Rally held in April in Venezuela demanding freedom for Alex Saab / credit: Kawsachun News
Editor’s Note: This article was originally published by Kawsachun News.
JUNE 12, 2022—Today marks two years since the kidnapping of Venezuelan diplomat Alex Nain Saab, while on a humanitarian mission to Iran, his third mission to the country, to try to alleviate the effects of the U.S. economic warfare against Venezuela.
Saab, an accredited diplomat protected under the Vienna Convention, was abducted in Cape Verde without an arrest warrant or Interpol alert, and was taken to the United States in October of 2021. Cape Verdean authorities kept him arbitrarily imprisoned for 491 days without due process, in violation of the laws of Cape Verde, during which Saab experienced torture.
Venezuela’s CLAP food program (credit: Gloria La Riva/Liberation News) and Alex Saab (right, credit: U.S. Department of Treasury)
In the book, A Sacred Oath, written by former Trump Defense Secretary Mark Esper, Esper admits that the kidnapping was part of “soft” options to overthrow President Nicolas Maduro.
Esper also admits that Saab’s efforts, as a diplomat and businessman, were always aimed at making the situation of the Venezuelan population more bearable. “According to reports, under the direction of Maduro, Saab was on a special mission to negotiate a deal with Iran for Venezuela to receive morefuel, food and medical supplies . Saab was Maduro’s point man for a long time when it came to crafting economic deals and other transactions that kept the regime afloat.”
Meanwhile, the movement calling for the release of Alex Saab has gone international, and demands for his release were made at the counter-summits both in Los Angeles and Tijuana, during Biden’s Summit of the Americas.
Back in Venezuela, defense of Alex Saab is seen as not only the defense of an individual but as the defense of the sovereign actions of the Bolivarian government and people. The diplomat is also a member of the Venezuelan government delegation in the dialogue process which has taken place in Mexico.
While the Russian “special military operation” in Ukraine turns three weeks old today, energy-rich Azerbaijan is trying to preserve good ties with both Moscow and Kyiv.
Although the situation worries the Caucasus nation snuggled along the western shores of the Caspian Sea, the Azerbaijani government—based in the capital of Baku—tends toward preserving its neutrality and it potentially benefits from exporting additional gas to Europe.
Immediate Impact of War
Two days before the invasion, Azerbaijan signed an alliance agreement with Russia. The two countries are now de facto allies, although their parliaments still have not ratified the deal. According to the document, Moscow and Baku intend to deepen cooperation in the energy sector and strengthen military ties. It is worth noting Russia is already an ally of Azerbaijan’s arch-enemy, Armenia, and the agreement Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Azeri counterpart, Ilham Aliyev, signed in Moscow on February 22 is expected to reinforce Moscow’s positions in the South Caucasus.
Still, Russia’s isolation in the international arena could have an impact on its relations with Azerbaijan. Baku already has suspended all flights to the Russian Federation, and fears have emerged that remittances the approximately 650,000 Azeris working in Russia send home will significantly decline. Moreover, Russia is Azerbaijan’s top import partner. If Moscow eventually limits exports of various goods, including food, Baku likely will have to strengthen economic and political ties with another ally, Turkey.
It is not a secret Ankara supplied Baku with sophisticated Bayraktar drones prior to the 44-day war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. This landlocked mountainous terrain is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, although it was under the control of Armenian forces for more than two decades. It is believed the Turkish-made weapons were a game changer in the war. As a result of the conflict, Baku restored its sovereignty over large portions of the mountainous territory, as well as surrounding areas, and some 2,000 Russian peacekeepers were deployed to the region. More importantly, Azerbaijan and Turkey became official allies, after Aliyev and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan signed in June the Shusha Declaration.
Azerbaijan is now an ally of both Russia and Turkey, which could be a double-edged sword for Baku. Although the Caucasus nation supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity, it has avoided condemning Russia’s actions or imposing sanctions on the Russian Federation.
“We have never taken decisions on imposing sanctions on any country,” Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister Elnur Mammadov told Toward Freedom in an interview. He pointed out he does not expect any pressure from the West for Azerbaijan to impose sanctions on Moscow.
