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ITOA News



The Journal of the Illinois Tactical Officers Association





On the Cover

May Rifle Field Training Exercise (FTX)—Marseilles National Guard Base

Cover photo courtesy of Alan Kulovitz.

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All articles and photographs may be submitted to the Illinois Tactical Officers Association at itoa@itoa.org. All articles must be written and submitted by the author or with the authors permission to publish their work. All reference materials must also accompany the articles at time of submission.

Photographs and diagrams can also be emailed to the Illinois Tactical Officers Association with credit being given to the photographer.

A bio and photo (if available) of the author should also be submitted at the time when submitting an authors work.

Plagiarism will not be tolerated.

Articles may be written on any subject pertaining to Law Enforcement/SWAT and its related fields. All articles are subject to review by the Illinois Tactical Officers Association staff prior to publishing. It is the right of the Illinois Tactical Officers Association staff to reject any article for publishing at any time.

Deadline

To be considered for the next issue, articles (and photos/illustrations, if applicable) must be received by...

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What's inside—contents



President's Letter	2
Part 8: Command, Tactical, and Weapons Training Model	4
Maximizing the Potential for Success: SWAT Manpower	11
Combined Rifle and Pistol Field Training Exercise (FTX).....	14
ITOA Tactical Patrol Officer Recognition Program	22
Balancing Efficiency and Effectiveness and Building Cohesive Law Enforcement Agencies.....	24
Deciding Under Pressure...and Fast: You Need to Understand the Concept of “Coup d’oeil”	27
Field Training Exercise (FTX)—Marseilles Army National Guard Base	30
Why Surrender is Never an Option.....	36
Book Review—Officer Down / A Practical Tactical Guide to Surviving Injury in the Street	39
2013 Membership Drive	40
List of Advertisers.....	40
ITOA is Celebrating 26 Years!.....	41
Membership Application	42

Visit www.itoa.org to learn more about up and coming events and training

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President's Letter



Training is the foundation of ITOA. Our Annual Training conference held in November prevents us from doing the hands on training that we want to include, so other ideas have been considered as to how to make this work. The Board of Directors decided to put together multiple three day training events (FTX's) across the North Region. From Lake County to Joliet, the Three Day Field Training Exercises are into the second day as I write this. We started with eight different training tracks and were able to move six to the operational phase. The tracks and lead Board coordinators/instructors include; MACTAC (Ed Mohn), Team Patrol Tactics (Lou Hayes and Tony Johnson), K-9 Perimeter and Containment (Danny Ramirez), Designated Marksman (Eric Perkins), and Tactical Medicine/TEMS (Rob Briggs). We were able to hold costs to \$100 for each of these three day events and with the partnership of Cook County Homeland Security we brought LAPD Officer Jack Schonley back to assist with the Perimeter and Containment instruction. The instructor cadre for these classes is all ITOA members and true professionals. Each track is coordinated and taught in part by Board members who have continued to put in long hours and hard work. This is the first one and we look to make this an annual offering.

Our continued training includes the second of the year Rifle FTX on August 21st at the Marseilles National Guard Base. The May Rifle FTX had over 50 officers on site but we have had as many as 100. The weather report looked rough but it turned out to be a great time and no rain. So regardless of the forecast, come on out. We have to work in bad weather, so training in it makes us stronger.

ITOA has undergone a change in operations. We are moving to a computerized system for Conference, training, and membership registration and where payment can be made on line. It is time for us to get on board with the current generation of technology. We will no longer use phone contacts as primary communications as it creates too many delays. We found that e-mail works best and it goes to multiple Board members so no one person has to be the only contact. The contact e-mail is itoa@itoa.org. If you have any needs send an e-mail and we will get back to you asap. This issue has the 2013 Conference information and registration information. Our Conference Co chairs Ed Mohn, Randy Meyers, and Greg Poulos have been working with the Board since the end of last Conference to get the top presenters with us. It will be a great training event, so get your registration in early as we will only have 600 slots.

Our membership numbers continue to grow. In the hardest of the economic times, numbers fell as agencies no longer paid for officers. But we find that many of those officers understand the value of ITOA membership and have paid out of pocket. The \$40 cost of membership offers so many benefits that include; the ITOA News Magazine, a variety of \$10 Training Events, our Annual Training Conference and now our Three Day Hands On Training Events. Members gain access to the highest quality, affordable training. Add to all this the networking with officers at all levels of law enforcement and the truth is that every officer should be an ITOA member. You can assist in the effort by bringing in a partner or friend. The membership application is at the ITOA web site, www.itoa.org, send it to one or more of those men and women you work with. Better trained is better prepared for what we face every day on the street.

Our MACTAC and Rapid Deployment Instructor Classes are moving ahead full throttle. Lead Instructor, ITOA VP Ed Mohn and the training cadre have completed 12 instructor classes, with many more to follow. This is only possible because of the support provided by Director Mike Masters and Dep. Director Ray Hamilton at CCDHS-EM. This partnership has become a model

for building large scale rapid deployment capability. With over a thousand Rapid Deployment Instructors and three hundred MACTAC Instructors trained, departments state wide have in house expertise to develop comprehensive departmental readiness for extreme violent incidents.

Continue to check the ITOA Training calendar on the web site for these and other classes. If you have ideas or requests for additional training, write to us and we will do what we can to make it happen.

As we move into Summer, enjoy time off with your family but remember, violent crime does not take a vacation. Do not think that off duty means safe and sound. I have always taught that "off duty, does not mean off watch". Keep your gear close to hand, always armed with spare ammo, and a plan. Your Tac-Med gear, pressure bandage and tourniquet should always be part of your travel gear. It may have nothing to do with gunshot sounds, but a fall into a glass door or other serious injury that requires immediate intervention. This issue has a book review of Dr. Andrew Dennis' new text on police emergency medicine for the street officer. It is a great effort and Doc Dennis has been one of ITOA's strong supporters. Get a copy and increase your knowledge and readiness. We cannot stand still and believe that we know "enough". We must all be continuing students and study new tactics and gear. So long as we are protectors of the community and protectors of our loved ones, we hold the highest responsibility to be as capable as possible. This requires great effort and nothing good comes easy.

