Czech Protesters Rail Against Inflation, Sanctions and the Ukraine Proxy War

Editor’s Note: The following represents the writer’s analysis.

Thousands of demonstrators took to Mali’s streets on January 14 to demonstrate against sanctions the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) imposed on the country after the military government’s supposed delay in the transitional map (plan) to transfer power to civilians. The military junta called for mobilizations throughout the country. Protests took place in the capital, Bamako. Other cities in the West African country also witnessed demonstrations, the most notable ones being in Timbuktu in the north and Bougouni in the south.

The former transitional president, Bah Andau, called on his compatriots to defend the homeland.

What is the general context in which these popular demonstrations took place? What are the positions of the actors in the crisis? How did international actors react, including France and Russia? And how is their position a reflection of the Malian authorities and the demonstrations?

Election Day Canceled

The beginning of the latest crisis started at the national conference—organized by the transitional government on January 2—which concluded its work in Bamako by adopting a recommendation to extend the political transition map for a period ranging from six months to five years.

The transitional government, led by President Asimie Goïta (also spelled Guetta), had approved an 18-month timetable, from the military coup carried out in August 2020 to elections that are supposed to be held this month.

Then the transitional government retracted that map, claiming the transitional phase needed to be elongated because the country had suffered from terrorist attacks that coincided with the coronavirus pandemic.

The ruling military council justified this change by saying it was unable to meet this month’s deadline, pointing to the continuing instability due to violence, in addition to the need to implement reforms, including that of the constitution. The hope was protests would not take off around the election, as had happened with previous elections.

At the huge protests in Mali, lots of protesters are waving Russian flags and holding posters that say "Mali-Russia cooperation" and "Thank you China and Russia for your support of Mali".

There are also lots of protesters carrying posters that say "Death to France and allies". pic.twitter.com/YPhaP5d0ZA

— Turtle (@swimming_free) January 17, 2022

Unprecedented Cruelty of ECOWAS Sanctions

After the recommendation to elongate the transitional period was issued and submitted to ECOWAS, it decided to hold a double special session of the Conference of the Heads of the West African Economic and Monetary Union. That is where ECOWAS imposed a set of sanctions on January 9, which included:

1. closing the borders of ECOWAS member states with Mali, 
2. imposing a ban on trade (not including the trade of basic materials),
3. imposing a ban on financial dealings with Mali,
4. freezing Mali’s assets in West African banks, and
5. summoning the ambassadors of member states to Bamako.

ECOWAS said the junta’s proposal to hold presidential elections in 2026 is “totally unacceptable” because it “means that an illegitimate transitional military government will hold the Malian people hostage over the next five years.” ECOWAS will only lift sanctions gradually, when Malian authorities present an “acceptable” timetable and when satisfactory progress is observed in its implementation.

These sanctions are more stringent than those imposed after the first coup in August 2020, which prompted observers to accuse the regional organization of unfairly applying economic and political sanctions for goals linked to foreign interests, France in particular. This is pertinent because ECOWAS did not impose the same sanctions on another West African country, Guinea, which witnessed a coup in September. 

The strong French influence within the corridors of ECOWAS affects the independence of the organization’s decisionmaking. France colonized large portions of West Africa from the 1800s onward. Although West Africa gained independence and was split into sovereign states in the 20th century, France keeps a military presence in the Sahel region of West Africa and mandates many French-speaking African countries use the French currency, the franc, for transactions. 

These sanctions would seriously affect the Malian economy, which is among the poorest in the world and has been experiencing a crisis stemming from terrorism and the pandemic. This is especially because the Republic of Mali is landlocked and depends on Senegal and the Ivory Coast to engage in trade. Consequently, these sanctions constitute a tremendous political and economic pressure on the country, exacerbating its worsening problems. 

The Transitional Government Reacts

The government in Mali chose two parallel courses.

First, they rejected the sanctions and escalation in a strongly worded statement and recalled its ambassadors from ECOWAS countries, closed its land and air borders with them, and stated it would reserve the right to review its participation within ECOWAS bodies. The ECOWAS stated it did not take the situation in Mali into consideration before imposing sanctions, which Mali considered illegal, and not based on any legal basis regulating the work of the group. The sanctions also contradict ECOWAS’ objectives as an African regional organization aimed at achieving solidarity, and Mali expressed regret that the regional organization had become an “instrument in the hand of forces from outside the region have hidden plans,” an unmistakable reference to France.

Despite the harsh tone, Mali declared the door for dialogue is still open to reach a solution to the aggravating crisis.