Under the mediation of Russian President Vladimir Putin on November 26 in the southern Russian city of Sochi, the leaders of rival countries Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to ease remaining tensions after their 2020 war over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Armenian President Nikol Pashinyan (right) and Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev (left) flank Putin / credit: commonspace.eu
Fueling Demand
The European Union expects Azerbaijan to increase gas supplies to the continent, especially if Moscow eventually decides to turn off the taps. Indeed, the EU will need Azerbaijan’s energy resources to cope with possible Russian gas disruptions. But the problem is the country now does not have much more gas to export.
“In 2021, we exported 8.2 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Europe,” said Orkhan Zeynalov, the head of the International Cooperation Department of Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Energy, in an interview with Toward Freedom. “This year, we’re planning to increase the export up to 9.1 billion cubic meters.”
Such a small amount will not meet European needs for energy. In the long term, however, Azerbaijan will be able to provide more gas to Europe if it manages to increase the share of renewable energy sources for electricity production. Baku aims to turn Nagorno-Karabakh into a “green energy zone,” where foreign corporations, such as United Kingdom-based BP and United Arab Emirates-based Masdar, plan to build solar power plants. In addition, Saudi Arabian utility company Acwa Power is expected to build a 240-megawatt wind turbine farm in Azerbaijan, which should reduce the amount of gas the country currently uses.
Nakhchivan Corridor
In 2021, Azerbaijan increased its gas exports by nearly 40 percent, but the country is unlikely to ever replace Russia as Europe’s major energy supplier. Still, the growing demand for Azerbaijan’s gas will almost certainly have a positive impact on the country’s budget. Baku is expected to invest money in the construction of the Nakhchivan corridor, also known as Zangezur corridor, which seems to be a top priority for the Caucasus nation.
“We are already building 110 kilometers (68 miles) of the railway, and 124 kilometers (77 miles) of the highway in the region,” Mammadov said. “Our plan is to finish the construction by the end of 2023.”
The Nakhchivan corridor can be seen in red-and-white stripes by the city of Berdzor or Lachin. Since the end of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war Azerbaijan and Turkey have been promoting the concept of the “Zangezur corridor,” which, if implemented, would connect Azerbaijan to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region and Turkey to the rest of the Turkic world through Armenia’s Syunik Province / credit: Mapeh / Wikipedia
Why is this transportation network so important for Azerbaijan? The Nakhchivan corridor will allow the energy-rich nation a land connection with its exclave, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. At the same time, it will connect Azerbaijan with its ally, Turkey. The challenge, however, is 45 kilometers (28 miles) of the road will have to go through Armenian territory. Yerevan, unlike Baku, does not seem to be in a hurry to finish construction of the corridor, even though the railroad portion will connect Armenia with its ally, Russia, through Azerbaijan’s mainland. Yerevan, however, seems to be more interested in the construction of the North-South road corridor that will connect Armenia with Russia, through Georgia.
Georgia did not impose sanctions on Russia, even though the two nations fought a brief war in 2008. That is why the Kremlin does not see the former Soviet republic as an “enemy country,” which leaves room for normalization of relations between Moscow and Tbilisi. In the long-term, such a development would be beneficial for Armenia, given it would secure a land connection with Russia.
Although Moscow reportedly supports the project, and is actively dealing with issues on unblocking transport links in the region, it is not very probable Yerevan will complete the construction of its section of the corridor any time soon, if it all. Quite aware of that, Azerbaijan reportedly decided to bypass Armenia and connect its main territory with Nakhchivan via Iran. On March 11, Baku and Tehran signed a Memorandum of Understanding on establishing communication links in the region. Indeed, such a move could create a new geopolitical reality in the Caucasus.
But as long as the Russia-Ukraine conflict goes on, the final implementation of all the deals in the region will likely remain on hold. For the time being, both Azerbaijan and Armenia are expected to preserve good relations with Moscow, hoping the war in Ukraine will not spill over into the South Caucasus, an area the Kremlin sees at its “near abroad.”
Nikola Mikovic is a Serbia-based contributor to CGTN, Global Comment, Byline Times, Informed Comment, and World Geostrategic Insights, among other publications. He is a geopolitical analyst for KJ Reports and Enquire.
Cigarettes and Soviets: Smoking in the USSR, by Tricia Starks (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, New York, 2022)
Tricia Starks’ Cigarettes and Soviets: Smoking in the USSR (2022) is an exploration into the evolution of a unique industry throughout the course of the former Soviet Union.
