BRICS Summit Will Go On As Planned, Confirms Host South Africa

While Russia continues conducting its “special military operation” in Ukraine, Moscow’s ally, Armenia, has been seeking to normalize relations with its arch enemy, Azerbaijan. Although the South Caucasus region has traditionally been in the Kremlin’s geopolitical orbit, it is the European Union that seems to be playing the major role in peace talks, border delimitation and the reopening of transportation links.

During the past six months, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev met three times through the mediation of European Council President Charles Michel.

In the past, Russia had mediated conflict between the two Caucasus countries over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Although it is an internationally recognized part of Azerbaijan, it has been under Armenian control for more than two decades. In November 2020, Pashinyan and Aliyev traveled to Moscow to sign a ceasefire deal that effectively ended the 44-day war that Yerevan and Baku fought over the mountainous region.

As a result of the conflict, Azerbaijan restored its sovereignty over most parts of Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as surrounding areas. More importantly, Russia deployed about 2,000 peacekeeping troops, which strengthened its positions in the South Caucasus.

‘Karabakh Has Turned Into South Ossetia’

Russian forces are stationed mostly in parts of Nagorno-Karabakh that are still under Armenian control.

According to Tom Mutch, a New Zealand-born journalist who covered the 44-day war, such a position allows Moscow to turn the region into its de facto military state.

“Let’s be honest, Karabakh has turned into South Ossetia now,” Mutch told Toward Freedom, referring to Georgia’s breakaway region that Russia recognized as an independent state in 2008, following the brief war Moscow fought against its small neighbor. “Russia holds all of the political and military power in the region. But the problem is that the Kremlin is so distracted by what is going on in Ukraine that it doesn’t really have any ability to focus on Karabakh.”

Despite its preoccupation with the war in Ukraine, Russia hosted Azerbaijani and Armenian delegations on June 3 in Moscow, where they held the 10th meeting of the trilateral working group on the opening of regional transport communications. According to reports, representatives of the three countries discussed and coordinated on borders, customs, and other kinds of control, as well as safe transit of people, cars, and goods by roads and railways through the territories of Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Following the Brussels meeting in May between Pashinyan and Aliyev, Baku and Yerevan announced the creation of commissions for border delimitation. In other words, they would look into increasing movement between the two states.

Dr. Gulshan Pashayeva, a board member of Azerbaijan’s Center of Analysis of International Relations, claims that is one of the tangible results of the peace talks held under the EU auspices. Still, she does not think the EU can replace Russia as the major mediator in the South Caucasus.

“EU and Russia are quite different geopolitical actors with incompatible resources and influence,” she told Toward Freedom. “Therefore, they cannot replace each other.”

Both Azerbaijan and Armenia are members of the EU’s political and economic Eastern Partnership initiative. Russia, on the other hand, sees both countries as its allies—Armenia, through the military alliance, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and Azerbaijan, in the form of the allied cooperation agreement signed in February.

No Agreement Without Moscow

According to Russian political analyst Sergey Markedonov, Russia and the West have always cooperated regarding the Karabakh issue. But the problem is Western powers no longer want to work with Moscow amid the Ukraine conflict.

Meanwhile, Mutch said Nagorno-Karabakh could be a place Russia and the EU can cooperate, despite their strained relations regarding Ukraine.

“But I don’t see any agreement that can be signed without Moscow’s final say,” he stressed.

In his view, the real reason why peace talks seem like they are making progress is the military defeat of Armenia in 2020.

“The speech that Pashinyan made in April was widely seen as signaling that he was prepared to give up Armenia’s aspirations for a de jure independent status of Karabakh,” Mutch said. “That was the sticking point of negotiations for the past 25 years.”

In that speech on April 13, the Armenian prime minister said, “The international community is telling Yerevan to lower the bar on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh.” He pointed out Armenia “cannot rely on international partners, not because they do not want to help the landlocked nation, but because they cannot help.”