The second trend has been to mobilize the street, which is rising in anger at France and its suspicious role in Mali, as well as at ECOWAS and its sanctions that disturb Malians’ lives. Surprisingly, these demonstrations denounced the French presence, and saw the French occupation as grounds for terrorist practices. Protesters declared in their slogans their support for Russia’s directions in support of their country’s cause. During the action, the demonstrators carried posters in which they thanked Russia and its efforts in Mali.

It is no secret the agenda that appeared in the rallies and popular demonstrations is the same as the agenda carried by the Goïta government, which no longer desires the support of the French colonizer. Rather, the government has accused France on more than one occasion of being a major supporter of terrorism in Mali, and therefore saw in the Russian presence a hope and a means that could be relied upon to get the country out of the security quagmire and reduce or end the suspicious French role.

It may be true these demonstrations came out in response to the call of the military, and that they protested against the despised French colonial presence, as well as denounced the penalties of ECOWAS. But it should not be taken for granted that their emergence lends a kind of legitimacy to the double military coup, as well as offers approval and acceptance of the five-year transitional map.

It is undoubtedly a long transitional period, at the end of which may only see an extended military rule, or a false civilian rule that covers for the military rule that holds the wheel of government.

These demonstrations ignited a wave of anger against French colonialism, as the Malian and general African community demonstrated in front of the Malian embassy in Paris, in support of the Malian government’s decision to reject the ECOWAS decisions. January 22 was dedicated to organize demonstrations in front of the French embassies throughout the world.

The World Reacts

The Malian military’s agenda, which the popular demonstrations supported, met with multiple international reactions. For example, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said France and the Europeans, who are militarily involved in the fight against militants in the region, want to stay in Mali without any conditions.

The French Ambassador to the United Nations, Nicolas de Rivière, affirmed Paris’ full support for ECOWAS’ sanctions because Malian authorities did not respect ECOWAS demands and obligations in terms of a speedy return to the democratic process.

French anger in this context is understandable. It saw the Malian demonstrations and a hostile military that France did not expect and did not want. France fought against such a change in power for decades by passing whoever it deemed to be at its mercy into power, while suppressing and oppressing peoples with a tyrannical, dictatorial rule that hardly allows their voices to be heard.

However, Mali expelled the French ambassador on January 31, giving them 72 hours to leave the country.

As for Russia, it demanded an understanding of the position of the Malian authorities. The Assistant Russian Ambassador to the United Nations, Dmitry Polyansky, called during a meeting of the UN Security Council devoted to West Africa and the Sahel region, to show the necessary respect for the Republic of Mali and its efforts aimed at restoring order in the country, calling for an understanding of the difficulties they face. Without the return of the state’s authority to many regions of the country, it will not be possible to take into account the credibility of the election results, according to Russia.

The Russian position, consistent with the vision of the military government in Mali, rebuffs the Western presence that has begun to recede from Mali. It is a prelude to the expected Russian presence, whether in the form of security companies (Wagner) or direct support by Russian military forces.

These popular demonstrations may constitute the beginning of a real departure for the French colonialist and a decline in its role in West Africa. It may form the nucleus of a popular legitimacy that would constitute a lever for stable rule in the coming days.

Kribsoo Diallo is a Cairo-based Pan-Africanist researcher in political science related to African affairs. He has written for many African magazines and newspapers. Diallo has contributed to translated editions of papers and articles in Arabic and English for several research centers within the African continent.

Editor’s Note: This article originally appeared in Workers World.

Dozens of Bronx public school parents, teachers, students and community activists gathered on March 20, the 20th anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, to oppose a military recruitment fair, hosted by U.S. House Representatives Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (AOC) and Adriano Espaillat, at Renaissance High School in the Bronx. The grassroots Bronx Anti-War Coalition organized the demonstration.

The protesters aimed to educate students and parents about the violence and dangers that Black, Brown and Indigenous youth face entering the military. “A third of women in the military experience sexual harassment and assault,” said Richie Merino, a Bronx public school teacher and community organizer. “The rates are even higher for women of color. We demand justice for the families of Vanessa Guillén and Ana Fernanda Basaldua Ruiz,” two 20-year-old Latinas who were sexually assaulted and killed after speaking up at Fort Hood U.S. Army base in Texas.

Outside the AOC-endorsed military recruitment fair, Mohammed Latifu of the Bronx spoke to a group of community members. The group had gathered in memory of Latifu’s 21-year-old brother, Abdul Latifu, who was murdered on Jan. 10 at Fort Rucker, a U.S. Army base in Alabama. Abdul had been in the Army for only five months when he was bludgeoned to death with a shovel by another soldier.

Through tears, Mohammed shared how he and his family have been kept in the dark by military investigators and still await answers. He said their parents can’t sleep at night due to the senseless murder of their son Abdul.