Our ITOA motto: "Nothing Without Great Effort" must be our guide. What have you done to develop your fighting skills and your fitness level? What about your emergency medical knowledge and your gear load out? Do you have a plan for the fight? These questions must be answered with honesty. Only you know the truth about yourself. One day it will be you, and the only help you have will be yourself. No one is coming fast enough to save you. You must win by yourself and you can and will so long as you prepare to be the best you can be.

To that end, ITOA stands ready to offer the training to make you The One.

Remember, June 27th is the OSLO Norway presentation of the truck bombing of the government building and the Utoy Island massacre of over 50 young men and women at a summer camp. Again, our partnership with CCDHE-EM and NEMRT offers what may be the last time to see the Norwegian SWAT officers tell of their first hand efforts in this horrific series of events. Register through NEMRT at www.nemrt.com. Check the left side of the page for the link.

Stay safe and Ready.
Good Fortune to you.

Regards,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Jeff Chudwin". The signature is stylized and cursive.

Jeff Chudwin
ITOA President

Part 8: Command, Tactical, and Weapons Training Model—Rapid Deployment and MACTAC

By Louis Hayes and Ed Mohn

*NOTE: This is a follow-up essay to the “**Command, tactical, and weapons training model**” series from previous issues of ITOA News. For electronic version of those articles, visit www.theillinoismodel.com or contact the ITOA office staff. The concepts and details of The Illinois Model are included in those previous essays.*

Combine the number and frequency of ambushes and direct assaults against Police Officers with the never-ending incidents of active shooters and rapid mass murders and you have a threat matrix that mandates an expansion of police tactical skill sets and capabilities.

Counter to popular belief, Rapid Deployment tactics

did not CHANGE the way law enforcement responds to tactical problems. What it did do was EXPAND upon the time-tested, proven strategies that have and continue to serve us during traditional critical incidents. Rapid Deployment and MACTAC strategies and techniques provide a response capability to these newly expanding sets of life-threatening problems. The more traditional police strategies and tactics were not replaced with something new; they have simply been augmented with other time tested response capabilities.

Another emerging modification gaining wide acceptance is the realization that one or two officer response can and has proven to be effective in very early stages of these



Photo courtesy of Ed Mohn

situations. Rapid Deployment is not limited to groups of officers in formations. Single officers, a buddy team, and/or several buddy teams immediately intervening upon arrival have saved countless lives.

In the wake of global and domestic terrorist incidents, police agencies are now implementing Multiple Assault Counter-Terrorism Action Capabilities (MACTAC) programs.

MACTAC missions and strategies expand and adjust the traditional Rapid Deployment team tactics when officers have to address threats in larger danger areas such as neighborhoods, parks, industrial complexes, and other urban centers. Small maneuverable elements of officers can quickly and decisively move against the offenders, be they lone wolves, pairs, or small groups.

While the first years of active killer response training focused on first responders assembling into organized teams, police theory and strategy continues to modify and add additional skill sets to meet the ever-changing threat posed by these murders. Contemporary police response is rooted in unifying a mission, a strategy, and coordinated teamwork. And instead of separating active killer/anti-terrorism response from traditional police response, the two divergent **strategies** are united in a singular model.

The Illinois Model™ is an operational system that organizes and simplifies law enforcement actions from the “routine” daily incidents to the once-in-a-lifetime occurrences.

Rapid Deployment is not limited to groups of officers in formations. Single officers, a buddy team, and/or several buddy teams immediately intervening upon arrival have saved countless lives.

(whether injured or not) are more important than police officers. It also announces that suspects’ or offenders’ safety should not be placed above that of the police officers. All policing theory or philosophy is derived from these rankings, and officers should determine incident goals and objectives accordingly. Officers must also plan their strategies and tactics so they are in line with the Priority of Life.

In an active killer situation or an in-progress act of terrorism, the priority lies with the innocent people who are still in the targeted danger zone of an active killer as well as those who have already been injured (whether still in the danger zone or not). The goals and objectives of the police officers must factor in the safety of these victims.

Mission—Objective

From a general perspective, the broadest mission during any police response is to protect innocent lives. In an active mass killer situation or on-going terrorism act, there are more specific objectives:

1. Stop the on-going deadly behavior of the offender(s), limiting future casualties by taking physical custody of the criminal offenders, which may be accomplished at the exact time officers “stop” the deadly behavior of the offenders.
2. Separate offenders from future victims, limiting future casualties, by isolating the offenders and confining the offenders’ activities to the smallest of areas.
3. Evacuating and/or rendering aid to those innocent persons who have already been injured. Removing all innocents from the danger areas.

During the Clackamas (Oregon) Town Center Mall shooting in December 2012, the incident commander properly identified and communicated the missions. As heard on the police radio traffic tapes, the incident commander deploys teams into the mall with an assignment to seek and stop the believed-to-still-be-active shooter. When entry officers radio back their finding of the downed shooter, the incident commander broadcasts that entry teams are to focus on rescuing downed victims. This is a clear example of street leadership and clearly communicating the *changed* responsibilities of the officers inside the mall. When the priority mission is accomplished, then the next most critical mission must be addressed.

Officers’ and supervisors’ use of the Situation Report (SitRep, as discussed in Part 6 of this article series) is an organized method to announce current or updated situa-

The Illinois Model

The Illinois Model is a five-tiered system:

1. Priority of Life (Innocent and/or injured people; Police; Offenders/Suspects)
2. Mission/Objective (Lawful foundation and purpose)
3. Strategy/Tactics (How to achieve the Mission; Stabilize vs Act)
4. Team Skills (How officers work together within the Strategy)
5. Individual Skills & Equipment (Officers’ personal abilities)

The Priority of Life is the most pivotal in any police activity, with diminishing importance as one proceeds down the tiers.

The Priority of Life

The Priority of Life remains the most critical factor in any police response. It identifies that the innocent people



tions, locations, missions, and strategies. Whether face-to-face or via radio, the SitRep is an effective tool for this Mission-Objective tier. Line-level officers need to understand how their experiences and knowledge inside the danger zone affects the proper assignment and prioritization of missions, and communicate such.