Pashinyan also recently emphasized that the most important and most urgent issue between Armenia and Azerbaijan is the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. For Baku, however, the status of the mountainous region has already been resolved.

key points of Pashinyan's interview to Al Jazeerahttps://t.co/ffmElVxlpl

The most important and most urgent issue between Armenia and Azerbaijan and for the peace in our region is the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. pic.twitter.com/oT1eCluiOE

— Hov Nazaretyan (@HovhanNaz) June 14, 2022

“I strongly believe that Armenia will come to understand that there will be no special status for ethnic Armenians living in the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan,” Samir Mammadov told Toward Freedom. He heads the international affairs department at “Back to Karabakh” Public Union – a political organization that aims to return ethnic Azeris to Nagorno-Karabakh.

“Armenian government officials often claim that they want the rights of Armenians living in Azerbaijan to be respected. Azerbaijan can and will ensure that without allowing the creation of an artificial autonomy within its borders,” Mammadov said, pointing out that if Yerevan continues insisting on the status of Karabakh, Baku will “probably raise the issue of the rights of Azerbaijanis ethnically cleansed from Armenia.”

In other words, Baku expects Yerevan to recognize Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, while Armenia fears full implementation of the ceasefire deal the two sides signed in 2020 in Moscow would jeopardize the landlocked nation’s sovereignty. According to the Moscow agreement, “Armenia shall guarantee the security of transport connections between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic in order to arrange unobstructed movement of persons, vehicles and cargo in both directions.”

The Fate of a Corridor

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov recently assured Armenian officials the future railway and highway that will connect Azerbaijani mainland with its Nakhchivan exclave through southern Armenian will be “based on the recognition of the sovereignty of Armenian territory.”

For Azerbaijan, the future transportation route should be part of the Nakhichevan Corridor, also known as the Zangezur Corridor.

“The narrative of the wording of a so-called corridor is unacceptable for Yerevan,” Pashinyan said in a June 13 interview. “We have one corridor in our region, and this is the Lachin corridor connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia.”

That corridor is a mountain road that is de jure in the Lachin District of Azerbaijan, but is under the control of a Russian peacekeeping force as a result of the 2020 ceasefire deal.

Thus, the future of transportation links in the South Caucasus will almost certainly be on the agenda of future meetings between Pashinyan and Aliyev, be it in Brussels or in Moscow.

“The EU is ready to step up its support,” Michel said in a May 23 statement. “We agreed to remain in close contact and will meet again in the same format by July/August.”

Meanwhile, Lavrov is planning to meet today in Azerbaijan, which can be viewed as Russia’s attempt to keep both Armenia and Azerbaijan in its geopolitical orbit, despite the EU’s recent new role as a major mediator.

Nikola Mikovic is a Serbia-based contributor to CGTN, Global Comment, Byline Times, Informed Comment, and World Geostrategic Insights, among other publications. He is a geopolitical analyst for KJ Reports and Enquire.

Editor’s Note: The following represents the writer’s analysis about a disputed area known as “Western Sahara” and was produced by Globetrotter.

In November 2020, the Moroccan government sent its military to the Guerguerat area, a buffer zone between the territory claimed by the Kingdom of Morocco and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). The Guerguerat border post is at the very southern edge of Western Sahara along the road that goes to Mauritania. The presence of Moroccan troops “in the Buffer Strip in the Guerguerat area” violated the 1991 ceasefire agreed upon by the Moroccan monarchy and the Polisario Front of the Sahrawi. That ceasefire deal was crafted with the assumption that the United Nations would hold a referendum in Western Sahara to decide on its fate; no such referendum has been held, and the region has existed in stasis for three decades now.

