed control over the military airbase in Merowe, 200 km to Khartoum’s north, in the Northern State which borders Egypt.

While Hemeti is backed by the UAE, Egypt, which is said to be backing Burhan in this internal struggle, reportedly has planes in this airbase, making it a crucial infrastructure.

On April 12, at least a hundred RSF vehicles surrounded this airbase. Sudan Tribune reported that  “the army surrounded the RSF troops and requested them to evacuate but the paramilitary force refused.” Subsequently, military vehicles of the RSF also rolled into Khartoum and several other cities.

Complaining that “this deployment and repositioning” of the RSF “clearly violates the law,” the SAF spokesperson issued a statement at 3 a.m. on Thursday, warning that the  “continuation” of such deployments “will inevitably cause more divisions and tensions that may lead to the collapse of security in the country.”

According to the RSF, which first issued a statement on the fighting, clashes began after a surprise attack by the army on its troops in Soba, before simultaneous attacks on its bases in several other cities. The SAF has in turn accused the RSF of lying to conceal its own aggression.

RSF and the Army Worked Together to Protect Military Rule from Pro-Democracy Movement

Established in 2013, the RSF was formed by coalescing the various militias used by the state during the civil war in Darfur in the 2000s to commit alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.

Omar al-Bashir, the former dictator under whose administration these alleged crimes were committed, stands trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC). He was forced out of power on April 11, 2019, about four months after the start of the pro-democracy protests that have come to be known as the December Revolution.

By the time of his ouster, the RSF had become, and remains, one of the most powerful organizations in the country with a vast financial network built on mining gold in Darfur. Hemeti had pledged over a billion dollars to help stabilize Sudan’s central bank in the aftermath of Bashir’s removal.

Such increasing power and influence of the RSF have been making the army uneasy over the years. Reports about underlying tensions between the Burhan and Hemeti have been frequent. However, united with the intent to maintain military rule and protect it from the December Revolution, the two forces had been working together.

The junta formed by the generals in Bashir’s security committee after his removal was chaired by army chief Burhan, who in turn declared RSF head Hemeti his deputy on April 12, 2019, exactly four years before he would deploy the RSF to surround Merowe military airbase.

When the mass sit-in demonstration occupying the square outside the army HQ continued after Bashir’s removal, insisting on a civilian administration, the junta deployed the RSF on June 3, 2019. In the massacre that followed, RSF troops killed over a hundred protesters, wounding many more and raping several while the army watched over from its HQ.

Right-Wing Parties Seek Compromise with the Military Junta, Again

In the aftermath of this massacre, right-wing parties in the coalition, Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), entered into negotiations with the junta, forming a joint civilian-military transitional government in August 2019. In protest against this compromise, the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), a key player in the December Revolution, broke away from the FFC, which was formed in January that year to represent the pro-democracy protest movement.

Under this power-sharing arrangement with the FFC, the military controlled the defense, the police, the foreign policy, and much of Sudan’s economy. The little power that was ceded to the FFC-chosen civilians in this government was taken back with the military coup in October 2021, since when military rule has been absolute.

“No negotiations, No Compromise, No partnership” with the military, is a slogan that has been resonating in the mass-protests that have continued since the coup, regularly drawing hundreds of thousands to the streets in several towns and cities across the country.

Disregarding this popular call for the complete overthrow of the junta and the prosecution of its generals under a fully civilian transitional government, the FFC returned right back to negotiations after the coup, seeking a compromise and partnership with the military again.

The unpopular negotiations were supported by the Trilateral Mechanism, formed by the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), African Union (AU), and the seven-countries regional bloc, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

The United States threw its weight behind these negotiations, imposing pressure on the military as well as the right-wing FFC parties to make compromises and come to another power-sharing agreement.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which are backing Burhan, and the UAE, which is backing Hemeti, all want a military regime in Sudan, albeit with different hierarchical structures, Fathi Elfadl, national spokesperson of the SCP, told Peoples Dispatch.

“But the Americans,” he added, “have been pushing for a comprehensive agreement with the FFC to establish a civilian authority, which, however, will only serve as a cover for the real authority that will be invested in the Security and Defense Council controlled by the junta.”

Under much Western pressure and growing threats to their authority from the radical mass-movements below, the junta and the FFC signed a Framework Agreement in December 2022, laying the path toward a final political agreement on another power-sharing arrangement.

By then, at least 120 had been killed and thousands injured in the crackdown on pro-democracy protests by the army, the police, and the RSF. Yet, unwilling to compromise with the military, the network of over 5,000 local Resistance Committees (RCs) across Sudan, which have been leading the mass-protests since the coup, rejected the agreement, and vowed to continue mass-actions till the junta is toppled.

Hundreds of more protesters have since suffered injuries in the crackdown that has continued despite the junta’s commitment in the Framework agreement to respect “international human rights charters.. freedoms of peaceful assembly and expression”.

While the agreement stated that a civilian Prime Minister will be the supreme commander of the armed forces, Burhan clarified to media only days later that the “civilian Supreme Commander of the SAF” neither “presides over the army chief” nor appoints him, but “only approves recommendations made to him.”

Despite these demonstrations of bad faith, the FFC proceeded under the aegis of the trilateral mechanism to negotiate the contested issues left unresolved in the framework agreement.

These included the review of the Juba peace agreement which has brought no peace to the war-torn regions like Blue Nile and Darfur where hundreds of thousands have been displaced since in continuing armed attacks, mostly by the RSF and the militias it supports. Another contested issue was the nature of transitional justice for the victims of the June 3 massacre and other atrocities.

With several compromises, the FFC had found common ground with the junta on most of these issues by last month when the signatories of the framework agreement announced that the final political agreement will be signed by April 1. This was to be followed by a constitutional declaration on April 6, and finally, the establishment of the new joint transitional government by April 11, the anniversary of the overthrow of Bashir.

‘Only Way Out of the Crisis Is to Restore the Revolution’

However, on April 1, the signing of the political agreement was postponed to April 6, and then indefinitely delayed. The FFC said that the delay was caused due to a disagreement between the army and the RSF over the integration of the latter into the former’s structure.

While Burhan is insisting that the integration should take place within the two years of the transitional period by the end of which an election is to be held as per the agreement, Hemeti has refused, demanding 10 years.

“By lining up with the RSF in this dispute, the FFC has lost the little credibility they may have been left with after entering into negotiations with the junta for the second time,” SCP’s Foreign Relations Secretary, Saleh Mahmoud, told Peoples Dispatch.

While the FFC has denied the allegation, Middle East Eye reported that according to a draft of the final agreement it has seen, a period of 10 years had been agreed upon for this process of integration. Given that the FFC claims that it is only the disagreement within the security forces that is impeding the final agreement, the provision of 10 years in the draft might be an indication of the FFC’s willingness to allow the notorious paramilitary another decade of autonomy.

One explanation for the alleged siding of the FFC with the RSF is that the RSF agrees with the FFC that parties that have not signed the framework agreement should not be a part of the political agreement or have a share in state power. Burhan, however, has shown his keenness to also include other parties outside the framework agreement, especially those who had been in alliance with the ousted Bashir’s Islamist National Congress Party (NCP).

With the escalation of hostilities, however, the prospect of a final political agreement on the basis of the framework agreement has practically fallen apart, argued Mahmoud.

SCP reiterated in its statement that “the only way to get out of the crisis is to restore the revolution and establish the authority of the people.”