One of the dilemmas in this tier is how to decide and/or communicate who is responsible for what missions. In one school of thought, all officers act toward the highest priority mission (stopping active offender) until that objective is met. Another school of thought suggests that while some of the responders are seeking for the offender, some of the other responders should attend to seriously injured victims. There is no black-or-white answer to this; each situation is different including the severity of injuries, numbers of victims, knowledge of offenders' locations, etc.

Strategy—Tactics

The strategy is the “how to” complete a lawful mission or goal. Pre-Columbine massacre police strategy was

simple: stabilize or contain the incident and wait for SWAT. Dynamic entry into a building was reserved for tactical teams in two main circumstances:

1. High-risk warrant service, for evidence such as illegal drugs or guns.
2. Hostage rescue.

But the increase of active killer incidents, particularly in schools, forced police agencies to ADD capabilities within the patrol ranks. Patrol officers are now taught modified dynamic entry tactics to combat this growing trend and act immediately to on-going violence.

So now, police officers are armed with more “speeds” of response in a so-called spectrum of strategies; conceptually from stop, to slow, to medium, to fast. At one end of the spectrum, there is **Stabilize**. This is the strategy used for the vast majority of police actions. The circumstances that call for a stabilized strategy are events such as: burglary building searches, lone barricaded persons, suicidal persons, and felony-style vehicle stops. This slowed response uses perimeters, containment,

negotiations, chemical munitions, and extremely slow methodical searches. Because there lacks an urgency or immediate threat to life, specialized resources and manpower can be called upon... and waited for.

At the other end of the spectrum is **Act**. Action should be reserved for instances when an urgency can be articulated, as it relates to protection of life. In the case of an active killer or on-going deadly terrorist event, human life is endangered in two ways:

1. The killer continues to inflict injury/death on more victims.
2. The already-injured victims succumb to their wounds.

Because of these Priority of Life emergencies, immediate action must be taken. Time is critical. Waiting to enter a danger zone, if even for only seconds, might allow for more death. Therefore an officer's waiting equates to a violation of the Priority of Life.

All tactics used for Rapid Deployment (inside buildings), MACTAC (outside), or any sort of person or officer down rescue tactics polarize them-

selves toward the Act portion of the strategy spectrum. And therefore, Rapid Deployment, MACTAC, and Rescues are more accurately described as “strategies” than anything else.

The matching and changing of a proper strategy to the situation is critical. Imagine a static hostage taking. The standardized by-the-book strategy is to Stabilize, by containing and negotiating the surrender of hostages. However, if there is an immediate threat to hostages’ lives, officers (whether SWAT or patrol) make dynamic entry to accomplish the goal of saving hostages’ lives. Conversely, if during the course of an active killer incident, the officers stop the deadly offender and rescue all injured persons, the strategy slows towards Stabilization. The urgency has expired and more traditional tactics are used.

Again, the use of the SitRep method efficiently and effectively communicates changes or updates to strategy. A proper SitRep on the radio will accelerate or slow the pace of the incident to a safe and proper strategy. Line-level officers need to understand how their experiences and knowledge inside the danger zone affects the decision for the right strategy at the moment, and communicate such. (Part 3 of this article series goes into more detail of the decisions required for proper incident strategy.)

Team Skills

The Team Skills tier is placed under the Strategy-Tactics tier. The “strategy” of speed is much more critical to operational success (saving lives) than the teamwork or coordination needed to maintaining a team formation. Tactics within Rapid Deployment / MACTAC are built upon the six core team tactical skills: Crossfire, Priority of Fire, Flanking, Back-to-Back, Cross-Cover, and Cover-Maneuver.

Team Concepts
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Crossfire• Priority of Fire• Flanking• Back-to-Back• Cross-Cover• Cover-Maneuver

The idea of maintaining rigid formations has passed. More important than adhering to formations such as a diamond, wedge, or line is a compliance with the six core skills. After all, it’s the combinations of the six core skills that materialize into the formations! When officers learn and understand these conceptual team skills and integrate them when they utilize formations and movements, they can make changes on-the-fly in any terrain or building design. Learning the formations is merely practice of visual-

izing how the six core team tactical skills are at play.

For example, officers assigned to a Ranger File quickly learn the limitations regarding the fields of fire to frontal threats (fratricidal Priority of Fire issue from firing behind another officer), but also understand that there are almost no Priority of Fire issues with threats to either of the team’s sides. Similarly, a Wedge or Arrow formation balances Priority of Fire, Back-to-Back protection, and even Flanking into relatively safe positioning.

The “strategy” of speed is much more critical to operational success (saving lives) than the teamwork or coordination needed to maintaining a team formation.

These same six team tactical skills are found among the various formations and maneuvers inside a building with Rapid Deploy-

ment teams. But again, the reliance upon the concepts allows for adjustments in team size. The same concepts are required whether a 6-officer Diamond, a 3-officer Y, or two officers watching each other’s backs.

These same six team concepts are used for any and all team tactics. They are needed in: felony-style vehicle stops, containment/perimeter, building searches, K9 yard-to-yard searches, officer-down rescues, hostage rescue, covert clearing by SWAT, high-risk warrant service. In many of these cases, the teams appear to be in the same formations as during Rapid Deployment or MACTAC tactics. The same team interaction, relative officer positioning, and fields of fire must be maintained whether holding perimeter for a fleeing armed robbery suspect or making a hasty entry for a school shooter; the difference is in the speed of the team through or into the danger zone.

Teaching team skills according to these concepts is effective and efficient. It unifies teamwork regardless of the mission or strategy. Certain aspects of teams cross over into everything police officers are called to do. For example, the concept of Flanking is far from unique to MACTAC. Flanking positions are as commonplace as a two-officer traffic stop, ordinance arrest with handcuffing, building searching, or setting a neighborhood perimeter. The repetition of these skills in a wide array of applications turns officers into tacticians much more efficiently than having the officers simply repeat choreographed formations or positioning for isolated situations. (Part 4 of this article series goes in-depth into these six core team tactical skills.)

Individual Skills & Equipment

An individual officer must possess a certain list of skills before s/he can safely integrate into a team, whether static or dynamically moving. However, Individual Skills & Equipment is at the lowest ranking among the tiers. It is more important for a group of average-skilled officers to have good team cohesion than for a group of expert officers with no sense of team coordination. (Imagine an All-Star basketball team with five “ball hogs!”) The same analogy can be used



Photo courtesy of Ed Mohn

for equipment. More confidence should be given to a group of longtime teammate SWAT officers armed only with pistols, than to a group of patrol officers who are strangers to each other armed with rifles, that possess no cohesive skill sets and capabilities.

