As the Wikileaks scandal drags on a portrait is emerging of Brazil, and suffice it to say it is not too flattering. A rising power with global aspirations, Brazil has a lot more political and economic muscle than, say Venezuela or Bolivia. Yet, time and again the Lula administration takes a very meek approach toward the United States or, even worse, goes along with Washington’s geopolitical machinations.
In previous articles I discussed the Machiavellian scheming of Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim, who has sought to thwart the Ministry of Foreign Relations, also known as Itamaraty, in an effort to redirect foreign policy toward the United States. After reviewing those documents, I expected upcoming caches to paint a more progressive picture of Itamaraty’s dealings. However, recently released cables certainly don’t paint Brazilian diplomats as a particularly principled bunch either.
Though American diplomats under Obama fret that “U.S.-Brazil cooperation is often limited by Brazil’s unwillingness to speak out against anti-democratic actions in the hemisphere (Venezuela and Cuba),” nonetheless they note that “military-to-military relations are good and growing, and most of the Brazilian military understands the potential benefits of partnership with the United States.” Meanwhile, “cooperation on law enforcement issues, such as counternarcotics, container security, and intelligence sharing, is excellent and improving.” Diplomats noted other areas of mutual interest including climate change and bio-fuels, neither of which bodes well for the environment [for more on this see my online articles regarding Brazilian obstructionism at the Copenhagen climate summit and its backroom deals with the United States].
Key in solidifying the diplomatic relationship with the U.S. is Minister Jobim, a political figure wielding considerable influence within the Lula administration. During a meeting with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Arturo Valenzuela in late 2009, a “friendly and engaged” Jobim said that Brazil had no problem with the United States signing a defense agreement with Colombia. In another separate meeting with U.S. National Security Adviser James Jones, Jobim “stressed the importance of regional stability for Brazil, but cautioned that Brazil resists being labeled the regional leader because they do not see it as helpful in resolving problems.”
One reason that Jobim may have been reluctant to challenge the U.S. within the Andean region has to do with weapons purchases and the expanding role of the military in Brazilian society. During his meeting with Valenzuela, Jobim expressed interest in purchasing Global Super Hornet F18 fighter planes from Boeing. Though many Brazilians have an unpleasant view of the armed forces as a result of the repressive military dictatorship of 1964-1985, Lula has recently moved the defense industry center stage. In tandem with such desires, “Jobim highlighted the fact that Brazil’s new National Defense Strategy was crafted to ensure the defense sector would be an ‘enabler of development.’”
García, Amorim and Rousseff: A Machiavellian Bunch
Brazilian diplomats are less partial to the U.S. agenda than Jobim, though they clearly don’t want to rock the boat too much. In conversations with Valenzuela, Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Marco Aurelio García characterized Hugo Chávez as a politician who “has no sense of proportion.” García however did suggest that Valenzuela head to Caracas in an effort to improve U.S.-Venezuelan relations. In response, Valenzuela was non-committal, noting that it was “difficult to ignore both the provocative statements by Chávez and his authoritarian tendencies.” If García pressed Valenzuela any further on the matter, a cable released by Wikileaks makes no mention.
As the conversation continued, García sought to reassure the visiting U.S. diplomat that Brazil was a “responsible” partner and dished on other leftist nations in South America. For example, García “described Ecuador’s and Bolivia’s political systems as ‘rotten’; and called the future of Argentina ‘a big question mark,’ depending on whether the Kirchners recover or not.” In the separate meeting with Jones, García stated that Brazil supported a U.S. free trade deal with Colombia. In a revealing aside, Lula Chief of Staff Dilma Rousseff, who succeeds to the presidency of Brazil shortly, remarked that it was “disconcerting” to be confronted with questions from the press regarding United States bases in Colombia. “According to Rousseff,” one cable notes, “issues such as this open the door for radicals who want to create problems in the region.”
Speaking with Jones, the conversation then turned to the matter of the coup in Honduras. Though García supported the return of ousted leader and Chávez protégé Manuel Zelaya, the Brazilian was quick to add that Zelaya should be of little concern to Washington as he was “not a dangerous revolutionary.” There was no need to worry, García added, noting that returning Zelaya to power “will not lead to significant changes.” At that point, Foreign Minister Celso Amorim chimed in, proudly announcing that even though Chávez had wanted to make Zelaya into a martyr, Brazil had at long last convinced the Venezuelan leader that “only the United States can influence what happens in Honduras” and needed to be consulted.
Hoping to mollify U.S. diplomats on Iran, Amorim characterized Brazil’s ties to the Islamic Republic as “not deep, but pragmatic” and dominated by commercial concerns. He said the nature of the alliance should not be “overvalued” as the two nations “were not buddies.” Echoing Amorim, García added that Brazil’s engagement with the Islamic Republic was merely “a bet” which might not work. García described Lula’s reception of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as “not warm.”
What Does Brazil Stand For?
Reading the Wikileaks cables, it is clear that Brazilian officials are exceedingly fixated on their image and on demonstrating to the United States that their country is a responsible player which stands for political stability, i.e. not leftist radicalization or populist rule. Though Lula pursued a quirky foreign policy at times, Rousseff’s aside suggests she may opt for moderation rather than adventurism when crafting her own foreign policy over the next couple of years. For Venezuela and Bolivia, the not so subtle message from the Wikileaks scandal is clear: while Brazil will not destabilize neighboring countries, neither can it be trusted.
Nikolas Kozloff is the author of Revolution! South America and the Rise of the New Left (Palgrave, 2008) and No Rain in the Amazon: How South America’s Climate Change Affects the Entire Planet (Palgrave, 2010). Visit his website, www.nikolaskozloff.com
Photo by Pete Souza
