ANC Secretary-General Says Putin Welcome In South Africa Despite ICC Arrest Warrant

As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) broadens into Finland and Sweden, and the U.S.-dominated alliance continues to arm Ukraine, members of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) have refused to support Moscow’s “special military operation.” Kremlin allies such Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have continued with their neutral stance on the three-month war, while Belarus openly supports the intervention.

On May 16, CSTO member countries held a summit in Moscow, marking the 30th anniversary of the organization, which could play a significant role if the situation in Central Asia deteriorates.

According to Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, CSTO needs to consider all potential threats and pay more attention to ensuring the security of the sensitive region.

Ukraine War Overshadows Central Asian Conflict

Reports suggest Tajikistani forces recently launched an anti-terrorist operation against anti-government militants in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province, which borders Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and China. Prior to those clashes, the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) group reportedly fired rockets from Afghanistan into Tajikistan.

“Given the current security situation in northern Afghanistan, I anticipate that these reported rocket attacks will not be the last cross-border attacks from IS-K,” Brent Hierman, a professor of international studies and political science at Virginia Military Institute, told Toward Freedom. “Since the Tajikistani government fully denies the event, we are left with a pretty unclear picture of what may have occurred and what IS-K was targeting. However, it is the case that IS-K is trying to recruit Central Asians—especially Tajiks and Uzbeks—while also undermining Taliban claims on northern Afghanistan.”

In his view, Russian security concerns with regard to Tajikistan are overshadowed by its war in Ukraine.

However, a potential destabilization of Tajikistan could have a serious impact on Russia, given Moscow’s military base.

“Russian forces in Tajikistan, which used to be called the 201st Motor Rifle division, have long been used to secure the country’s southern border. Some of the troops stationed there have been sent to the war in Ukraine, although it is unclear how many,” said Heirman, emphasizing that Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan is more vulnerable now as a consequence.

At the same time, Tajik authorities are faced with hostilities in Gorno-Badakhshan, which complicates the situation. Heirman, however, does not expect CSTO to intervene in Tajikistan, even though some Kyrgyz experts believe the Moscow-led military bloc could soon deploy troops to the Central Asian nation.

“For more than a decade, Tajik authorities have been attempting to centralize control, and especially gain dominance over access to profitable revenue sources in Gorno-Badakhshan. The recent events are rooted in this effort,” Heirman stressed, pointing out that clashes in the region have a domestic source, although the government has framed them as terror threats.

The Kazakhstan Question

It is worth remembering that the violent mass protests in Kazakhstan, which broke out in early January, also had a domestic source. Nevertheless, CSTO deployed some 2,000 troops to the energy-rich country, and helped Tokayev stay in power. It is widely believed that what happened in Kazakhstan was a coup attempt. Now, some Chinese experts claim that the CSTO will soon have to deal with the emerging threats of terrorism and color revolutions. How likely is another “color revolution” attempt in Kazakhstan?

“If Chinese analysts believe there will be an emerging threat of terrorism, I would assume this would be a Western-sponsored terror threat,” Hrvoje Moric, a global perspectives teacher at Nazarbayev Intellectual Schools in Kazakhstan, told Toward Freedom. “The United States and Europe together with Gulf countries have been arming, training, and financing terrorists for decades. There is a new lawsuit implicating U.S.-ally Qatar as a sponsor of ISIS. This is a recent example, but is really nothing new.”

Moric, who has lived in Kazakhstan for three years, believes that the Kremlin’s ally will remain in Moscow’s geopolitical orbit, and will not abandon the Russia-led Eurasian Union and CSTO. Moreover, he expects Kazakhstan to participate in potential CSTO missions abroad.

CSTO’s Role in Ukraine

Moscow claims that Ukrainian forces have attacked Russian territory on several occasions, destroying oil depots and other important infrastructure facilities in the Russian Federation. According to Article 4 of the CSTO Treaty, “an act of aggression (an armed attack that threatens security, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty) against one of the member states will be considered as a collective act of aggression on all member states of the CSTO.”

Why has CSTO never reacted to protect Russia?

“From a legal point of view, Russia did not declare the war. It didn’t even declare mobilization or martial law. Thus, it is difficult for Russia to apply to CSTO,” Benyamin Poghosyan, chairman of the Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies in Yerevan, Armenia, told Toward Freedom. “Besides legal issues, there are also political ones. If Russia applies to CSTO for help, it will admit that it is not able to overcome Ukraine resistance, which will constitute a severe blow to the Russian image.”

In May 2021, Armenia formally asked CSTO to intervene against Azerbaijan’s alleged incursion. The Kremlin, however, ignored Yerevan’s requests. As a result, during the recent CSTO summit, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, openly criticized the bloc, and even accused its allies of selling weapons to Azerbaijan.