There are baseline individual skills required for Rapid Deployment, MACTAC, or any police “team” for that matter. Chief among these skills is weapon muzzle discipline. Any time multiple officers have weapons drawn or deployed around each other, there is a chance for negligent fratricide. In real life, there is no true “safe” direction, only “safer” direction. Strict muzzle control and trigger finger manipulation is absolutely necessary with all the dynamic movement, especially at the running speeds required in a MACTAC situation. Fields of fire quickly change and moving officers may suddenly block once-clear sight pictures.

Radio communication skills are also at the top of the list. Yet again, the use of the SitRep method keeps officers clearly transmitting during chaotic events. But officers must first understand what occurrences within a chaotic critical event will change the entire mission or strategy of ALL

responding officers (such as the downing of the offender, or the knowledge of unaccounted injured persons, or the knowledge that all other innocent persons have been evacuated turning the incident into a barricaded person call). These bits of information must be broadcast in a clear and concise manner so major changes can be made to the overall response plan.

Regarding equipment during an active killer or terrorist event, others have compiled so many other articles and lists. A short list can include: rifle, medical gear, ballistic vest/helmet, and a universal breaching tool.

Individual excellence and top-tier equipment will only win out in these situations when that solo officer adheres to the Priority of Life rankings, with a clear Mission-Objective, and effective Strategy—Tactics. Otherwise, all that skill and ability goes to waste.

Summary

Rapid Deployment and MACTAC find themselves firmly at the far end of Act in our strategy spectrum. The speed, surprise, and violence of “action” used in R/D and MACTAC are to be reserved for those few incidents and moments

when there is an immediate or on-going threat to life—whether a single officer-down in a danger area, an active shooter in a large populated building, lone wolf terrorists in a public place, or multiple coordinated acts of terrorist cells. There must be an articulated urgency to act. Otherwise, accepted police strategy dictates a Stabilization strategy of containment and waiting for experts and resources.

The six team tactical skills and concepts set the tactical foundation from which all other tactics and techniques are derived. A higher priority is the speed (or lack of speed), and then the coordination within and between the teams. If a one-sentence summary is to be given to responders being sent into a Rapid Deployment or MACTAC incident, it is this: **Move forward toward the task at hand, maintain 360-degree coverage and be prepared to confront what lies around each corner... every second counts.**

Since the first days of active killer response training shortly after Columbine, the mission has remained the same. However, there is a better understanding among trained responders of the importance of strategy and coordination over adhering to a rigid formation and/or doctrine. The formations do "work," provided they are used in conjunction with sound strategy and versatile concepts.

"Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication."
—Leonardo DaVinci

The Illinois Model is a framework that includes Rapid Deployment and MACTAC into its broad yet simple array of police strategy. This system fully integrates a spectrum, rather than isolating differences. By using *The Illinois Model* as an operational template for all police incidents and training, officers and supervisors work under a singular and simple decision-making process for all types of police incidents. ✪

About the Authors

Louis Hayes is a Police Officer for the Hinsdale IL Police Department, where his responsibilities include teaching various use of force disciplines, weapon systems, and teamwork skills. He is currently assigned to the FIAT SWAT Taskforce as a Team Leader and trainer. Lou sits on the board of directors for the Illinois Tactical Officers Association, for which he coordinates the Trainers Forum. Lou has also attained Tactical Patrol Officer (Master) designation; certified as a Rapid Deployment and MACTAC instructor. His cadre developed and teaches several user-, supervisor- and instructor-level courses, each framed around the cadre's *The Illinois Model* (www.TheIllinoisModel.com). He can be reached at Louis.Hayes@comcast.net.

Commander Edward F. Mohn has been a Police Officer for 24 years. For 19 of those years he served with the Northern Illinois Police Alarm Systems Emergency Services Team. As the teams Entry Team Leader and Assault Force Commander, Cmdr. Mohn has planned and lead his team in the successful resolution of over 350 critical incidents,

including barricaded gunman, hostage rescue, felony fugitive apprehensions, high risk warrant and clandestine laboratory eradication missions. Cmdr. Mohn was the SWAT Team Commander and Operations Section Chief for the 1st deployment of Task Force Illinois to New Orleans Louisiana after the Hurricane Katrina disaster in 2005.

He is the Vice President of the Illinois Tactical Officers Association where he has been the lead instructor and state-wide coordinator for the Rapid Deployment/ Immediate Action response to active shooter training efforts for 12+ years. He has personally trained and certified over 1100 Rapid Deployment and MACTAC Instructors and has assisted numerous schools, businesses and corporations in developing and implementing interior and exterior threat response plans.

Cmdr. Mohn has a BA from National Louis University and is a Graduate of the Northwestern University Police Staff & Command program. Cmdr. Mohn has been highly decorated for his actions including The Medal of Valor, 3 Medals of Commendation, 3 Meritorious Service Medals and a Life Saving Medal. He is a nationally recognized Lead Instructor in a multitude of SWAT, tactical patrol, active shooter, firearms, leadership and officer survival disciplines. He is an adjunct instructor for a number of nationally recognized police tactical training companies and has been a presenter at numerous state and national conferences and conventions.



Photo courtesy of Ed Mohn

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Maximizing the Potential for Success: SWAT Manpower

By Randy Olsberg

The issue of SWAT manpower has been a controversial topic for many years. There are passionate advocates for both smaller and larger manpower foot prints when it comes to SWAT operations.

Why is this topic often controversial in nature? In the authors opinion it is primarily due to the fact that many SWAT teams throughout the US do not have sufficient manpower to perform large scale or complex tactical missions. This through no fault of the teams in question, the issue is driven by the agencies budget process based on what can be reasonably afforded.

The intent of this article is not to impugn the skill, dedication, or courage of members of smaller SWAT teams; I have served on both large and small tactical teams. Besides being a member of a large multi-jurisdictional SWAT Team with 70 plus team members for 18 years, I was also one of the founding members and the original

team leader of my former agency's Warrant Service Team with 12-14 team members.