In mid-January 2022, the United Nations sent its Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, Staffan de Mistura, to Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania to begin a new dialogue “toward a constructive resumption of the political process on Western Sahara.” De Mistura was previously deputed to solve the crises of U.S. wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria; none of his missions have ended well and have mostly been lost causes. The UN has appointed five personal envoys for Western Sahara so far—including De Mistura—beginning with former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker III, who served from 1997 to 2004. De Mistura, meanwhile, succeeded former German President Horst Köhler, who resigned in 2019. Köhler’s main achievement was to bring the four main parties—Morocco, the Polisario Front, Algeria and Mauritania—to a first roundtable discussion in Geneva in December 2018: this roundtable process resulted in a few gains, where all participants agreed on “cooperation and regional integration,” but no further progress seems to have been made to resolve the issues in the region since then. When the UN put forward De Mistura’s nomination to this post, Morocco had initially resisted his appointment. But under pressure from the West, Morocco finally accepted his appointment in October 2021, with Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita welcoming him to Rabat on January 14. De Mistura also met the Polisario Front representative to the UN in New York on November 6, 2021, before meeting other representatives in Tindouf, Algeria, at Sahrawi refugee camps in January. There is very little expectation that these meetings will result in any productive solution in the region.

Abraham Accords

In August 2020, the United States government engineered a major diplomatic feat called the Abraham Accords. The United States secured a deal with Morocco and the United Arab Emirates to agree to a rapprochement with Israel in return for the United States making arms sales to these countries, as well as for the United States legitimizing Morocco’s annexation of Western Sahara. The arms deals were of considerable amounts—$23 billion worth of weapons to the UAE and $1 billion worth of drones and munitions to Morocco. For Morocco, the main prize was that the United States—breaking decades of precedent—decided to back its claim to the vast territory of Western Sahara. The United States is now the only Western country to recognize Morocco’s claim to sovereignty over Western Sahara.

When President Joe Biden took office in January 2021, it was expected that he might review parts of the Abraham Accords. However, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken made it clear during his meeting with Bourita in November 2021 that the U.S. government would continue to maintain the position taken by the previous Trump administration that Morocco has sovereignty over Western Sahara. The United States, meanwhile, has continued with its arms sales to Morocco, but has suspended weapons sales to the United Arab Emirates.

Phosphates

By the end of November 2021, the government of Morocco announced that it had earned $6.45 billion from the export of phosphate from the kingdom and from the occupied territory of Western Sahara. If you add up the phosphate reserves in this entire region, it amounts to 72 percent of the entire phosphate reserves in the world (the second-highest percentage of these reserves is in China, which has around 6 percent). Phosphate, along with nitrogen, makes synthetic fertilizer, a key element in modern food production. While nitrogen is recoverable from the air, phosphates, found in the soil, are a finite reserve. This gives Morocco a tight grip over world food production. There is no doubt that the occupation of Western Sahara is not merely about national pride, but it is largely about the presence of a vast number of resources—especially phosphates—that can be found in the territory.

In 1975, a UN delegation that visited Western Sahara noted that “eventually the territory will be among the largest exporters of phosphate in the world.” While Western Sahara’s phosphate reserves are less than those of Morocco, the Moroccan state-owned firm OCP SA has been mining the phosphate in Western Sahara and manufacturing phosphate fertilizer for great profit. The most spectacular mine in Western Sahara is in Bou Craa, from which 10 percent of OCP SA’s profits come; Bou Craa, which is known as “the world’s longest conveyor belt system,” carries the phosphate rock more than 60 miles to the port at El Aaiún. In 2002, the UN’s Under-Secretary General for Legal Affairs at that time, Hans Corell, noted in a letter to the president of the UN Security Council that “if further exploration and exploitation activities were to proceed in disregard of the interests and wishes of the people of Western Sahara, they would be in violation of the principles of international law applicable to mineral resource activities in Non-Self-Governing Territories.” An international campaign to prevent the extraction of the “conflict phosphate” from Western Sahara by Morocco has led many firms around the world to stop buying phosphate from OCP SA. Nutrien, the largest fertilizer manufacturer in the United States that used Moroccan phosphates, decided to stop imports from Morocco in 2018. That same year, the South African court challenged the right of ships carrying phosphate from the region to dock in their ports, ruling that “the Moroccan shippers of the product had no legal right to it.”

Only three known companies continue to buy conflict phosphate mined in Western Sahara: Two from New Zealand (Ballance Agri-Nutrients Limited and Ravensdown) and one from India (Paradeep Phosphates Limited).

