Colombian presidential candidate Gustavo Petro (right) announced in March Afro-Colombian activist Francia Márquez as his vice-presidential running mate on the Pacto Histórico ticket / credit: Twitter / Francia Márquez
Recent polls indicate left-wing presidential candidate Gustavo Petro and his running mate, Francia Márquez, are the most popular candidates in Colombia. But they appear to fall short of the 50 percent of potential votes required to win the first round of the presidential election on Sunday.
Onlookers say their popularity might explain a surge in death threats against the candidates. The ticket is striking: Petro is a former guerilla-turned-elected-official while Márquez is an award-winning Afro-descendant activist. The pair have inspired people in the country, which has been torn apart by decades of paramilitary violence, partly due to being tied politically, militarily and economically to the United States. Plus, state-sanctioned violence and dozens of deaths at the hands of police during last year’s nation-wide strike remain fresh in the national memory.
The situation has gotten so dangerous, the candidates have been seen at campaign events flanked by bodyguards holding bulletproof shields, as the Washington Post recently reported.
“The U.S. will not be happy with their victory because they will challenge U.S. military ties and ties with NATO,” said Dan Kovalik, professor of international human rights at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Such a break could devastate U.S. hegemonic relations in the Western Hemisphere, which the United States has long related to as its “backyard.”
Just a week ago, the United States invited the Colombian defense minister to Washington to announce the country as a “major non-NATO ally.” This comes after $4.5 billion in arms and military training have been poured into Colombia through the United States’ Plan Colombia, which claims to go after the illicit drug trade. However, many activists say small-time farmers have suffered while the flow of drugs have not stopped.
Kovalik pointed to another time a leftist was almost elected. Jorge Eliécer Gaitán was assassinated during his second presidential run in 1948. That set off “La Violencia,” a 10-year period that ended with at least 200,000 people dead.
Meanwhile, six years after peace accords were signed with paramilitary groups, more than 1,000 social leaders have been killed, a statistic that disturbs many activists.
Even with a Petro-Márquez victory, security for the candidates could be dicey after entering office, given how closely linked the paramilitaries, the military and economic elites are in Colombia. A Márquez advisor, Hildebrando Vélez Galeano, told Toward Freedom the campaign had received information paramilitary groups were planning to murder the candidates. He referred to the police and military as “mafia controlled.”
Earlier this month, a military analyst and former colonel was accused of violating the Colombian constitution when he condemned Petro’s candidacy. The constitution bars members of the military from expressing political opinions.
“It’s because of Petro’s commitment to use the power of the state to go after these Uribistas,” said Ajamu Baraka, a campaign advisor. In mentioning Uribistas, Baraka referred to the presidency of Álvaro Uribe, a right-winger who militarized the police and ramped up the war against farmers and activists of Indigenous and Afro-descendant backgrounds. Petro recently mentioned that, if elected, he would hold accountable those who have been threatening his and Márquez’s lives.
Teri Mattson, a U.S. activist who hosts CodePink’s “What the F Is Going On In Latin America and the Caribbean” YouTube show, was denied entrance into Colombia on Sunday to serve as an election observer. She was deported to the United States the following day.
“I would not be surprised if that was orchestrated to say, ‘It’s getting very chaotic and the government will need to suspend the election,'” Mattson told Toward Freedom.
A few other election observers have been denied entrance, too, including Argentinian Alejandro Rusconi.
BREAKING: Official electoral observer @ale_rusconi —invited by the @CNE_COLOMBIA ahead of Sunday's election — has been denied entry to Colombia without explanation. CNE Magistrate @LuisGPerezCasas has said: "This is not good for [Duque's] government, nor for democracy." pic.twitter.com/9zGUyhE2Ge
— Progressive International (@ProgIntl) May 25, 2022
“The people who have sustained war and violence are determined to continue sustaining it at all costs,” said Charo Mina Rojas, a leader in Proceso de Comunidades Negras, an alliance of Afro-descendant organizations in Colombia. She also relayed concern about election fraud and voter intimidation.
Overall, though, the situation looks promising to many onlookers because of the presence of left-wing regional strongholds like Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela; as well as many countries boycotting the U.S.-hosted Summit of the Americas; and the political tide recently turning in countries like Honduras and Perú.