I am equally proud to have been a member of both tactical units. Both of these tactical units were made up of hard working, dedicated officers who volunteered to perform high risk missions.

I am, however, a realist. There was and still is a difference in both of these tactical units. The multi-jurisdictional tactical unit is a full service SWAT Team that has on average 55-60 operational team members with additional supporting staff. My former agency's Warrant Service Team has a much narrower operational scope, normally that of narcotics search warrants and vehicle buy-bust operations within their specific capabilities.

When assessing the ability to perform a complex and/or large-scale mission size does matter when we are



Photo courtesy of Randy Olsberg

attempting to “maximize the potential for success.” There is a difference between planning for success and planning to maximize the potential for success. This is never more critical than when dealing with a hostage crisis.

To illustrate the point we are going to plan a hostage rescue mission on a fairly modest home. The home is approximately 1200 square feet on a slab, with 3 bedrooms, a living room, kitchen, 2 bathrooms (master bathroom window is glass block) and a utility room.



For the purposes of this exercise we have one hostage and one hostage taker who are in an unknown location inside the home. The hostage taker has indicated to the negotiators a credible imminent threat to the hostage’s life. The hostage taker has not been observed in a position that would allow for a sniper initiated hostage rescue leaving a stronghold hostage rescue as our only viable option.

There are several tactical entry solutions that can be envisioned. However in order to “maximize” the potential for success based on my background and training I would like to take down the vast majority of the structure within moments of the mission initiation. In order to maximize the potential for success I would like to place a “minimum” of 18 team members on target not including snipers, tactical command, negotiators and medics. By using a “minimum” of 18 team members on target this allows me to use:

- Three 2 man break and rake teams, one for each bedroom
- Two 6 man entry teams using multiple breach points, in this case front and rear doors
- This one potential tactical solution allows the team

to dominate 90% of the residence within moments of mission initiation, hopefully leaving the hostage taker with no time to react.



Can this mission possibly be accomplished with less than 18 team members? Yes it can, there is no doubt. The question however is with less manpower are we maximizing the potential for success?

Please remember that I am not suggesting that this should be “the” model solution. Teams will use many different approaches to solve a tactical problem. I accept that there are potentially multiple valid tactical plans to choose from.

As stated previously this is the minimum manpower I would like to use in this dedicated stronghold hostage rescue. My actual preference would be to push no fewer than 17 team members inside the structure allowing for three officers per room not including the team leaders.

We all know that if a hostage taker wishes to harm



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or kill a hostage, they can do so at practically any time. The stronghold hostage rescue option relies to a certain extent on two issues: The calculated risk that the hostage taker may possibly not have the actual determination to kill the hostage and/or the rapid domination of the structure or specific location of the hostage taker/hostage that would not allow the hostage taker the opportunity to harm the hostage.

The question you have to ask yourself is this; if the hostage is one of your loved ones, which tactical option would you prefer if intervention becomes a necessity? Would you prefer a single breach point with 7-8 team members working their way through the house room by room or a minimum 18 team member entry team dominating 90% of the residence within moments of mission initiation?

To some extent lower levels of manpower will rely on luck to succeed. Far more often than not law enforcement has luck on their side. I would never knowingly turn down good luck. However to be lucky and to be good are not the same thing. When hostage's lives are at risk, I would rather maximize my potential for success instead of hoping for good luck to succeed. In order to do this I need a sufficient number of well-trained veteran team members.

Teams must work up to the level where they can perform multiple breach point operations, link points, window break and rake operations, have team SOP's for collapsing down rooms/structures as well as many other tactical techniques and procedures.

The big question is how many team members are enough to maximize the potential for success? That I cannot say as the circumstances will dictate the numbers needed. If the crisis is in a hotel room the answer may be as simple as 5-6. If the crisis site is a 4000 sq. foot house the answer may be 50 plus or considerably less if there is specific credible intelligence of the location of the hostage taker and hostage. The equation is not as simple as square feet, number of rooms or floors. There are simply too many variables involved to be able to field a one size fits all manpower equation.

So what are smaller teams to do in order to maximize their potential for success? There are several answers to this question:

- One solution is to embrace multi-jurisdictional SWAT Teams. Multi-jurisdictional teams generally allow for increased manpower, more equipment and increased budgets while sharing the economic and manpower related burdens to each member jurisdiction. This becomes a matter of budget necessity for many jurisdictions. Understand, however, that this option may be politically unpopular if it means the disbanding of the current tactical unit.
- If multi-jurisdictional teams are not the preferred answer for your jurisdiction then establish relationships and train with neighboring or other nearby teams in your area on a regular basis to the point that you can "very effectively" work together during a large or complex critical incident.

This article was not intended to discuss the entire range of hostage rescue operations or supply a magic equation for determining the number of SWAT officers needed for operations. This article is simply intended to show in one select circumstance the minimum number of officers that I believe, based on my background and training, would be necessary to reasonably guarantee a positive outcome if a stronghold hostage rescue operation was necessary.

Opinions on SWAT manpower vary greatly based one's experience, background and training. In closing I encourage those reading this article to find ways to maximize your team's potential for successful operations. ☘

About the Author

Randy Olsberg is the Assistant Special Teams Manager for the Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System (ILEAS); he is retired from the Wheeling Illinois Police Department having served 18 years as a member of the NIPAS Emergency Service Team a multi-jurisdictional SWAT Team in the Chicago metro area.

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Combined Rifle and Pistol Field Training Exercise (FTX)

By Eric Perkins

The Illinois Tactical Officer's Association presented a tactical field training exercise at Illinois State Police-District 5 range in Lock Port, Illinois on March 22, 2013. Over 50 Law Enforcement Officers from local, state and federal agencies were on hand. Those in attendance were from widely varying assignments (patrol, K-9, investigations, and SWAT). Participants were tested in basic tactical firearms skills with a semi-automatic rifle and semi-automatic pistol.

Our goal for this tactical field training exercise was to increase officer confidence and survivability in future lethal force encounters. The courses of fire were designed to test the participants skill sets as they relate to firearms handling and engaging threats at close to intermediate distances.

