The Uvalde Shooting and the History of U.S. Gun Violence with Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz

Editor’s Note: This article originally appeared in Multipolarista.

The U.S. government has imposed aggressive sanctions that aim to “kneecap” China’s tech sector and halt the country’s rise, Washington policymakers and industry analysts have admitted.

The Joe Biden administration took the extraordinarily aggressive action this month of blocking China from importing most semiconductors, machines to create chips and supercomputer parts.

A former Pentagon official acknowledged that this was a “disproportionate” and “unilateral” attack, amounting to a “form of economic containment.”

He said this in an article in Foreign Policy, the magazine of the D.C. political class, titled “Biden Is Now All-In on Taking Out China.”

Jon Bateman, an ex-analyst for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) who served in several important policy roles in the Pentagon, wrote that U.S. officials have “imposed disproportionate measures” and “strong-armed others into compliance.”

Washington’s “mindset all but guarantees a continued march toward broad-based technological decoupling,” he concluded.

Bateman stated that the “increasing boldness of U.S. unilateral actions, and Washington’s open embrace of a quasi-containment strategy” reflect the U.S. government’s new cold war goal: “China’s technological rise will be slowed at any price.”

Today, Bateman is a senior fellow in the technology and international affairs program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a powerful Washington-based think tank that helps Washington craft policy – with plentiful funding from the U.S. government, its allies, large corporations and banks, and billionaire oligarch family foundations.

Bateman is by no means a pro-China advocate. In April, he published a report for Carnegie called “U.S.-China Technological ‘Decoupling’: A Strategy and Policy Framework.”

In the lengthy document, Bateman “offered a concrete picture of what centrist decoupling might look like and how implementation could work at the agency level.”

Bateman wrote the Foreign Policy article as part of a debate with more hard-line hawks in elite Washington policy-making circles. He warned that their “maximalist” strategy could backfire and hurt the U.S. and its allies, and instead promoted a more cautious, incrementalist approach.

“America’s restrictionists—zero-sum thinkers who urgently want to accelerate technological decoupling—have won the strategy debate inside the Biden administration,” he warned.

“More cautious voices—technocrats and centrists who advocate incremental curbs on select aspects of China’s tech ties—have lost,” Bateman lamented.

He acknowledged that Washington’s new cold war on China has been completely bipartisan, but “Donald Trump’s scattershot regulation and erratic public statements offered little clarity to allies, adversaries, and companies around the world,” whereas “Joe Biden’s actions have been more systematic.”

“The United States has waged low-grade economic warfare against China for at least four years now—firing volley after volley of tariffs, export controls, investment blocks, visa limits, and much more,” he wrote.

Bateman said the Biden administration’s new sanctions, however, “more so than any earlier U.S. action, reveal a single-minded focus on thwarting Chinese capabilities at a broad and fundamental level.”

“Although framed as a national security measure, the primary damage to China will be economic, on a scale well out of proportion to Washington’s cited military and intelligence concerns,” he wrote.

He added, “The U.S. government imposed the new rules after limited consultation with partner countries and companies, proving that its quest to hobble China ranks well above concerns about the diplomatic or economic repercussions.”

Bateman noted that the United States is trying to pressure allies to join its new cold war on China, leading an international campaign to economically isolate Beijing by building a “Chip 4” alliance with South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan – which control the vast majority of the global semiconductor industry.

Bateman’s fears that these aggressive new cold war policies could backfire have already come true. Washington’s rapid attempt to decouple the U.S. economy from China is taking a toll on U.S. universities.

At least 1,400 scientists of Chinese descent have left U.S. research institutions and instead gone to China, according to a report published this October by academics at Harvard, Princeton, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).

The South China Morning Post reported that the “high number illustrates a ‘chilling effect’ resulting from U.S. government policies deterring research and academic activity by scientists of Chinese descent and suggests American research could suffer.”

The tech press has sounded similar alarm bells about Washington’s bellicose attacks on Beijing.

Electronics industry website EE Times quoted a corporate analyst who said the U.S. “sanctions put a temporary checkmate on China developing their foundry industry at more advanced nodes.”

The website also used cold war rhetoric to refer to the aggressive U.S. policies, writing:

The latest U.S. salvo in the chip war against China will set back its domestic chipmakers by generations, while global suppliers of semiconductors and fab tools will incur billions of dollars in lost sales because of a giant dent in demand out of China, analysts told EE Times.

The administration of U.S. President Joe Biden has strengthened Cold War measures from longer than 40 years ago. In its new rivalry, the U.S. aims to freeze China’s advancement on a new front: chip technology that is critical for economic development and military superiority.

Wired magazine came to the same conclusion, reporting that the U.S. sanctions aimed to “kneecap” China’s tech industry.