“Colombia is the last beachhead the U.S. has in Latin America,” Kovalik said.
Julie Varughese is editor of Toward Freedom. She recently wrote about the historic candidacy of Márquez.
Donetsk People’s Republic military parade on May 9, 2018 / credit: Andrew Butko
Editor’s Note: The following is the writer’s analysis.
While Russia and the United States continue to act as geopolitical rivals during what is now dubbed the “new Cold War,” they often agree to deals on political crises and conflicts around the globe.
Territory in Donetsk Oblast under the control of the Donetsk People’s Republic (in yellow) and the Luhansk People’s Republic (in pink), as of 2015 / credit: ZomBear/Marktaff
Recently, the two countries discussed the Donbass War between two Moscow-backed self-proclaimed republics—the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic in Ukraine’s Donbass region—and the Washington-sponsored Ukraine. But will that finally end the bloodshed that erupted in the energy-rich region of eastern Ukraine after more than 89 percent of voters in the Donbass voted in May 2014 for independence from Kiev?
Every conflict has its epilogue around the negotiating table. In 2015, the self-proclaimed Donbass republics, as well as Ukraine, Russia and European mediators signed the Minsk Agreement, which effectively ended offensive military operations in the war-torn region. But it did not end the war itself. To this day, sporadic shelling and gunfire remain part of everyday life for the local population.
On October 13, Ukrainian Armed Forces captured Andrey Kosyak, the officer of the Luhansk People’s Republic Office at the Joint Center for Control and Coordination. Kosyak is one of about 600,000 Donbass residents who hold Russian citizenship in a region of 2.5 million people. In response to the arrest, local activists blocked the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)’s headquarters in Donetsk, demanding Kosyak’s release. The mission then suspended its operations in the Donbass. The Kremlin’s reaction to this incident appeared weak. It took a week for the Russian foreign ministry to demand Ukraine grant access to the Russian citizen. Kiev, backed by the West since the neo-Nazi rampage the Obama-Biden administration fueled, is unlikely to rush to allow Russian diplomats to meet with the captured officer. That means the Kremlin has no option. However, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev wrote on October 11, “Russia knows how to wait. We are patient people.”
Indeed, endless waiting along with a few weak actions seem to be the Russian strategy. After the Ukrainian Army on October 26 captured the village of Staromaryevka in the Donbass, Russia did not take any steps to defend its proxies in the region. More importantly, Ukraine has destroyed the artillery of pro-Russian forces in its first combat deployment of the Turkish-made Bayraktar drones, and the Kremlin’s reaction was yet again soft. Even though Kiev confirmed its army has used the sophisticated weapon, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said, “It is very hard to figure out what is true and what is false.” It is not a secret Ukraine purchased Bayraktar drones from Turkey after the unmanned combat aerial vehicle proved to be a game changer in the 44-day war in Nagorno-Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Given the Kremlin hesitates to engage in a direct military confrontation with Ukraine, Kiev is expected to continue its limited military operations in the Donbass, quite aware Moscow will turn a blind eye to Ukrainian actions. Russia is still waiting for Ukraine to implement the Minsk agreements and grant the Donbass a special self-governing status after it holds elections under Ukrainian legislation. In return, the Russian-backed Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk’s People’s Republic would allow Ukraine to reinstate full control over its border with Russia. Neither side, however, seems determined to implement the deal.
From the Ukrainian perspective, a special self-governing status for both Donbass region republics would mean a second Crimea has been created. Another pro-Russia entity potentially creates obstacles in Ukrainian political life, which has been heavily linked with the West since late 2013’s Euromaidan. From the Russian perspective, returning the Donbass region to Kiev’s control would mean Moscow has de facto betrayed its proxies in the region and has lost control over the Donbass coal mines at the time when coal prices in the global market have hit a record high.