Participating officers experienced several timed and untimed courses of fire. Each course of fire focused on the fundamentals of tactical firearms use and required officers demonstrate the following:

1. Sight alignment,
2. Trigger control,
3. Grip,
4. Shot placement,
5. Multiple shooting positions (standing or kneeling),
6. Shooting on the move,

7. Transitioning from rifle to pistol,
8. Safety selector manipulation,
9. Trigger finger indexing,
10. Muzzle awareness,
11. Weapon manipulation when wounded.

Thank you to the following members volunteers who donated their time to assist as Range Safety Officers during the FTX. They provided a watchful eye during the live fire events. Their dedication made all the difference in the successful outcome. They were;

Robert "Doc" Adelman
Michael Davey
Mike Boyce
James Malloy
Nick Drakulich

Joshua Mooi
Dave Jarmusz
Erv Weesit
Chris Joswick
Efren Paleyo

Stay tuned for future realistic live fire events offered by the Illinois Tactical Officers Association. 📍

Combined Rifle and Pistol Field Training Exercise (FTX)

Course scores and photo gallery continued on pages 15 through 21 ➔



Photo courtesy of Alan Kulovitz

Course 1 – Description and Results

Course Description

Upon command each participating LEO will run 50 yards as a group. After returning to the firing line officers may choose to complete; 10 push-ups or 10 jumping jacks. Once finished officers are allowed to load their respective rifle and wait for the command to fire. Upon command time starts and each LEO will engage a deadly force target with 10 rounds standing, 10 rounds kneeling and 10 rounds standing with their rifle. Upon finishing all required rifle rounds LEO's will safely transition to their pistol and fire 6 rounds standing.

- **Time:** 1:30
- **Distance:** 50 and 25 yards
- **Target:** Targets On Line Hg Threat
- **Requirements:** Body armor, eye and ear protection, semi-automatic rifle with sling, 3-10 round rifle magazines, 1-6 round pistol magazine, pouches and clothing suitable to range training.
- **Rifle Condition:** Left on the deck, bolt open, on safe, ejection port up and magazine out.
- **Pistol Condition:** Upon command LEO's will load with 1-6 round magazine and secure pistol back in the holster.

**Officers must identify their respective target prior to the start of this event.*

Course Results

	Name	Department	Rifle	Sights	First Score	Best Score
1.	Eric Perkins	Elk Grove Village PD	LMT	Elcan	750	750
2.	Chris Joswick	North Aurora PD		EoTech	410	550
3.	Efren Pelayo	Elk Grove Village PD	Stag	AimPoint	390	390
4.	R. Michael Tyler	Quincy PD	Rock River	AimPoint	365	385
5.	Tyler Bzdelik	Illinois National Guard	Delton	Iron	360	245
6.	Josh Brkovic	Orland Hills PD	Rock River	Bushnell	310	310
7.	Louis Velez	Evanston PD	S&W M and P	Vortex	285	355
8.	John Mars	Lindenhurst PD	Rock River	Iron	285	285
9.	Robert Nava	Mount Prospect PD			255	310
10.	James Molloy	Orland Hills PD	Rock River	AimPoint	245	245
11.	Brian Rust	Evanston PD		LMT	240	430
12.	Michael Jones	South Chicago Hts.	LWRC	Iron	225	250
13.	Eric Gugel	Lindenhurst PD	Rock River	Iron	205	205
14.	Tony Ferenzi	Marionette Park PD			205	205
15.	Joshua Mooi	Naperville Park Dist.	Rock River	Iron	195	270
16.	Martin Deperte	Gurnee PD		Iron	160	465
17.	Miguel Martinez	Mount Prospect PD	Rock River	Iron	135	135
18.	David Jarmusz	Chicago Police Dept.	Rock River	Iron	130	255
19.	Carol McClanathan	Gurnee PD	Bushmaster	Iron	110	265

Course 2—Description and Results

Course Description

Upon command each participating LEO will run 50 yards as a group. After returning to the firing line officers may choose to complete; 10 push-ups or 10 jumping jacks. Once finished officers are allowed to load their respective rifle and wait for the command to fire. Upon command time starts and each LEO will engage a deadly force target with 5 rounds standing at the 15 yard target and 5 rounds kneeling at the 40 yard target.

- **Time:** 1:00
- **Distance:** 15 and 40 yards
- **Target:** Targets On-Line Hg Threat
- **Requirements:** Body armor, eye and ear protection, semi-automatic rifle with sling, 2-10 round magazines, magazine pouches and clothing suitable to range training.
- **Rifle Condition:** Left on the deck, bolt open, on safe, ejection port up and magazine out.

**Officers must identify their respective target prior to the start of this event.*

Course Results

	Name	Department	Rifle	Sights	First Score	Best Score
1.	Michael Jones	South Chicago Hts.	LWRC	Iron	515	515
2.	Brian Rust	Evanston PD		LMT	430	430
3.	Chris Joswick	North Aurora PD		EoTech	420	550
4.	David LaFrancis	Park Ridge PD	DSA	Leopold	420	420
5.	David Jarmusz	Chicago Police Dept.	RockRiver	Iron	405	405
6.	Efren Pelayo	Elk Grove Village PD	Stag	AimPoint	380	380
7.	R. Michael Tyler	Quincy PD	Rock River	AimPoint	370	370
8.	Tyler Bzdelik	Illinois National Guard	Delton	Iron	360	360
9.	Josh Brkovic	Orland Hills PD	Rock River	Bushnell	365	365
10.	James Molloy	Orland Hills PD	Rock River	AimPoint	355	425
11.	Louis Velez	Evanston PD	S&W M and P	Vortex	355	355
12.	Martin Deperte	Gurnee PD		Iron	330	330
13.	John Mars	Lindenhurst PD	Rock River	Iron	290	290
14.	Carol McClanathan	Gurnee PD	Bushmaster	Iron	275	275
15.	Joshua Mooi	Naperville Park Dist.	Rock River	Iron	245	245
16.	Frank Lauria	Park Ridge PD	LWRC	AimPoint	220	335
17.	Anthony Poli	Elmhurst	Bushmaster	Iron	190	285
18.	Eric Gugel	Lindenhurst PD	Rock River	Iron	120	180

Course 3—Description and Results

Course Description

This course simulates a situation where the LEO is wounded on the strong side, yet must continue to fight assailant(s) in order to save innocent lives. The objective is to effectively and safely operate your patrol rifle to engage hostile targets with your support hand, arm and shoulder. All shooting must be conducted from the kneeling supported position. Charging and reloading must be conducted using the muzzle stops to “pit” the rifle with the butt of the weapon to the LEO's shoulder/chest. The muzzle stops are located at the 25 yard line. No other technique may be used. LEO's may not transition to their pistol and they may not shoot on the move or from the prone position. All shooting must be done at the 25 yard line.