Juxtaposed against the development of the cigarette industry in the West, the evolution of tobacco within the USSR provides a looking glass into both the distinctions between the two systems and how they both similarly confronted social pressures. In the author’s words, “[the book] presents the relationship among state, production, profit, health, culture, gender, biology, use, image, and users” (p. 10).
The Cigarette Industry’s Utility in a Nascent Socialist State
Starks begins prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, in 1917, during Lenin and his comrades’ famous train ride back to the then-Russian Empire. She proceeds to move the reader through time by commissioning a theme for the periods that she covers in each chapter, including posters and photographs for reference throughout. The book concludes with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and a brief preview of the transformation of tobacco in the immediate aftermath.
The choice to focus on the tobacco industry through the paradigm of the Soviet system is an interesting case study in what distinguished their socialist system and the particular challenges they faced throughout the 20th century. In the capitalist West, and particularly in the United States, the traditional narrative on the rise of the tobacco industry is one of capitalist marketing and the explosion of consumerism as industrial modes of production expanded throughout the century. However, despite the lack of consumption-driven marketing within the newly formed Soviet republics, the demand for tobacco was tremendous. Soviets initially smoked it in the form of a coarse Russian tobacco known as makhorka or as filterless Russian cigarettes known as papirosy, only later increasing consumption of cigarettes.
Soviet Approach to Health and Cigarettes
Lenin despised the use of tobacco, going as far as to enforce designated smoking areas and issue smoking vouchers during the revolutionaries’ train ride back to Petrograd (p. 1). Following the triumph of the October Revolution, the Soviets would go on to found the first national prophylactic [preventative] healthcare system in 1918 (p. 2). Under the leadership of Nikolai Aleksandrovich Semashko, the new People’s Commissariat for Public Health (known as the Narkomzdrav) quickly acknowledged the dangers of smoking and launched the world’s first mass anti-smoking campaign, calling for both wide-reaching public education and curtailment of production and distribution. However, the conditions that the USSR’s planned economy faced presented them with a difficult choice. That was because demand for tobacco far exceeded supply coming out of the destruction of World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution, the industry’s unions were strong, and the revenue from its sale and export was badly needed. Thus, they decided to continue production while committing to a robust propaganda campaign to inform the public about the dangers of smoking.
The perspective that the public awareness campaigns took serves as a great example of what distinguished the Soviet approach from the West. Representative of the collectivism that guided the state, posters and resources throughout the period highlighted individuals’ responsibility to their community and the social impacts of smoking. While the extent of tobacco’s danger to physical health was far from fully understood, the socialist perspective of Soviet medical professionals led them to include the social implications of smoking in their understanding of its dangers. At a delicate time for the revolutionary project, Narkomzdrav rightfully warned smoking could not only limit one’s ability to be a productive member of society, but could also drain badly needed resources from the state. Posters highlighted how smokers caused fires in factories and in homes, polluted public and personal spaces, and influenced the next generation to take up the habit.
An Unusual Analysis of Former USSR
The focus of Cigarettes and Soviets is enticing. Starks’ avoidance of Cold War-era pseudo-history and histrionic oversimplifications, which seek to disparage the Soviet project, is particularly refreshing. Starks notes:
“The depiction of tobacco as the true opiate of the masses assumes a passive smoking population and a state in total control. The potency and popularity of papirosy prepared the Soviets to have a massive market for any tobacco they produced, and for the state to interfere in the biopsychosocial bond between smoker and tobacco held danger (p. 8).”
The first anti-smoking campaign demonstrated the question of tobacco was complex and the way Soviets chose to respond illustrates their principles. Pamphlets and other materials produced during this early period criticized alcohol and tobacco for “[endangering] order, health, and political progress” as well as “[softening] consciousness (p. 95).” Narkomzdrav looked to align their message with the Bolshevik Revolution and tap into the revolutionary energy among the people to dissuade them from smoking. However, Starks also points out the Soviets were restricted in their ability to take action by both the social conditions and the concrete benefits tobacco production provided. In 1931, Anastas Mikoian, head of the People’s Commissariat of Food Industry, “praised tobacco workers for fueling the Stalinist industrialization drive (p. 111).” Mikoian was commenting on the reality the USSR faced; industry and the economy were still developing and tobacco was in high demand, able to provide welcome satisfaction in the face of shortages of other products while the revenue it produced funded development.