U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland / U.S. State Department
Still, the Kremlin has appeared to have signaled it is ready to compromise over the energy-rich region. On October 11, U.S. Under Secretary of State Victoria Nuland met in Moscow with Dmitry Kozak, who serves as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s deputy chief of staff. According to reports, the two officials had a “productive discussion about the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements and the restoration of peace, stability, and Ukrainian sovereignty in the Donbass.” That Nuland, who was on Russia’s sanctions list, was allowed to visit the Russian capital is a sign Washington has the upper hand in its relations with Moscow. The Kremlin had lifted targeted sanctions on the U.S. diplomat in exchange for a lift in U.S. sanctions on a few Russian officials and foreign-policy experts. As the U.S. dollar still controls transactions throughout the world, U.S. sanctions have had devastating consequences for 39 countries. Plus, the United States had requested Nuland’s visit to Russia. In other words, Russia had to make a concession to the United States. Moreover, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stressed his country would not object to U.S. participation in talks on the Donbass if Washington supports the Minsk Agreement.
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and his team sit across from Petro Poroshenko of the Euromaidan Movement, Vitali Klychko of the UDAR Party, and Arseniy Yatsenyuk of the Fatherland Party at the outset of a meeting with the Ukrainian opposition leaders on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference in Munich, Germany, on February 1, 2014. Victoria Nuland can be seen to Kerry’s right (fourth from the right) / credit: U.S. State Department
Given Washington is the major foreign actor operating in Ukraine, any peace process that excludes the United States is unlikely to have major success. So far, Moscow and Kiev have been attempting to resolve the Donbass conflict through Normandy-format talks that have included Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France. But no progress has been made. Lavrov recently suggested inviting the United States to these talks, but Germany reportedly refused the Kremlin’s proposal, which means warfare in the Donbass likely will continue for the foreseeable future.
Alexander Borodai, prime minister of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic / credit: Mark Nakoykher
This means the region will be stuck in a state that can be described as neither war nor peace, although forces on both sides will try to change the status quo. Alexander Borodai, who was prime minister of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic in 2014 and is now a member of the Russian Parliament, said Russia should abolish the border with the Donbass republics. However, customs points between the republics already have been abolished and both entities have been integrated into the Russian economy. As Borodai pointed out, the Donbass already is a de facto part of Russia. However, unless the conflict in the region escalates into a large-scale confrontation, the Kremlin unlikely will incorporate the coal-rich territory into the Russian Federation.
Ukraine, for its part, is not expected to start any significant military operations until it gets the green light from Washington. On October 18, during U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s visit to Kiev, a fresh allotment of U.S.-made arms and other military equipment was delivered, part of a $60 million package the Biden administration had approved.
Since 2014, the United States has committed more than $2.5 billion to support Ukraine’s forces so that they can preserve their country’s territorial integrity and secure its borders and territorial waters. pic.twitter.com/MqKupUaQSo
— Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III (@SecDef) October 19, 2021
According to Austin, the United States has committed more than $2.5 billion since 2014 to support Ukraine’s Armed Forces, and Turkish defense company Baykar is expected to build a maintenance and modernization center for Bayraktar drones in Ukraine, which means the former Soviet republic is seriously preparing for a potential war against Russia.
At this point, a major escalation of the Donbass conflict does not seem probable. But, in the long term, such an option will almost certainly be on the table.
Nikola Mikovic is a Serbia-based contributor to CGTN, Global Comment, Byline Times, Informed Comment, and World Geostrategic Insights, among other publications. He is a geopolitical analyst for KJ Reports and Enquire.
Anti-government protest in Sri Lanka on April 13 in front of the Presidential Secretariat / credit: AntanO / Wikipedia
Editor’s Note: This article was originally published by Multipolarista.
Facing a deep economic crisis and bankruptcy, Sri Lanka was rocked by large protests this July, which led to the resignation of the government.
Numerous Western political leaders and media outlets blamed this uprising on a supposed Chinese “debt trap,” echoing a deceptive narrative that has been thoroughly debunked by mainstream academics.
In reality, the vast majority of the South Asian nation’s foreign debt is owed to the West.
These structural adjustment programs clearly have not worked, given Sri Lanka’s economy has been managed by the IMF for many of the decades since it achieved independence from British colonialism in 1948.
As of 2021, a staggering 81 percent of Sri Lanka’s foreign debt was owned by U.S. and European financial institutions, as well as Western allies Japan and India.
This pales in comparison to the mere 10 percent owed to Beijing.
According to official statistics from Sri Lanka’s Department of External Resources, as of the end of April 2021, the plurality of its foreign debt is owned by Western vulture funds and banks, which have nearly half, at 47 percent.