“We really want to hear what happened,” Latifu said. “What took place? What transpired? Until today, no answers. No phone calls. We still don’t have any updates. Anybody who was thinking about enlisting their kid in the military, I think you better think again. Don’t do it. I wouldn’t dare ask my kid’s friends or anybody to join the military.”

Outside the @aoc sponsored U.S. military recruitment event at low-income public high school in the Bronx, we invited Mohammed Latifu to speak, who is seeking justice for his 21yo brother, Abdul Latifu, who was murdered in Jan at Fort Rucker, a US Army base in AL #JusticeForLatifu pic.twitter.com/29xA7VZaTY

— U.S./NATO = State Sponsors of Terrorism (@bxcommie) March 21, 2023

‘They’re Killing Their Own’

“They say they ‘protect’ the country,” Latifu continued. “They’re killing their own. They’re molesting these women that go over there. These kids, young men and women that go over there, they’re sexually harassed, and then they kill them and try to cover it up.

“They’ll tell you, ‘sorry for what happened, our condolences.’ No, keep your condolences! We want answers. What we really want is justice — justice for everybody who has had to endure this and their families,” Latifu concluded.

Brx Greens join Brx Antiwar activists to protest against Rep. AOC & Espaillat Military Fair at Bronx Renaissance High School 3/20/23 @gpny @gppeaceaction @GPUSBlackCaucus @gaijingirl2004 @JosBtrigga pic.twitter.com/aNP9CBzM5u

— Bronx Green Party (@Brx_Greens) March 22, 2023

Outside the event, representatives from IFCO (Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization)/Pastors for Peace informed students about alternative ways to “travel and see the world” without the military. They spoke about how to apply to the Latin American School of Medicine (ELAM) in Cuba and receive a free medical degree. Chants of “Cuba Sí, Bloqueo No!” broke out in the crowd.

Claude Copeland Jr., a Bronx teacher and member of About Face: Veterans Against the War, shared his experiences as a victim of the poverty draft. He spoke about how recruiters pitched the military as the only way to advance economically and secure safe, independent housing. They never told him about alternatives or other options. If you have no resources, “you have to sign your life away,” he said.

Community members criticized Ocasio-Cortez for abandoning her antiwar campaign promises to oppose predatory recruitment tactics by U.S. military recruiters, who target young, low-income Black and Latinx children.

“Only three years ago,” Merino said, “AOC introduced an amendment to prohibit military recruiters from targeting kids as young as 12 through online gaming. She understands the U.S. military preys on vulnerable, impressionable kids. For AOC to now use her celebrity status to headline a high school military recruitment event, in the Bronx, signals that she has turned her back on the Black, Brown and migrant working-class community that elected her into office.”

“We don’t want our children to train to kill other poor, Black and Brown people like themselves. The best thing we can do now is to grow the movement to completely remove police and military recruiters from our schools,” Merino concluded.

On July 9, the government of Rwanda said that it had deployed 1,000 troops to Mozambique to battle al-Shabaab fighters, who had seized the northern province of Cabo Delgado. A month later, on August 8, Rwandan troops captured the port city of Mocímboa da Praia, where just off the coast sits a massive natural gas concession held by French energy company TotalEnergies SE and U.S. energy company ExxonMobil. These new developments in the region led to the African Development Bank’s President M. Akinwumi Adesina announcing on August 27 that TotalEnergies SE will restart the Cabo Delgado liquefied natural gas project by the end of 2022.

Militants from al-Shabaab (or ISIS-Mozambique, as the U.S. State Department prefers to call it) did not fight to the last man; they disappeared across the border into Tanzania or into their villages in the hinterland. The energy companies will, meanwhile, soon start to recoup their investments and profit handsomely, thanks in large part to the Rwandan military intervention.

Why did Rwanda intervene in Mozambique in July 2021 to defend, essentially, two major energy companies? The answer lies in a very peculiar set of events that took place in the months before the troops left Kigali, the capital city of Rwanda.

 

Billions Stuck Underwater

Al-Shabaab fighters first made their appearance in Cabo Delgado in October 2017. For three years, the group played a cat-and-mouse game with Mozambique’s army before taking control of Mocímboa da Praia in August 2020. At no point did it seem possible for Mozambique’s army to thwart al-Shabaab and allow TotalEnergies SE and ExxonMobil to restart operations in the Rovuma Basin, off the coast of northern Mozambique, where a massive natural gas field was discovered in February 2010.

The Mozambican Ministry of Interior had hired a range of mercenaries such as Dyck Advisory Group (South Africa), Frontier Services Group (Hong Kong), and the Wagner Group (Russia). In late August 2020, TotalEnergies SE and the government of Mozambique signed an agreement to create a joint security force to defend the company’s investments against al-Shabaab. None of these armed groups succeeded. The investments were stuck underwater.