In later chapters of Cigarettes and Soviets, the thoughtfulness that guides the author’s exploration of the pre-Stalin era at times fades. Starks mentions the Soviets declined aid offered through the Marshall Plan, but fails to explain that this was due to the purposefully small amount offered to a country that suffered a great deal of damage throughout World War II and that the USSR recognized the strings attached to the aid in the plan (p. 157). The analysis of later decades doesn’t provide the depth to fully understand the profound changes happening within the tobacco industry and within the USSR. For example, one of the first Western industries to break into the Soviet market was tobacco, following the lead of Marlboro owner Philip Morris’ joint venture with a Soviet tobacco factory on the topically named Soiuz-Apollon cigarettes in 1975 (p. 175). However, unlike her analysis of how the post-1921 New Economic Policy era’s policies influenced tobacco imagery and propaganda, Starks does not elaborate on the post-WWII sociopolitical developments influencing the changes.
Nonetheless, Tricia Starks’ new book, Cigarettes and Soviets: Smoking in the USSR, is enlightening and thought-provoking. The case study on the peculiar USSR tobacco industry provides an interesting window into the Soviet project, highlighting challenges the Soviet people faced and successes the Bolshevik Revolution was able to produce.
Nick Flores is a co-founder of and organizer with Bushwick, Brooklyn-based G-REBLS, a grassroots organization as well as a member organization of the Black Alliance for Peace’s Solidarity Network. Nick holds a double-major bachelor’s degree in history and Latin American studies.
On left: Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti. On right: Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic. Cars with the Kosovo license plate (center left) and the Serbian license plate (credit: Nikola Mikovic) / photo illustration: Toward Freedom
KOSOVSKA MITROVICA, Kosovo—A fight over license plates in the Balkans has gotten the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) involved.
Posters and graffiti can be seen throughout the Serbian-dominated part of the town of Kosovska Mitrovica in northern Kosovo that say, “No surrender—Serbian license plates and ID remain.”
Despite the European Union moderating bilateral talks, ethnically Albanian-dominated authorities in Pristina, Kosovo’s capital, plan on September 1 to re-register vehicles featuring Serbian plates. However, recent protests jammed up border crossings between Kosovo and Serbia. Plus, a poll shows the majority of Kosovo-based Serbs plan to continue using Serbian-issued license plates.
“They will certainly provide resistance if Pristina attempts to ‘nationalize’ thousands of cars if their owners refuse to replace Serbian-issued license plates with Kosovan ones,” said Milica Andric Rakic. The project manager of Kosovska Mitrovica-based non-governmental organization New Social Initiative told Toward Freedom that Serbs may bow to a certain degree to pressure from Belgrade, but will not accept ultimatums from Pristina.
This dispute comes amid Serbia’s resistance to the European Union’s and the United States’ pressure to recognize the 2008 secession of Kosovo. But, as Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic recently pointed out, both entities refuse to acknowledge breakaway republics in Ukraine’s Donbass region.
A map of the Balkans region of Europe showing the boundary between Serbia and Kosovo / credit: caingram.info
Serbia-Kosovo Relations
Following the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia, the Serbian police and army were forced to withdraw from the country’s southern province, Kosovo. Then NATO troops entered Kosovo in June 1999, having remained since. Nine years later, Pristina declared independence, a move recognized by most Western countries. In southern Kosovo, ethnic Albanians make up over 90 percent of the population.
Serbia’s defeat, however, did not mark the end of the presence of Serbian institutions in Kosovo. In the north, as well as in certain places in the south, Serbs make up the majority of the population. Despite the secession, Serbia has continued issuing license plates and identification cards (IDs) to Serbs living in northern Kosovo.
“For Kosovo’s Prime Minister Albin Kurti, those car plates are illegal,” Rakic said. “But for the local Serbs, they are the only ones they have.”
She said Serbs do not want to integrate into Kosovo’s legal and political system, despite occasional pressure that comes from Belgrade. For them, Kosovo is part of Serbia. That is Belgrade’s official position, too.