The top holders of the Sri Lankan government’s debt, in the form of international sovereign bonds (ISBs), are the following firms:
BlackRock (U.S.)
Ashmore Group (Britain)
Allianz (Germany)
UBS (Switzerland)
HSBC (Britain)
JPMorgan Chase (U.S.)
Prudential (U.S.)
The Asian Development Bank and World Bank, which are thoroughly dominated by the United States, own 13 percent and 9 percent of Sri Lanka’s foreign debt, respectively.
Less known is that the Asian Development Bank (ADB) is, too, largely a vehicle of U.S. soft power. Neoconservative DC-based think tank the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which is funded by Western governments, affectionately described the ADB as a “strategic asset for the United States,” and a crucial challenger to the much newer, Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
“The United States, through its membership in the ADB and with its Indo-Pacific Strategy, seeks to compete with China as a security and economic partner of choice in the region,” boasted CSIS.
Another country that has significant influence over the ADB is Japan, which similarly owns 10 percent of Sri Lanka’s foreign debt.
An additional 2 percent of Sri Lanka’s foreign debt was owed to India as of April 2021, although that number has steadily increased since. In early 2022, India was in fact the top lender to Sri Lanka, with New Delhi disbursing 550 percent more credit than Beijing between January and April.
Together, these Western firms and their allies Japan and India own 81 percent of Sri Lanka’s foreign debt – more than three-quarters of its international obligations.
By contrast, China owns just one-tenth of Sri Lanka’s foreign debt.
The overwhelming Western role in indebting Sri Lanka is made evident by a graph published by the country’s Department of External Resources, showing the foreign commitments by currency:
As of the end of 2019, less than 5 percent of Sri Lanka’s foreign debt was denominated in China’s currency the yuan (CNY). On the other hand, nearly two-thirds, 64.6 percent, was owed in U.S. dollars, along with an additional 14.4 percent in IMF special drawing rights (SDR) and more than 10 percent in the Japanese yen (JPY).
Western media reporting on the economic crisis in Sri Lanka, however, ignores these facts, giving the strong, and deeply misleading, impression that the chaos is in large part because of Beijing.
Sri Lankan Economic Crisis Driven by Neoliberal Policies, Inflation, Corruption, Covid-19 Pandemic
This July, Sri Lanka’s government was forced to resign, after hundreds of thousands of protesters stormed public buildings, setting some on fire, while also occupying the homes of the country’s leaders.
The protests were driven by skyrocketing rates of inflation, as well as rampant corruption and widespread shortages of fuel, food, and medicine – a product of the country’s inability to pay for imports.
In May, Sri Lanka defaulted on its debt. In June, it tried to negotiate another structural adjustment program with the U.S.-dominated International Monetary Fund (IMF). This would have been Sri Lanka’s 17th IMF bailout, but the talks ended without a deal.
By July, Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe publicly admitted that his government was “bankrupt.”
Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who spent a significant part of his life working in the United States, entered office in 2019 and immediately imposed a series of neoliberal economic policies, which included cutting taxes on corporations.
These neoliberal policies decreased government revenue. And the precarious economic situation was only exacerbated by the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic.
Facing an out-of-control 39.1 percent inflation rate in May, the Sri Lankan government did a 180 and suddenly raised taxes again, further contributing to popular discontent, which broke out in a social explosion in July.
Media Falsely Blames China for Sri Lankan Debt Default
While 81 percent of Sri Lanka’s foreign debt is owned by Western financial institutions, Japan, and India, major corporate media outlets sought to blame China for the country’s bankruptcy and subsequent protests.
The Wall Street Journal pointed the finger at Beijing in a deeply misleading article titled “China’s Lending Comes Under Fire as Sri Lankan Debt Crisis Deepens.” The newspaper noted that the crisis “opens a window for India to push back against Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean region.”
U.S. media giant the Associated Press also tried to scapegoat China, and its deceptive news wire was republished by outlets across the world, from ABC News to Saudi Arabia’s Al Arabiya.
VOA accused Beijing of “pursuing a kind of ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ meant to bring economically weak countries to their knees, dependent on China for support.”
On social media, the Western propaganda narrative surrounding the July protests in Sri Lanka was even more detached from reality.
A veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and National Security Agency (NSA), Derek J. Grossman, portrayed the unrest as an anti-China uprising.
“China’s window of opportunity to one day control Sri Lanka probably just closed,” he tweeted on July 9, as the government announced it was resigning.
After working for U.S. spy agencies, Grossman is today an analyst at the Pentagon’s main think tank, the RAND Corporation, where he has pushed a hawkish line against Beijing.
China’s window of opportunity to one day control Sri Lanka probably just closed. pic.twitter.com/WOLIb3SUTf
— Derek J. Grossman (@DerekJGrossman) July 9, 2022
BBC Reluctantly Admits the ‘Chinese Debt Trap’ Narrative in Sri Lanka Is False
China has funded several large infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka, building an international airport, hospitals, a convention center, a sports stadium, and most controversially a port in the southern coastal town of Hambantota.
The UK government’s BBC sent a reporter to Sri Lanka to investigate these accusations of supposed “Chinese debt traps.” But after speaking to locals, he reluctantly came to the conclusion that the narrative is false.
“The truth is that many independent experts say that we should be wary of the Chinese debt trap narrative, and we’ve found quite a lot of evidence here in Sri Lanka which contradicts it,” BBC host Ben Chu acknowledged.
He explained, “The Hambantota port, well, that was instigated by the Sri Lankans, not by the Chinese. And it can’t currently be used by Chinese military naval vessels, and actually there’s some pretty formidable barriers to that happening.”
“A lot of the projects we’ve been seeing, well, they feel more like white elephants than they do Chinese global strategic assets,” Chu added.
In our latest film from Sri Lanka, which faces financial collapse as the global Big Squeeze bites, Ben Chu examines the effect that Chinese loans and investment are having on the country:#Newsnighthttps://t.co/GBFZ1ItP0G
The British state media outlet interviewed the director of Port City Colombo’s economic commission, Saliya Wickramasuriya, who emphasized, “The Chinese government is not involved in setting the rules and regulations, so from that standpoint the government of Sri Lanka is in control, and it’s up to the government of Sri Lanka’s wish to flavor the city, the development of the city, in the way it wants to.”
“It is accurate to say that infrastructure development has boomed under Chinese investment, Chinese debt sometimes, but those are things that we’ve actually needed for a long, long time,” Wickramasuriya added.
Chu clarified that, “Importantly, it’s not debt but equity the Chinese own here.”
“So is the debt trap not all it seems?” he asked.
Mainstream U.S. Academics Debunk the ‘Chinese Debt Trap’ Myth
Mainstream Western academics have similarly investigated the claims of “Chinese debt traps,” and come to the conclusion that they do not exist.
Even a professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, which is notorious for its revolving door with the U.S. government and close links to spy agencies, acknowledged that “the Chinese ‘debt trap’ is a myth.”
Writing in 2021 in the de facto mouthpiece of the DC political establishment, The Atlantic magazine, scholar Deborah Brautigam stated clearly that the debt-trap narrative is “a lie, and a powerful one.”
“Our research shows that Chinese banks are willing to restructure the terms of existing loans and have never actually seized an asset from any country, much less the port of Hambantota,” Brautigam said in the article, which was co-authored by Meg Rithmire, a professor at the stridently anti-socialist Harvard Business School.
The Chinese "debt-trap" narrative is a false one which wrongfully portrays both Beijing and the developing countries it deals with, Deborah Brautigam and Meg Rithmire write: https://t.co/FagExsdeNT
Brautigam published her findings in a 2020 article for Johns Hopkins’ China Africa Research Initiative, titled “Debt Relief with Chinese Characteristics,” along with fellow researchers Kevin Acker and Yufan Huang.
They investigated Chinese loans in Sri Lanka, Iraq, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Angola, and the Republic of Congo, and “found no ‘asset seizures’ and, despite contract clauses requiring arbitration, no evidence of the use of courts to enforce payments, or application of penalty interest rates.”
They discovered that Beijing cancelled more than $3.4 billion and restructured or refinanced roughly $15 billion of debt in Africa between 2000 and 2019. At least 26 individual loans to African nations were renegotiated.
Western critics have attacked Beijing, claiming there is a lack of transparency surrounding its loans. Brautigam explained that “Chinese lenders prefer to address restructuring quietly, on a bilateral basis, tailoring programs to each situation.”