Wired said Washington’s “sweeping new controls are designed to keep [China’s] AI industry stuck in the dark ages while the U.S. and other Western countries advance.”

The tech magazine quoted Gregory Allen, director of the AI governance project at the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), an influential neoconservative think tank in Washington that is bankrolled by the weapons industry, U.S. government, and Washington’s allies.

Allen summed it up: “The United States is saying to China, ‘AI technology is the future; we and our allies are going there—and you can’t come.’”

Benjamin Norton is founder and editor of Multipolarista.

Editor’s Note: The author offers their perspective on American Exceptionalism in this essay.

In a chapter he wrote titled “Exceptionalism,”¹ historian Daniel T. Rodgers argues American Exceptionalism is a historically contrived myth. The book in which the chapter appears is Imagined Histories: American Historians Interpret the Past (1998, edited by Anthony Molho and Gordon S. Wood). Rodgers discusses the origins and evolution of the historicism that undergirds the embedded structural creed that says the United States stands alone as inimitable among nations. Historicism is the theory that history determines social and cultural phenomena.

Within U.S. social movements, American Exceptionalism increasingly has been used to explain the ideology that guides U.S. interventions around the world and against domestic colonized populations, such as African and Indigenous peoples. This essay seeks to examine the roots of this ideological framework.

Historian Frederick Jackson Turner first struck an exceptionalist chord in his 1893 essay, “The Frontier in American History,” with his “perennial rebirth” or “rebaptized as an American”² theme that proclaimed a singular “American” character. This came about by rejecting the European ethos and replacing it with a unique pioneering spirit exclusive to the “American.” Within was a detailed examination of the dialectical shifts of American historiography, philosophy and religion that pulsed through the “American” experience: From the earliest origins of the pious fundamentalism of the Massachusetts Bay Colony to the American Revolution, World War II, the Cold War and its current role as a global hegemonic superpower, Rodgers demystifies and untangles the “skein of tropes”³ that underpin the “newness” and “distinctiveness” that defines United States’ historical, social and political “uniqueness.”⁴ Rodgers ignites his chapter with a question: Is the United States different? Then, through the use of scholarly and authoritative evidence, he methodically proceeds to lay bare the mythological foundations that buttress the United States’ fabled white-supremacist history, analyzing and exposing an unexceptional exceptionalism at its core, for all to see. Yet, in spite of his and other scholars’ well researched conclusions, Rodgers ends his chapter by exposing the persistent and entrenched depths of the American exceptionalist archetype, writing, “Michael McGerr and Michael Kammen demonstrate [that within modern American historicism] challenges to the exceptionalist paradigm [still] generate sharp, visceral reactions.”⁵

Rodgers, unswayed by post-1950s acculturation, looks back through time critically scouring the metahistorical chronicle in search of the decisive epochs that contributed most to the phenomenon called American “exceptionalism.” His contribution is considered a seminal work in contemporary and post-exceptionalist historiography. Literary critic and academic Donald Pease writes, “Daniel T. Rodgers, perhaps the most articulate of a growing cadre of post-exceptionalist U.S. historians, has formulated the rationale for this collective endeavor with eminent clarity.”⁶ Rodgers proclaims the United States’ build-up and victory in WWII, its rise to global supremacy and its dominance throughout the Cold War are central to decoding the portent of American Exceptionalism. 

Contemporary scholars concur. “I agree that World War II set up an important phase in the history of American exceptionalism,”⁷ states Ian Tyrell. Rodgers and his post- exceptionalist colleagues (through primary and secondary source material) expose past and present historiography by turning it on its head. Laurence Veysey points out, “It is clear that earlier interpretations of American history and culture, aggressively put forth as recently as the 1950s and emphasizing ‘uniquely’ American experiences and habits of mind, served largely to mislead us.”⁸ Eric Rauchway pushes even further by stating, “The concept of American exceptionalism does not really have anything to do with actual history,”⁹ meaning that, in-depth analysis of the historical record reveals quite a different story.

Rodgers points to another specious characteristic of exceptionalist historicism. That being the claim that providential intervention and the United States’ cultural preeminence are guided, if not driven, by God, which defines the nation’s “difference.” Rodgers explains, “…difference in American national culture has meant ‘better’: The superiority of the American way.”¹⁰ He argues how unexceptional the United States is in this regard. “Pride and providentialism are too widely spread to imagine them American peculiarities.”¹¹ According to Rodgers, the dissemination of American Exceptionalism, in the mid-20th century, was undergirded by a political, philosophical and psychological propaganda campaign: A deep rivalry with the former USSR that led the United States to co-opt and invert a Stalinist neologism of the 1920s (i.e., Soviet “exceptionalism”) and plant it firmly and inextricably, in its “divine” and rightful place: The United States of America! Yet, he queries even further: “What was the historiographical past of that conceit?”¹²