Human Rights

After the 1991 ceasefire, the UN set up a Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). This is the only UN peacekeeping force that does not have a mandate to report on human rights. The UN made this concession to appease the Kingdom of Morocco. The Moroccan government has tried to intervene several times when the UN team in Western Sahara attempted to make the slightest noise about the human rights violations in the region. In March 2016, the kingdom expelled MINURSO staff because then-UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon referred to the Moroccan presence in Western Sahara as an “occupation.”

Pressure from the United States is going to ensure that the only realistic outcome of negotiations is for continued Moroccan control of Western Sahara. All parties involved in the conflict are readying for battle. Far from peace, the Abraham Accords are going to accelerate a return to war in this part of Africa.

Vijay Prashad is an Indian historian, editor and journalist. He is a writing fellow and chief correspondent at Globetrotter. He is the chief editor of LeftWord Books and the director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research. He is a senior non-resident fellow at Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China. He has written more than 20 books, including The Darker Nations and The Poorer Nations. His latest book is Washington Bullets, with an introduction by Evo Morales Ayma.

Editor’s Note: The following is the writer’s analysis.

The United States has been accusing Russia of preparing to invade Ukraine, while it continues to build a U.S. military presence in the Black Sea. Warmongering and fearmongering rhetoric began to dominate the public discourse, as media, politicians and military experts have been warning of an “imminent” Russian invasion that could have grave consequences for global peace and security. But does the Kremlin really intend to fight a war against the NATO-backed eastern European country?

According to reports, Moscow has deployed thousands of troops and military equipment to western Russia’s regions that border Ukraine. At the same time, U.S. navy ships Mount Whitney and Arleigh Burke recently entered the Black Sea, while the 9th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron’s B-1B Lancers soared over eastern Europe during a NATO fighter integration mission through the region.

Moreover, a Russian Aeroflot airliner flying from Tel Aviv to Moscow was forced to change altitude over the Black Sea because a NATO CL-600 reconnaissance plane crossed its designated flight path. These actions would be the equivalent of Russian naval ships and fighter jets entering the Gulf of Mexico. 

As usual, though, the Kremlin’s reaction was weak.

“Just because an air incident over the Black Sea’s international waters has been prevented, this does not mean the U.S. and NATO can further put lives at risk with impunity,” said Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said.

❗️ Maria #Zakharova: @usairforce actions have posed risks to civil aviation.

Just because an air incident over the Black Sea’s Int waters has been prevented, this does not mean the US and NATO can further put people’s lives at #risk with impunity.

🔗 https://t.co/mHgrPfSV9f pic.twitter.com/wKBBlPViVk

— MFA Russia 🇷🇺 (@mfa_russia) December 5, 2021

However, such a statement is unlikely to provoke fear in NATO’s headquarters. 

Crossing Russia’s Red Line

Russian President Vladimir Putin has pointed out the deployment of certain offensive missile capabilities on Ukrainian soil is Moscow’s “red line.”

Yet, the United States has demonstrated it does not take Russia’s threats and boundaries seriously.  

“I don’t accept anybody’s red lines,” U.S. President Joe Biden said on December 4. 

The two leaders then held a “virtual summit” on December 7. Shortly after their discussion, the U.S. Congress removed sanctions against Nord Stream 2, Russian sovereign debt and 35 Russians from the draft defense budget. Such actions demonstrate the two leaders have reached certain deals not only on Ukraine, but on energy issues as well. However, tensions between Moscow and Washington, which seem to be an integral part of a new Cold War era, are expected to remain high for the foreseeable future.

What’s the Possibility of War?

Ahead of the talks between Putin and Biden, the Russian leader clarified his call for new security guarantees.

Putin said Russia would seek “concrete agreements that would rule out any further eastward expansion of NATO and the deployment of weapons systems posing a threat to Russia.” Even if the United States provides such guarantees—which does not seem very probable given that such a move would be interpreted as a concession to Putin and a sign of weakness—it is not probable Washington would implement the deal.