The researchers noted that China puts an “emphasis on ‘development sustainability’ (looking at the future contribution of the project) rather than ‘debt sustainability’ (looking at the current state of the economy) as the basis of project lending decisions.”
“Moreover, despite critics’ worries that China could seize its borrower’s assets, we do not see China attempting to take advantage of countries in debt distress,” they added.
“There were no ‘asset seizures’ in the 16 restructuring cases that we found,” the scholars continued. “We have not yet seen cases in Africa where Chinese banks or companies have sued sovereign governments or exercised the option for international arbitration standard in Chinese loan contracts.”
Benjamin Norton is founder and editor of Multipolarista.
A protest in Taleex, Somalia, on January 15 / credit: Khaatumo Media Office
Editor’s Note: Light editing helped conform this article that originally appeared in Peoples Dispatch to TF’s style.
Protests against secessionist rule are spreading across the Sool region of Somaliland, the breakaway region of northern Somalia. Unionist protesters are calling for reunification with Somalia and Somali activists and observers opine that the protests might soon spread across Somaliland, questioning the legitimacy of its unrecognized claim to sovereignty, which the United States and the United Kingdom have been seeking to strengthen with recent overtures.
On Sunday, January 15, protests were reported from the Taleex city, where Somaliland’s tricolor flags were removed and replaced with the blue flags of Somalia. Taleex is about 160 kilometers northeast of the epicenter of the protests, Las Anod, Sool region’s capital city. Las Anod was captured by Somaliland from Somalia’s autonomous region of Puntland in 2007.
The protests began in the city on December 28. In an attempt to put them down, security forces killed at least 20 civilians over the following five days, before reportedly retreating to the city’s outskirts on January 5.
Somaliland’s commander of Armed Forces, Brigadier General Mahad Ambashe, has, however, indicated his intention to take back the city, saying that his troops “shall continue staying in Las Anod and Sool region to ensure law and order has been followed by residents.”
Defiant, the clan leaders of the region held a meeting in Las Anod on January 12, calling on Somaliland’s forces to withdraw from Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn (SSC), where a majority of the people have been historically opposed to secession from Somalia.
Pro-unionist troops under the command of the head of the Dhulbanate clan have taken over the city and sworn to defend it from Somaliland. “Everybody is waiting for the tribesmen in Las Anod to fully announce a war against Somaliland. And you will hear this very soon as they have formed a committee of 33 heads to come up with a roadmap to remove Somaliland from SSC,” Elham Garaad, a UK-based Somali activist whose unionist parents migrated out of Somaliland, told Peoples Dispatch.
The protests had spread to the city of Kalabaydh, 70 kilometers (43 miles) to the southwest of Las Anod, by January 12. Two days later, unionist demonstrations broke out in Xudun, 100 kilometers (62 miles) to the north of Las Anod, and in Boocame, 80 kilometers (49 miles) to its east. Protesters also took to the streets of Boocame’s neighboring Tukarak on January 15, and blocked a minister from visiting the city.
Badhaan, a city in Sanaag region, and Buuhoodle city in Cayn region, have also witnessed protests. The three regions together had formed the Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn (SSC) state of Somalia, before being forced into Somaliland by the secessionist Somali National Movement (SNM).
Waving the blue flag of Somalia, the protesters have been demanding the “right to self-determination” on the question of reuniting with Somalia, which was fractured after the civil war that ended with the collapse of its federal government in 1991.
‘Most Regions in Somaliland Oppose Secession’
“Until 1991, there was no such thing as Somaliland, except when the area was a British Protectorate,” Mohamed Olad, a Somali activist studying law in the United States, told Peoples Dispatch. “The idea of forming a country on the basis of this border of the British protectorate,” separating itself from the part of Somalia under Italian occupation, was opposed by two of the three original states of Somalia that came to be part of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland after 1991, he said.
Support for secession was largely limited to the North West state, a stronghold of the SNM, which fought in the war against Somalia’s federal government led by Mohamed Siad Barre. SSC and Awdal “have historically opposed” the notion of Somaliland, Olad explained, adding that Awdal was captured by the SNM with the help of Ethiopia during the civil war.