Rodgers traces the historiography back to an 18th-century travel writer, J. Hector St. John de Crévecoeur, who first described the Europeans [i.e., white males] inhabiting North America as unique and distinctive. Crévecoeur posed an essentialist question, “What is an American?”¹³ Rodgers demonstrates Crévecoeur was, “virtually unread in the United States before the twentieth century [his] lyric passage on … [the] ‘melting’ of persons of all [European] nations into ‘a new race of men’ [was] extracted from context … which now seemed to appear everywhere.” That was co-opted and retitled, “What Is the American, This New Man?” by “Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., [U.S. historian who] made it the motif of his presidential address to the American Historical Association in 1942.”¹⁴ Rodgers asserts, “The literature of the new American Studies movement [from then on] was saturated with Crévecoeur references.”¹⁵ He continues, “They led off that catalyst of revisionist histories … [including] Robert E. Brown’s Middle-Class Democracy and the Revolution in Massachusetts, in 1955.”¹⁶ The United States was considered from that point on, in and out of the academy, a uniquely singular phenomenon in world history.

Rodgers exposes an irony. “…In their anti-Marxism, they reimagined Marx’s general laws of historical motion applied everywhere but to their own national case.”¹⁷ Meaning, “John Winthrop’s ‘city upon a hill’ … was no longer a mid-Atlantic hope … it was now America itself.”¹⁸

Until the most recent shockwaves of the U.S. empire felt externally, and internally, in the forms of a 20-year-long Afghan debacle, endless wars for profit, brutal domestic police abuse (which disproportionately kills people of color), a permanent war on the poor and a healthcare system that ruthlessly places profits above life, the American Exceptionalism myth woven throughout U.S. history was fixed. But now, the mask has fallen for all the world to see.

Stephen Joseph Scott is an essayist associated with The University of Edinburgh’s School of History. He is a singer/songwriter, humanist/activist, a self-taught musician and performer. As a musician, Scott uses American Roots Music to illustrate the U.S. social and political landscape. His latest video is “We Know They Lied.”

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¹ Daniel T. Rodgers, “Exceptionalism,” in Imagined Histories: American Historians Interpret the Past, ed. Anthony
Molho and Gordon S. Wood (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1998), 21–40.
² Ibid., 25.
³ Ibid., 22.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid., 35.
⁶ Donald Pease, “American Studies after American Exceptionalism?” in Globalizing American Studies (University of
Chicago Press, 2010), at https://chicago-universitypressscholarship-
com.ezproxy.is.ed.ac.uk/view/10.7208/chicago/9780226185088.001.0001/upso-9780226185064-chapter-2
⁷ Ian Tyrrell and Eric Rauchway, “The Debate Table: Eric Rauchway and Ian Tyrrell Discuss American
Exceptionalism,” Modern American History 1 (2018): 247–256.
⁸ Laurence Veysey, “The Autonomy of American History Reconsidered,” American Quarterly 31, no. 4 (1979): 455.
⁹ Tyrrell and Rauchway, “Debate Table.”
¹⁰ Rodgers, “Exceptionalism,” 22.
¹¹ Ibid.
¹² Ibid., 21.
¹³ Ibid., 37.
¹⁴ Ibid., 27.
¹⁵ Ibid.
¹⁶ Ibid.
¹⁷ Ibid., 29.
¹⁸ Ibid., 27.

Editor’s Note: Kawsachun News spoke to Ecuadorian economist Juan Fernando Terán on April 2 about Western sanctions, the Ukraine war and how Latin America can protect its economy. The original interview can be found here.

Who is paying the price of western sanctions on Russia? Ecuador’s banana industry has collapsed without the Russian consumer market.

Juan F. Terán: Countries that export food and agricultural goods are in an incredibly difficult position now. Ecuador, Colombia, Brazil and Argentina are among the worst affected. These countries import almost all the supplies they need for agricultural production; fertilizer, agrochemicals and even seeds in some cases. Sanctions have cut off these supplies. We could have prevented this situation.

Latin America lived through a golden era of development and integration during the period of leaders such as [former Ecuadorian President Rafael] Correa, [former Bolivian President] Evo Morales, [former Brazilian President] Lula [da Silva] and others. During these years, a lot of work went into the issue of how the region can start producing its own agricultural supplies. This was a flagship project of [Union of South American Nations] UNASUR. The aim was to guarantee food security in the face of fluctuations in international markets. There was also the proposal for a Latin American-wide bank and a common currency. This could’ve helped the region’s economy survive this current monetary crisis, too.