At this point, Mozambique’s President Filipe Nyusi indicated, as I was told by a source in Maputo, that TotalEnergies SE might ask the French government to send a detachment to assist in securing the area. This discussion went on into 2021. On January 18, 2021, French Defense Minister Florence Parly and her counterpart in Portugal, João Gomes Cravinho, talked on the phone, during which—it is suggested in Maputo—they discussed the possibility of a Western intervention in Cabo Delgado. On that day, TotalEnergies SE CEO Patrick Pouyanné met with President Nyusi and his ministers of defense (Jaime Bessa Neto) and interior (Amade Miquidade) to discuss the joint “action plan to strengthen security of the area.” Nothing came of it. The French government was not interested in a direct intervention.

A senior official in Maputo told me that it is strongly believed in Mozambique that French President Emmanuel Macron suggested the Rwandan force, rather than French forces, be deployed to secure Cabo Delgado. Indeed, Rwanda’s armies—highly trained, well-armed by the Western countries, and given impunity to act outside the bounds of international law—have proved their mettle in the interventions carried out in South Sudan and the Central African Republic.

 

What Kagame Got for the Intervention

Paul Kagame has ruled Rwanda since 1994, first as vice president and minister of defense and then since 2000 as the president. Under Kagame, democratic norms have been flouted within Rwanda, while Rwandan troops have operated ruthlessly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A 2010 UN Mapping Project report on serious human rights violations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo showed that the Rwandan troops killed “hundreds of thousands if not millions” of Congolese civilians and Rwandan refugees between 1993 and 2003. Kagame rejected the UN report, suggesting that this “double genocide” theory denied the Rwandan genocide of 1994. He has wanted the French to accept responsibility for the genocide of 1994 and has hoped that the international community will ignore the massacres in the eastern Congo.

On March 26, 2021, historian Vincent Duclert submitted a 992-page report on France’s role in the Rwandan genocide. The report makes it clear that France should accept—as Médecins Sans Frontières put it—“overwhelming responsibility” for the genocide. But the report does not say that the French state was complicit in the violence. Duclert traveled to Kigali on April 9 to deliver the report in person to Kagame, who said that the report’s publication “marks an important step toward a common understanding of what took place.”

On April 19, the Rwandan government released a report that it had commissioned from the U.S. law firm Levy Firestone Muse. This report’s title says it all: “A Foreseeable Genocide: The Role of the French Government in Connection with the Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda.” The French did not deny the strong words in this document, which argues that France armed the génocidaires and then hastened to protect them from international scrutiny. Macron, who has been loath to accept France’s brutality in the Algerian liberation war, did not dispute Kagame’s version of history. This was a price he was willing to pay.

 

What France Wants

On April 28, 2021, Mozambique’s President Nyusi visited Kagame in Rwanda. Nyusi told Mozambique’s news broadcasters that he had come to learn about Rwanda’s interventions in the Central African Republic and to ascertain Rwanda’s willingness to assist Mozambique in Cabo Delgado.

On May 18, Macron hosted a summit in Paris, “seeking to boost financing in Africa amid the COVID-19 pandemic,” which was attended by several heads of government, including Kagame and Nyusi, the president of the African Union (Moussa Faki Mahamat), the president of the African Development Bank (Akinwumi Adesina), the president of the West African Development Bank (Serge Ekué), and the managing director of the International Monetary Fund (Kristalina Georgieva). Exit from “financial asphyxiation” was at the top of the agenda, although in private meetings there were discussions about Rwandan intervention in Mozambique.

A week later, Macron left for a visit to Rwanda and South Africa, spending two days (May 26 and 27) in Kigali. He repeated the broad findings of the Duclert report, brought along 100,000 COVID-19 vaccines to Rwanda (where only around 4 percent of the population had received the first dose by the time of his visit), and spent time in private talking to Kagame. On May 28, alongside South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa, Macron talked about Mozambique, saying that France was prepared to “take part in operations on the maritime side,” but would otherwise defer to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and to other regional powers. He did not mention Rwanda specifically.

Rwanda entered Mozambique in July, followed by SADC forces, which included South African troops. France got what it wanted: Its energy giant can now recoup its investment.

This article was produced by Globetrotter.

Vijay Prashad is an Indian historian, editor and journalist. He is a writing fellow and chief correspondent at Globetrotter. He is the director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research. He is a senior non-resident fellow at Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China. He has written more than 20 books, including The Darker Nations and The Poorer Nations. His latest book is Washington Bullets, with an introduction by Evo Morales Ayma.