The SSC leaders, on the other hand, were tricked into signing an agreement on the guarantee that Somaliland would form itself into a single state within Somalia. “That agreement never included secession,” he said, adding that discontent against Somaliland’s rule has since been intensifying, and protests might also soon spread to Awdal.
Three of the four major clans—namely the Dhulbahante, Warsangeli and Gadabursi—along with the smaller Issa clan, had opposed the secession from Somalia, added Elham Garaad. Only the Isak clan, which dominated the SNM and had a strong presence in the North West state, supported the secession and formation of Somaliland. Other clans have since felt marginalized by the Isak, which wields disproportionate power in the government of Somaliland.
But currently, the “Isak themselves are divided,” Garaad said. “Gaarhajis, one of the largest tribes (under the Isak clan), has been vocal about the atrocities in the SSC region.” Defending the right of the people in SSC to be unionist, they have called on the Somaliland government to stop the killings. Garaad maintains that the current spate of protests may soon reach even Somaliland’s capital city Hargeisa, which has been a historic stronghold of the SNM’s secessionist politics, dominated by the Isak.
“SNM was led by the elite and petty bourgeoisie of the Isak clan. They have neither dealt with the class contradictions within the clan, nor succeeded in integrating other clans into the secessionist movement,” historian Mohamed Hassan told Peoples Dispatch. “While the Isak is supposed to be the ruling clan, in effect, what you have in Somaliland is a one-man rule by former army Colonel Musa Bihi Abdi, whose term had already expired in October 2022. [An] increasing number of people within the Isak clan are also supporting unionist politics.”
Somalia is among the most homogeneous countries in Africa, in terms of language and religion, explained Hassan, who is also an advisor to the head of Ethiopia’s Somali state. The clan system from feudal times, preserved under colonial administration as an essential tool for divide-and-rule, remains the key fissure exploited by imperialism to ensure Somalia remains a fractured nation, he argued.
Rising Tide of Somali Nationalism
“But hundreds of thousands from Somaliland are working and staying in Somalia,” he added. Youngsters from Somaliland make up a significant portion of Somalia’s national army. The large Somali diaspora is getting increasingly politicized and organized by international exposure. All this has contributed to a surge in Somali nationalism, he said, adding that even businessmen in Somaliland, who want a larger and integrated market, seek a unified Somalia.
The tensions between clans—whose leaders choose the MPs in most of Somalia, including in Somaliland—is only a surface manifestation of the tide of Somali nationalism churning from underneath, Hassan argued. In the face of this nationalist sentiment, Somaliland’s existence as an independent entity is facing a “crisis of legitimacy” internally, he maintains.
This crisis is accentuated by the fact that Musa Bihi Abdi’s presidential term expired last October, despite which he has continued to rule without having conducted elections yet. In September, the Somaliland Electoral Commission announced that elections cannot be held for at least nine more months due to financial and technical problems.
Opposition parties, which have 52 of the 82 seats in Somaliland’s parliament, had led protests in August demanding timely elections. At least seven people were killed and several more wounded in the crackdown on these protests. It was the assassination of a popular opposition politician, in the backdrop of a spate of killings of prominent people in the SSC region over the last decade, that triggered the protests on December 28 in Las Anod, which have snowballed into a unionist movement.
While Somaliland is thus unraveling, with internal rifts between ruling and opposition parties, mounting tensions between the clans, and sa urging unionist sentiment contesting its legitimacy, the United States and the United Kingdom have been increasingly legitimizing the secessionist state.
U.S. Military Base in Somaliland?
The then-commander of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) General Stephen Townsend met with President Abdi in Somaliland in May, becoming the highest ranking official to visit the breakaway state, whose claims to sovereignty have no international recognition.
While not recognizing Somaliland as a sovereign state, and officially adhering to ‘One Somalia policy,’ the United States has lately made several gestures seen as a dilution of this policy. Prior to Townsend’s visit, in March 2022, the Somaliland Partnership Act was introduced in the U.S. Senate by Republicans Jim Risch and Mike Rounds, and Democrat Chris Van Hollen.