- **Time:** 1:30
- **Distance:** 25 yards
- **Target:** Targets-On-Line
- **Requirements:** Body armor, eye and ear protection, semi-automatic rifle with sling, 2-10 round magazines, magazine pouches and clothing suitable to range training.

**Officers must identify their respective target prior to the start of this event.*

Course Results

	Name	Department	Rifle	Sights	First Score	Best Score
1.	Chris Joswick	North Aurora PD		EoTech	550	550
2.	Eric Perkins	Elk Grove Village PD	LMT	Elcan	550	550
3.	Martin Deperte	Gurnee PD		Iron	450	520
4.	Anthony Poli	Elmhurst	Bushmaster	Iron	440	440
5.	R. Michael Tyler	Quincy PD	Rock River	AimPoint	410	450
6.	David Jarmusz	Chicago Police Dept.	Rock River	Iron	390	390
7.	James Molloy	Orland Hills PD	Rock River	AimPoint	345	360
8.	Joshua Mooi	Naperville Park Dist.	Rock River	Iron	340	340
9.	Tyler Bzdelik	Illinois National Guard	Delton	Iron	340	340
10.	Louis Velez	Evanston PD	S&W M and P	Vortex	315	500
11.	Frank Lauria	Park Ridge PD	LWRC	AimPoint	300	300
12.	David LaFrancis	Park Ridge PD	DSA	Leopold	290	495
13.	Efren Pelayo	Elk Grove Village PD	Stag	AimPoint	290	290
14.	Michael Jones	South Chicago Hts.	LWRC	Iron	265	235
15.	Brian Rust	Evanston PD	LMT		260	260
16.	Carol McClanathan	Gurnee PD	Bushmaster	Iron	190	190
17.	Eric Rudzinski	Chicago PD	DPMS	Iron	100	100
18.	Eric Gugel	Lindenhurst PD	Rock River	Iron	65	65

Course 4—Description and Results

Course Description

Phase 1: Time: 1:00

Upon command time starts and each LEO will engage a deadly force target with 1 round standing and 1 round kneeling. All LEO's will conduct only one re-load with a second 5 round magazine and continue the above mentioned process until all rounds have been expended.

Phase 2: Time: 7 Seconds and 10 Seconds

As a group move to the 10 yard line. Upon command, time starts. Draw and shoot targets 1 and B with one round each in less than 7 seconds. A cease fire is given and all LEO's re-holster.

As a group move to the 7 yard line. Upon command, time starts. Draw and shoot targets 2 and A with one round each in less than 7 seconds. A cease fire is given and all LEO's re-holster.

As a group move to the 5 yard line. Upon command, time starts. Draw and shoot targets 3 and 4 with one round each. RELOAD and shoot targets C and D with one round each in less than 10 seconds. A cease fire is given and all LEO's re-holster.

As a group move to the 3 yard line. Upon command, time starts. Draw and shoot the remaining 4 black dots with one round each in less than 10 seconds. Cease fire is given.

- **Time:** 1:00/2:00
- **Distance:** 25, 10-3 Yards
- **Targets:** HG Threat And Dot Target
- **Requirements:** Body armor, eye and ear protection, semi-automatic rifle with sling, 2-5 round rifle magazines, 2-6 round pistol magazine, pouches and clothing suitable to range training.
- **Rifle Condition:** Upon command leo's will load with 1-5 round magazine with the muzzle pointed at the base of the berm.
- **Pistol Condition:** Upon command leo's will load with 1-6 round magazine and secure pistol back in the holster.

**Officers must identify their respective target prior to the start of this event.*



Photos courtesy of Alan Kulovitz

Course 4—Description and Results — continued

Course Results

	Name	Department	Rifle	Sights	First Score	Best Score
1.	Chris Joswick	North Aurora PD	Rock River	EoTech	550	550
2.	Eric Perkins	Elk Grove Village PD	LMT	Elcan	530	530
3.	Eric Rudzinski	Chicago PD	DPMS	Iron	510	510
4.	Louis Velez	Evanston PD	S&W M and P	Vortex	500	540
5.	Anthony Poli	Elmhurst	Bushmaster	Iron	440	440
6.	Martin Deperte	Gurnee PD		Iron	410	410
7.	R. Michael Tyler	Quincy PD	Rock River	AimPoint	400	400
8.	David Jarmusz	Chicago Police Dept.	Rock River	Iron	390	390
9.	John Mars	Lindenhurst PD	Rock River	Iron	360	360
10.	James Molloy	Orland Hills PD	Rock River	AimPoint	335	335
11.	Joshua Mooi	Naperville Park Dist.	Rock River	Iron	330	330
12.	Frank Lauria	Park Ridge PD	LWRC	AimPoint	300	300
13.	David LaFrancis	Park Ridge PD	DSA	Leopold	290	495
14.	Efren Pelayo	Elk Grove Village PD	Stag	AimPoint	290	290
15.	Carol McClanathan	Gurnee PD	Bushmaster	Iron	280	280
16.	Tyler Bzdelik	Illinois National Guard	Delton	Iron	265	340
17.	Michael Jones	South Chicago Hts. PD	LWRC	Iron	265	265
18.	Miguel Martinez	Mount Prospect PD	Rock River	Iron	260	260
19.	Robert Nava	Mount Prospect PD			255	365
20.	Eric Gugel	Lindenhurst PD	Rock River	Iron	235	235
21.	Brian Rust	Evanston PD	LMT		210	420
22.	Tony Ferenzi	Marionette Park PD			100	245



Photos courtesy of Alan Kulovitz



Photos courtesy of Alan Kulovitz



Photos courtesy of Alan Kulovitz

ITOA Tactical Patrol Officer Recognition Program

By Ed Mohn

The ITOA's Tactical Patrol Officers (TPO) program has been formalized and is ready for implementation. The ITOA's Tactical Patrol Officer is a training and recognition initiative to train patrol officers in a core group of tactical skill sets that will better prepare them when confronted with unexpected, on-going violent criminal events. The skill sets learned will assist officers not only when confronted with a violent criminal event, but will enhance their daily survival and tactical capabilities.