“Russia does not view Azerbaijan as an enemy, and is interested in increasing its influence in Baku,” Poghosyan explains. “Simultaneously, Russia competes with Turkey in Azerbaijan. Ankara significantly increased its influence in the country as a result of the 2020 Karabakh war. Moscow understands very well that any military clashes with Azerbaijan will ruin its relations with Baku, and will turn Azerbaijan into another Georgia for Russia.”

In 2008, Russia fought a brief war against neighboring U.S.-backed Georgia. Back then, Russian CSTO allies de facto supported the Kremlin’s actions in the Caucasus nation.

The coming months will show if Russia can manage to consolidate its position in the CSTO, with its nominal allies “picking a side,” or if the organization will remain a club whose members share very few common interests.

Nikola Mikovic is a Serbia-based contributor to CGTN, Global Comment, Byline Times, Informed Comment, and World Geostrategic Insights, among other publications. He is a geopolitical analyst for KJ Reports and Enquire.

Editor’s Note: The following is the writer’s analysis of Russia-Sudan relations.

Russia’s ambitious plans to establish a naval base in Sudan could soon be thwarted. The northeast African country is reportedly trying to “blackmail” Moscow by demanding a review of a deal allowing construction of a Russian naval facility on Sudan’s Red Sea coast.

In November 2020, the Kremlin announced plans to build a seaport technical facility in the city of Port Sudan, guaranteeing Russia’s first substantial military foothold in Africa since the former Soviet Union was dismantled. The two countries reached a deal that would allow Russia’s navy a 25-year lease in Port Sudan, housing up to four ships and 300 soldiers, in exchange for weapons and military equipment for the northeast African country.

But now, a Russian state news agency, RIA Novosti, reports Sudan wants to re-negotiate the deal. One Russian publication went so far as to call it “blackmail.” In exchange for providing the land for a naval base to Russia, Khartoum reportedly has asked Moscow to arrange payments to the country’s central bank during the first five years of the lease, with the option of extending the deal to 25 years.

The Kremlin has not yet responded to the proposal, although Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov said the two countries’ militaries continue negotiations on the creation of a naval logistics base for Russian warships in the Red Sea. Sudan’s officials, on the other hand, strongly deny their country has been trying to “blackmail” Moscow.

“It is not true. This news is not true. This is groundless news. The Sudanese side is not asking for any payments in connection with the military base agreement,” said Onur Ahmad Onur, charge d’affaires of Sudan’s embassy in Moscow.

Whether or not Sudan really asked Russia for financial compensation, the Kremlin’s struggle to improve its positions in northeast Africa is unlikely to be an easy one. Back in June, it became obvious Russia could face many obstacles in its attempts to establish a material-technical support facility in the strategically important region located between the Gulf of Aden in the south and the Suez Canal in the north. Such a facility could provide material support in the form of ships and soldiers and technical support in the form of command, control, communication, computer and intelligence operations.

On June 1, Sudanese Armed Forces Chief of Staff Muhammad Usman al-Hussein announced the revision of the agreement. About three weeks later, the Sudanese Minister of Defense Yasin Ibrahim Yasin traveled to Moscow to discuss Russian-Sudanese military cooperation with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Shoigu.

In July, while Russia was preparing to ratify the agreement, Sudanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Mariam al-Mahdi arrived in the Russian capital. She said Sudanese lawmakers will “evaluate whether the agreement is a benefit to Sudan itself and the strategic goals pursued by Russia and Sudan.” She also pointed out the future of the deal will largely depend on a “positive solution to a number of issues on which Khartoum counts on Moscow’s understanding and support.”

In an interview with Russian state-owned news agency RIA Novosti, Al-Mahdi openly stressed Sudan needs Russia’s help regarding the country’s dispute with neighboring Ethiopia, which is building the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)—a hydroelectric-power gravity dam on the Blue Nile River.

“Thanks to its good relations with Ethiopia, Russia can try to convince the Ethiopian side to listen to the voice of reason and come to an agreement that will not do harm to Sudan, as was the case when the dam was first filled,” Al-Mahdi said.

Khartoum fears Ethiopia’s apparent determination to fill the GERD would “threaten the lives of half the population in central Sudan.” In addition, the two countries have a decades-old border dispute, and some analysts claim Sudan and Ethiopia are on the verge of a wide-scale confrontation. It is worth noting Russia and Ethiopia signed a military cooperation agreement in July, and Kremlin officials claim the deal “does not have any destabilizing character.” However, Sudan recently seized Russian-made weapons—72 boxes of arms and night-vision binoculars—that were reportedly smuggled to Khartoum from Ethiopia. This was seen as an “attempt to destabilize the country.” It is entirely possible Russia is trying to balance between the two regional rivals, although Moscow could attempt to indirectly pressure Sudan to give the green light for the establishment of the Russian naval base in the Red Sea.