The “Biden Administration has limited itself to the confines of a ‘single Somalia’ policy at the detriment of other democratic actors in the country. In this complex time in global affairs and for the Horn of Africa, the United States should explore all possible mutually-beneficial relationships with stable and democratic partners, like Somaliland, and not limit ourselves with outdated policy approaches and diplomatic frameworks that don’t meet today’s challenges,” Jim Risch had said.
The act was signed into law by U.S. President Joe Biden on December 23, under the Fiscal 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, which was the first time a separate reference to Somaliland was made in U.S. law.
The Act commissions a feasibility study by the “Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense,” to determine “whether opportunities exist for greater collaboration in the pursuit of United States national security interests… with… Somaliland.”
It further seeks to identify “the practicability and advisability of improving the professionalization and capacity of security sector actors within the Federal Member States (FMS) and Somaliland.” While adding that “Nothing in this Act… may be construed to convey United States recognition of Somalia’s FMS or Somaliland as an independent entity,” it stops just short of doing that.
Somaliland’s port city of Berbera will also be one of the sites for the U.S.-led multinational 10-day military exercise scheduled to take place in February. On January 13, personnel from AFRICOM’s Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa [CJTF-HOA] visited Somaliland and surveyed the Berbera port.
“Berbera is now an American military base without settling the secession issue,” former Somali Special Envoy to the United States, Abukar Arman, wrote in the Eurasia review. “Stakes have never been higher for all actors. Against that backdrop, President Muse Bihi was given the nod and wink to march on ahead to secure total control over his claimed territory by any means necessary. He was also granted the reassurance that neither the central government of Somalia nor Puntland will interfere militarily or otherwise.”
‘Oil Companies Want a Weak and Divided Somalia’
In the meantime, Genel Energy, listed in London Stock Exchange, claimed the right to explore and exploit the oil fields in Somaliland last month. The oil ministry of the federal government of Somalia has said it “categorically rejects Genel Energy plc’s claim to own petroleum rights in Somalia’s northern regions and calls upon Genel Energy plc to cease its illegal claim to own petroleum rights.”
Insisting that it is the only body authorized to grant such rights, it warned: “Any authorization granted in violation of Somalia’s laws and regulations is unlawful and would be considered null and void.”
Refuting Somalia’s Federal government, Somaliland’s secessionist government has claimed “the authority to engage foreign investors in order to explore and exploit the Republic of Somaliland’s potential hydrocarbons and mineral resources. No one other than the Somaliland government has the authority to claim or award an exploration license within Somaliland,” a statement issued on December 29 said, amid the crackdown on the protests in Las Anod.
Las Anod is also claimed by Somaliland’s neighboring Puntland, which has been an autonomous region within Somalia in dispute with Somaliland over the SSC region. On January 9, Puntland declared that it will be independent of Somalia until the Federal Constitution is finalized.
Disputes over the rights to enter into partnerships with foreign companies over oil and other natural resources are reported to be among the key reasons behind tensions between the Federal government of Somalia and Puntland.
“Oil and gas has been found across Somalia, including in Somaliland and Puntland. British capital is heavily invested. These oil companies want a weak and divided Somalia, because a strong and united country will be more difficult to exploit,” Hassan said.
Puntland’s state government maintains that the provisional federal constitution and the constitution of Puntland state allows it to act as an independent entity until the federal constitution is finalized, and all the states’ constitutions are harmonized with it.
Pointing out that Puntland has a constitutional right to be independent until the finalization of the federal constitution, Olad said it is Somaliland that has been blocking the finalization of the constitution. The federal government of Somalia, he said, should ensure that Somaliland will no longer hold the process of finalizing the constitution hostage.
However, a lack of confidence in the federal government led by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who is seen as inept and pliable by western powers, is perceptible, despite the surging unionist politics and nationalist sentiment.
The federal government can truly reflect the widespread sentiment of Somali nationalism only when it is elected on the basis of one-person-one-vote, argues Olad. Former President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, aka Farmajo, who had become a popular representative of Somali nationalism, had promised to break the stranglehold of the clans by implementing universal adult suffrage, but failed to do so. He lost the clan-controlled election last year, and the current government of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has failed to materialize the aspirations of Somali nationalism.
Mohamed Hassan sums the situation up by citing [Italian communist] Antonio Gramsci: “The old is dying and the new is struggling to be born,” he says, adding that “the winds of change are most definitely blowing over all of Somalia.”