U.S. officials already have declined to rule out dispatching U.S. forces to eastern Europe, although at this point it is highly uncertain if the U.S. troops could be deployed to Ukraine. Ukraine’s Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov has called on the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom to dispatch their military personnel to the former Soviet republic, even though the eastern European nation is not part of NATO.

“Those troops should be stationed in places where Russia can see them,” Reznikov stressed. Meanwhile, Denis Pushilin, leader of the Russia-backed self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic that declared independence from Ukraine in 2014, said he would request Russia’s assistance in case the situation in the region escalates.

Indeed, a potential deployment of NATO troops in Ukraine would prevent a Russian intervention, given Moscow would be unlikely to confront NATO troops. Russia’s policy makers are quite aware any incursion into Ukrainian territory would result in severe anti-Russia sanctions, which could potentially include actions against Russian oligarchs and energy producers, as well as disconnect Russia from the SWIFT international payment system used by banks around the world. On the other hand, given the United States has the upper hand vis-à-vis Moscow, it is entirely possible some sanctions will be imposed, even if Russia does not invade Ukraine. The West also can deploy troops to Ukraine to prevent what they would call a potential Russian invasion, and there is very little the Kremlin can do about it.

Hypothetically, Russia could recognize the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic and Lugansk People’s Republic, and build military bases on their territories, but such a move is unlikely to have an impact on Ukraine’s goal to restore sovereignty over the coal-rich region. From the legal perspective, the Donbass, as well as Crimea, is part of Ukraine, and no foreign actors would condemn Ukrainian attempts to return the regions under its jurisdiction. Still, unless its gets the green light from Washington, Kiev is unlikely to launch any large-scale military actions against Russia, or Russia-backed forces. Moscow, for its part, is expected to continue preserving the status quo. Supporters of the notion that Russia is keen on invading Ukraine fail to explain what the Kremlin’s motive for such an action would be.

Energy Deals

However, Moscow achieved its goals in 2014 when it incorporated Crimea, which has significant offshore gas and oil reserves into the Russian Federation. That year Russia tacitly supported the creation of the Donbass republics that reportedly have 34.4 billion tons of coal reserves. Since Moscow, through its proxies, already controls the Donbass coal production and export, capturing the other energy-poor regions of Ukraine would represent nothing but an additional cost for Russia.

Nonetheless, Western and Ukrainian media continue to spread rumors of an “imminent” Russian invasion. Ukrainian military officials claim Russia could start its campaign against the former Soviet republic in February—in the middle of winter when troops are up to their knees in snow. Meanwhile, Oleksiy Arestovych, the head of the Office of the Ukrainian President, recently suggested his country could “fire missiles at the Russian Federation, in case the Kremlin starts a full-scale war against Ukraine.”

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, on the other hand, openly said in case of a potential conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Minsk will support its ally, Moscow. At the same time, Belarus announced joint military exercises with Russia along its border with Ukraine. Plus, Lukashenko promised to visit Crimea soon, which would be Belarus’ de facto recognition of the Kremlin’s incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation.

His visit, whenever it comes, undoubtedly will have a serious impact on relations between Belarus and Ukraine. Kiev fears Belarus could take part in what they perceive would be a Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the country’s authorities have taken Lukashenko’s threat very seriously. According to reports, citizens of Ukraine already started preparing to defend the Ukrainian capital against an invasion, whether it may come from Russia or Belarus.

One thing is for sure: Unless Kiev starts a massive military campaign in the Donbass, or engages in a serious provocation against Russia, the Kremlin is unlikely to start a war against Ukraine. And even if a war breaks out, Russia’s actions are expected to be very calculated, limited and carefully coordinated with its Western partners, as part of moves toward a “stable and more predictable relationship” between Moscow and Washington.

Nikola Mikovic is a Serbia-based contributor to CGTN, Global Comment, Byline Times, Informed Comment, and World Geostrategic Insights, among other publications. He is a geopolitical analyst for KJ Reports and Enquire.