At this point, it remains uncertain if the Sudanese parliament will ratify the agreement on the Russian base in Port Sudan. Some Russian experts think the construction of a Russian military facility on the Red Sea is unlikely.

“Russia is not going to pay Sudan to host a base in Port Sudan,” said Dmitry Zakharov, head of the Eurasian Institute of Youth Initiatives. “Due to the unthinkable corruption in the African country, the Russian government has no desire to invest in such a project.”

Unlike the Kremlin, the United States seems willing to provide limited financial assistance to Sudan. On August 29, Sudan’s Ministry of Finance and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) signed an agreement for a $5.5 million development grant to support “democratic transition” and to promote economic growth. This is part of a total estimated amount of $200 million to be granted by 2024.

After the Sudanese transition government recognized Israel in 2020, the Trump administration removed Sudan in December from the U.S. list of “state sponsors of terrorism” and lifted U.S. sanctions. Sanctions normally prevent food, fuel and medicine from entering a country, harming ordinary people. Three months later, the two countries held an online Business and Investment Forum, and U.S. navy ships docked in Sudan for the first time in decades. Some Russian military experts believe the United States is pressuring Sudan not to allow Russia to open a naval base in the country, although such a facility could improve Khartoum’s position with neighboring Ethiopia.

Overall, it is Russia, rather than Sudan, that seeks to strengthen its geopolitical positions in the strategically important region. Thus, the coming days and weeks will show if Russia will adopt a more proactive approach regarding this sensitive issue. One thing is for sure: The naval base on the Red Sea would be just the first step in Russia’s ambitions plans to return to Africa, a region that has ceased to be in Moscow’s geopolitical orbit in the post-Soviet years.

Nikola Mikovic is a Serbia-based contributor to CGTN, Global Comment, Byline Times, Informed Comment, and World Geostrategic Insights, among other publications. He is a geopolitical analyst for KJ Reports and Global Wonks.

Editor’s Note: The following represents the writer’s analysis.

Chances for a proxy war between Washington and Moscow spiked after the United States refused to provide written guarantees that NATO would neither expand into nor deploy forces to Ukraine and other ex-Soviet states that are not members of the U.S.-led alliance.

However, a reading of the situation indicates Ukraine would be devastated by a NATO-Russia war, which Moscow has been preparing for as diplomatic talks go nowhere. Meanwhile, U.S. President Joe Biden’s latest remarks indicate the United States may be inviting Russia to make a move into Ukraine.

Crossing the ‘Red Line’

In early January, Russian and U.S. representatives held talks over Ukraine, but apparently did not find a common ground. Russian demands were clear: No NATO in Ukraine, and no Ukraine in NATO.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken as well as NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said Russia would have no say over who should be allowed to join the bloc. And that was the outcome of the U.S.-Russia negotiations. No compromise has been reached.

Given that it was Russia that initially issued an “ultimatum” to its Western partners, it was not surprising that—after the failure of their recent summits—Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said on January 13 that “there is no need for a new round of talks in the near future.” However, his boss, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, reportedly agreed to meet with the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and the two diplomats are expected to hold another round of talks on January 21. Such Russian hesitance gives Washington the upper hand over the Kremlin, and the United States and its allies can simply continue demonstrating they do not take Russian demands, “ultimatums” and “red lines” too seriously.

🇬🇧 передала #ЗСУ легкі протитанкові засоби
Це зміцнюватиме 🛡 спроможності України, а надані засоби будуть використані виключно з оборонною метою pic.twitter.com/ipGpqPfInG

— Defence of Ukraine (@DefenceU) January 18, 2022

Although Russian officials repeated on several occasions that NATO presence in Ukraine is one of the Kremlin’s “red lines,” NATO member United Kingdom continues to supply weapons to the former Soviet republic. Besides that, reports suggest Canadian special forces have been deployed to Ukraine to deter alleged Russian aggression. Plus, Kiev already has purchased and used U.S.-made Javelin anti-tank missiles, as well as Turkey-produced Bayraktar drones. All that, however, does not mean NATO will go to war with Russia over Ukraine. But such actions clearly demonstrate the West still has significant leverage over the Russian Federation.