What’s happening now, though? Let’s look at the case of Ecuador: We have two main sources of income in exports. The first is oil. Logically, the war in Ukraine should have been beneficial because the price of oil has risen, which should mean more income from sales for Ecuador. However, the conservative President Guillermo Lasso had already promised the IMF the payment from future oil sales. Even if the price of oil goes to $300 (per barrel) it won’t benefit ordinary citizens.

What about agriculture?

JFT: The country also earns a lot by exporting goods such as bananas, coffee, shrimp and flowers. The primary market for Ecuadorian flower production is Russia. Now those producers are facing a dramatic crisis because sanctions have cut them off from their clients. This is a huge industry for Ecuador. In the provinces of Pichincha and Cotopaxi, there are entire regions dedicated almost entirely to flower production. They even have airports there because these flowers are exported to the world by plane. A small part of their production goes to the United States and Europe, but the large majority goes to Russia. Russia is one of the few countries where people buy flowers all year round rather than just for certain dates like Valentine’s Day.

What about our shrimp, coffee, or cacao exports? All that requires fertilizer and other imported agricultural supplies. Now there’s a global shortage, Russia was the world’s leading producer and now they’re sanctioned.

What has been the government’s response?

JFT: Countries can survive this storm if they have an umbrella, but Ecuador doesn’t have a progressive government. It has a neoliberal government. Our economy has no umbrella now.

What has been the neoliberal response to this current crisis? The flower producers were the first to ask for assistance. They asked for loans, so they can sustain themselves temporarily during this drop. President Lasso replied by saying that going into business means assuming risk and that the state has no obligation to bail anyone out. This idea of not bailing anyone out is a great idea in my opinion, but only if it’s applied evenly. We shouldn’t have to bail out the bankers when they have a crisis. But, of course, Guillermo Lasso will never abandon his people. He only abandons small farmers, who are now in crisis.

Electing progressive governments in Latin America is not a question of ideology; it’s also about citizens defending their economy and living standards. If a banker manages to win an election, then these are the results.

Many countries now see Washington as an unreliable ally and are looking to trade in different currencies. Do you think the U.S. dollar will lose its international hegemony? What would that mean for Latin America?

JFT: When the [Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa] BRICS countries start trading entirely in Yuan, or any currency that isn’t the dollar, then the world is going to really change. I think we can expect to see this transformation within the next five years. It’ll represent the definitive defeat of the U.S. empire. History shows us that a country’s military power is linked to the power of its currency.

When Britain ruled the world, the British pound dominated international trade. Even Ecuador’s external debt was in pound sterling during those years. The reserves of our central bank were in pound sterling. This came to an end after the end of World War 2 because the U.S. became the new dominant power and built the world’s financial and monetary institutions for its own ends. The current war in Ukraine is also about currency. The U.S. is participating in this conflict against Russia because they need to defend the power of the dollar.

What can the region do?

JFT: Latin America needs to slowly de-link our region from the U.S. dollar. We need to diversify our international currency reserves. Correa began to do this in Ecuador by investing in gold reserves. This was criticized by the opposition at the time. However, this diversification can only happen if we make the necessary changes to our commercial relations. If we’re to start building reserves in the Chinese yuan, then we need to deepen commercial relations with China to achieve this.

I think we should return to the proposal of UNASUR of creating a common Latin American currency with its own central bank. We also need a Latin American payment system. Look at how the U.S. is using SWIFT to cut off any country they don’t like from the global economy. We can’t allow that. It makes us vulnerable. Russia and China are creating their own payment systems. We should have our own as well.

There’s no use in just complaining about U.S. aggression. That’s what they do. They invade and attack countries all over the world. The real problem is that Latin America is exposed and unable to deal with this kind of economic war. In response, we need to turn towards Asia in a serious way. Why isn’t the Ecuadorian government securing new markets for our shrimp and banana in China? There’s huge demand there. Bolivia and Ecuador both have vast mineral wealth, we need to bypass the West and focus on Asia when it comes to trade and investment in these commodities.

U.S. media has attacked countries like Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, for not imposing their own economic sanctions on Russia. Do you think this capricious request from the United States will further break down the U.S. sphere of influence here and across the rest of the global South?

These sanctions are causing an inflation crisis for people everywhere. Europeans are paying 8-9 euros for a gallon of gasoline. In the U.S., it’s $4.75. Up to $6 in places like California and Miami. This is shocking. The sanctions are having a boomerang effect on the U.S. and its citizens. Though not everyone is suffering: Arms manufacturers are not suffering. People like [U.S. President Joe] Biden’s son [Hunter], with shady dealings in the gas business, are not going to suffer.

Financial analysis reports came out this week indicating that if the price of gasoline remains at $4.75 as a national average in the U.S., then the U.S. economy will enter into a recession at the end of this year. None of what they’re doing is reasonable from the perspective of ordinary citizens.