However, amid Western pressure over the years, Serbia has had to make concessions to Kosovo. For example, in 2011, Serbia agreed to create de facto border crossings with Kosovo, while Serbian police officers were integrated into the Kosovo police force. In 2013, Belgrade called on Serbs living in northern Kosovo to take part in Pristina-run local elections. Two years later, Serbia’s judicial authorities in northern Kosovo were integrated into the Kosovo legal framework.
“The Serbs in northern Kosovo never supported such actions. That is why Belgrade was always either ‘bribing’ them or pressuring them to integrate into Kosovo’s institutions,” Rakic said, referring to various deals Belgrade has offered Serbs over the years to de-escalate the situation.
‘New Generation Will Not Put Up with Terror’
Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic expressed solidarity with ordinary Serbians at an August 17 joint press conference with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg.
“A new generation of young men in northern Kosovo will not put up with the terror that comes from Pristina,” Vucic said.
Kosovo-based Serbian shopowner Sinisa Radovic told Toward Freedom he’d get Kosovo license plates to avoid being fined / credit: Nikola Mikovic
But, Sinisa Radovic, who owns a small souvenir shop in Kosovska Mitrovica, said he has no choice but to re-register his vehicle.
“Otherwise, they will confiscate it. Right now, if I drive a car with Serbian-issued plates south of Kosovska Mitrovica, the police can fine me and I would have to pay 250 euros,” Radovic explained.
In northern Kosovo, drivers have used stickers to cover Serbian state symbols on license plates. It is a temporary solution to the dispute.
On August 18 in Brussels, Vucic and Kurti failed to reach a deal, although EU High Representative for Foreign Policy and Security Josep Borrell claimed they have until September 1 to resolve the burning issue.
Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti has stated Serbian license plates are considered illegal. Rakic said it’s possible Kosovo’s authorities will force Serbs into Kosovo’s legal system without an agreement with Serbia.
“Such an attempt will undoubtedly lead to an escalation,” she pointed out.
‘Pristina Will Have a Big Problem’
Moreover, Pristina now requires Serbs living in northern Kosovo to replace their Serbian-issued identification cards with Kosovo documents.
Some challenges Serbians in Kosovo face are that Pristina neither recognizes Serbian-issued driver’s licenses nor Serbian-issued IDs.
Some Serbians hold Kosovo’s IDs, while others cannot get them for technical reasons. In order to apply for a Kosovo ID, one would have to attach a birth certificate. Serbians living in Kosovo would want a Kosovo-issued ID to be able to get Kosovo-issued driver’s licenses and plates to be allowed to drive south of the Serbian-dominated areas. Plus, to get paid by a Kosovo-based employer, they would need a Kosovo ID to be able to open bank accounts to receive direct paycheck deposits.
“But Pristina does not recognize birth certificates issued by Serbia’s authorities after June 1999, which means that someone who was born in Kosovska Mitrovica in 2000 does not legally exist for Pristina and cannot even apply for an ID,” Rakic explained.
Serbian pensioner Mirko Trajkovic told Toward Freedom he’d resist “illegal” Kosovo authorities’ instructions / credit: Nikola Mikovic
Yet, some holdouts remain. One of them is local pensioner Mirko Trajkovic.
“This is Serbia. Why should I have any documents issued by illegal institutions in Pristina?” Trajkovic said, adding Belgrade will not betray Serbs in northern Kosovo.
This reporter found it difficult to find many Serbs who would comment. Many fear both the Serbian and Kosovo governments would retaliate.
Neither Belgrade nor Pristina effectively control northern Kosovo. The territory is a “gray zone,” where NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission is expected to intervene in case of potential clashes between Serbs and the Albanian-dominated Kosovo Security Forces.
Meanwhile, panic has spread on social media and in Western media. Plus, the Kosovo prime minister speculated about an escalation leading to a new war in the Balkans.
Rakic thinks that’s unlikely, though. But she did suggest one possibility: Because Kosovo has rejected all Serbian proposals for a resolution, what could happen if no deal is reached by September 1 is Belgrade may call on the Serbian community in the north to boycott Kosovo-issued documents and license plates.
“Then Pristina will have a big problem, since it is logistically very difficult to confiscate thousands of vehicles.”
Nikola Mikovic is a Serbia-based contributor to CGTN, Global Comment, Byline Times, Informed Comment, and World Geostrategic Insights, among other publications. He is a geopolitical analyst for KJ Reports and Enquire.