Russia Prepares for Conflict

Moscow, for its part, has been flexing its military muscle. Russia and its only European ally, Belarus, announced joint drills will be held in February, aimed against Polish, Lithuanian and Ukrainian military build-up. According to Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Ukraine continues concentrating its radical nationalists from the National Guard next to the Belarusian border, while more than 30,000 military personnel as well as equipment and weapons are concentrated in neighboring Poland and the Baltic states. As the Russian defense ministry announced, the joint exercises will be held at five training grounds, most of them located in the central and eastern parts of Belarus, not in the south close to the Ukrainian border. Still, the United States has inferred Russia and Belarus could use military drills to invade Ukraine, capture the country’s capital, Kiev, and overthrow the government. How likely is such a scenario?

On January 14, Ukraine was hit with a cyber attack that took down the websites of several government departments including the ministries of foreign affairs and education. The authorities have accused both Russia and Belarus of orchestrating the attack. It is worth remembering that in 2008, three weeks before Russia invaded Georgia to protect its proxies in South Ossetia following Georgia’s offensive against the breakaway region, the Caucasus nation started facing cyber attacks alleged deployed by Russia.

Thus, it is entirely possible that what Ukrainian websites experienced is a message that the eastern European country could experience the same fate if it decides to launch a large-scale offensive against Russia-backed self-proclaimed regions that broke away from Ukraine—the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Lugansk People’s Republic in the Donbass region.

However, unless there is a huge provocation against Russian and Belarusian forces, or even against the Donbass republics, Moscow is unlikely to engage in a military campaign against Kiev. Ever since the Donbass conflict erupted in 2014, Russia has been trying to avoid a direct military confrontation against Ukraine at any cost. Back then, the Ukrainian army was on the brink of collapse, and Russia had an opportunity to seize not just Crimea, but all Russian-speaking regions in southeast Ukraine. It remains unclear why the Kremlin would launch an invasion now, when Ukrainian Armed Forces are well equipped and motivated to fight.

Spheres of Influence

It is worth remembering, however, that many in Russia, as well as in southeast Ukraine, hoped in 2014 that the Kremlin would establish a new state dubbed Novorossiya—an entity whose borders would have spanned from the city of Kharkov in the east to the port city of Odessa on the Black Sea. However, in 2015 Alexander Borodai, who served as the first prime minister of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic and is now a member of the Russian Parliament, said Novorossiya was a “false start.” Has now the time come for a de facto division of Ukraine?

As Biden stressed on January 19, Russian President Vladimir Putin will move into Ukraine “because he has to do something.”

“It’s one thing if it’s a minor incursion and we end up having to fight about what to do and not do,” Biden told reporters during a White House news conference marking his first year in office.

Could it be that the U.S. President de facto gave the green light to Putin for a “minor incursion” into the eastern European country? Does that mean Washington will turn a blind eye if Russia intervenes in the Donbass to protect the self-proclaimed republics in case of a Ukrainian military offensive? 

Western officials, however, keep threatening Russia that it will pay a “high price” if it decides to invade Ukraine. But what if the Kremlin’s calculation shows the price is acceptable? From a purely military perspective, the longer Russia waits, the higher price it will have to pay. Ukraine will have more sophisticated weapons, which means that Russia’s potential invasion will not go as smoothly as some might hope. Even if Russian troops eventually capture Kiev and other Ukrainian regions, that does not mean all troubles for the Kremlin will be over. The West is expected to impose severe sanctions on the Russian Federation, and Moscow will have to find ways to fund what most Ukrainians would call a “occupation apparatus” if Russia happened to occupy more than just the Donbass region, where the majority ethnically Russian population has welcomed Russian backup. But Moscow would also need to find ways to feed millions of people.

The problem, however, is tensions between Russia and the West over Ukraine have reached such a high level that a proxy war—be it on Ukrainian territory or elsewhere—is unlikely to be prevented. It can be postponed, though. The United States is evidently trying to buy time to supply more weapons to Ukraine, which the West helped manufacture a coup inside of in 2014 by funding neo-Nazis, who now make up a portion of Ukraine’s military. Russia could respond by deploying nuclear missiles in Cuba and Venezuela—countries Washington sees as part of its sphere of influence, or as it calls the Western Hemisphere, its “backyard.” At the same time, the United States does not accept Russia can have its own sphere of influence. That means Moscow—if it aims to be accepted as a serious actor in the international arena—will have to fight for the right to have its own geopolitical orbit.

Finally, Ukraine—as the weakest link in the geopolitical game played by the United States and Russia—is expected to pay the heaviest price, and will be treated like collateral damage in a new cold war.

Nikola Mikovic is a Serbia-based contributor to CGTN, Global Comment, Byline Times, Informed Comment, and World Geostrategic Insights, among other publications. He is a geopolitical analyst for KJ Reports and Enquire.