The ITOA's Tactical Patrol Officer program is based on the belief that effective police response to violent on-going life threatening situations is enhanced when first responding officers have commonalities of training, tactics, equipment, verbiage and capabilities. The ITOA has developed and provides training in these core skill sets through the Cook County Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, North East Multi Regional Training and the Illinois Terrorism Task Force.

In an effort to recognize and encourage TPO training, two levels of recognition have been established. The Tactical Patrol Officer and the Master Tactical Patrol Officer. The required training for each level of proficiency and recognition are as follows:

Tactical Patrol Officer designation may be granted to officers who have completed the following training:

1. Rapid Deployment end user course
2. MACTAC, Urban Tactics end user course
3. Tactical Rifle operator's course
4. Self Aid/Buddy Aid end user

course

5. Patrol Tactics end user course
 - Contact/Cover
 - Building Searches
 - High Risk Felony Traffic Stop Techniques and Tactics
 - Arrest Team Techniques and Tactics
 - K-9 Search and Arrest Tactics

Master Tactical Patrol Officer designation may be granted to officers who have completed the following instructor training:

1. Rapid Deployment Instructor Course
2. MACTAC Urban Tactics Instructor Course
3. Self Aid/Buddy Aid Instructor Course
4. Tactical Rifle Instructor Course
5. Patrol Tactics Instructor Course

Equivalent Training

The training courses and skill sets required for TPO designation can be met in a variety of ways. While there is no one mandated course that an officer must attend to accomplish any of the requirements, it is important that the training result in the officer being proficient at the skill sets.

As an example—it is not sufficient that officers watch a video, or power point presentation on rapid deployment. To obtain the designation of TPO, an officer must be proficient at the nationally recognized active shooter response protocols and skill sets to obtain the TPO designation.

There are two pathways to obtain the Tactical Patrol Officer or Master Tactical Patrol Officer designation; Department Participation or Individual Officer Request.

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Department Participation

The following guidelines have been established for departments that would like to participate in the ITOA's Tactical Patrol Officer program.

Step #1: TPO Coordinator—Each department should select a Department TPO program coordinator who will be the ITOA's point of contact and program coordinator for the department. The department TPO coordinator should be an officer/supervisor who has the ability and authority to identify, certify and recommend department personnel for the designation of TPO. The Department coordinator will be responsible for identifying and nominating the officers in their department who meet the TPO requirements.

Step #2: Letter of Intent—Each Department must send a letter (e-mail) of intent to the ITOA stating that your department would like to participate in the TPO training & recognition program. This letter must also identify the department TPO coordinator, his/her name, rank, telephone number and e-mail. All future correspondence will be through the departments TPO coordinator.

Step #3: TPO Identification and Nomination—Each department TPO coordinator can then identify the officers in their department that meet the TPO training requirements.

Step #4: Nomination Letter—A letter (e-mail) from the departments TPO coordinator to the ITOA certifying that the officers they are nominating have completed the required training. This e-mail must include the Name and Rank of the officer as they want it to appear on the certificate and which designation, TPO or Master TPO.

Upon receipt of a list of certified officers, the ITOA will issue a certificate to the department recognizing the officers TPO designation and provide the TPO coordinator the contact information to acquire the TPO uniform pins. It is the departments and/or officers responsibility to order and pay for the uniform pin.

Individual Officer Request

The following guidelines have been established for individual officers that would like to participate in the ITOA's Tactical Patrol Officer program.

Step #1: Recognition Request—An individual officer who has met the training requirements for the TPO designation may send a letter (e-mail) to the ITOA requesting recognition. The Letter must include the following for each of the TPO requirements:

- Course Title
- Course Date(s)
- Lead instructor
- Company
- Organization providing the training

Step #2: Upon Receipt of the Self Nomination Letter—The ITOA will review the information and issue a certificate

to the individual officer recognizing the officers TPO designation. The ITOA will also provide the officer with the contact information to acquire the TPO uniform pins. It is the individual officers responsibility to order and pay for the uniform pin.

Please send all TPO correspondence to the ITOA at: itoatpo@itoa.org. ☛



Tactical Patrol Officer Uniform Pin



Master Tactical Patrol Officer Uniform Pin

Balancing Efficiency and Effectiveness and Building Cohesive Law Enforcement Agencies That Can Decide In Crisis Situations

By Fred T. Leland Jr..

Through the Boyd Cycle is how we gather and process information and make decisions in our day to day law enforcement duties. We utilize this process of observation-orientation-decision and action to see the world around us, orient to what we perceive is going on and then based on this observation and orientation we make decisions and take actions to accomplish certain objectives based on what our goals or intent is. As law enforcement professionals we need to not only understand the Boyd cycle but we need to condition it through training so that we become more effective at applying it on the street. How are our efforts at becoming efficient law enforcement agencies affecting our ability to effectively execute timely observation, orientation, and decision and action cycles on the street? Is there a balance to be sought that has room for across the board adjustments to efficient processes, policies and procedures and effective real time decision making utilizing experienced people and ideas?

One of Col. John Boyd's most important insights we need to make a greater effort to understand is, "Machines don't fight wars, people do and they use their minds." How this applies to law enforcement is to understand what technologies, processes, policies and procedures work on the street, one must first understand how people think and act in the uncertainty, fear and chaos of dynamic encounters and what creates friction in decision making as a cop interacts with a suspect bent on getting his way or in a crisis situation such as a multiple car accident with mass casualties, a blizzard, hurricane, tornado, or fire etc. Only with this understanding is it possible to develop technologies, processes, policies and procedures, to serve the street cops needs. By understanding the needs and dynamics of people (cops) who work the streets, it is possible to design a system from the streets to the courts that advances police departments, efficiency and effectiveness.

Is It Not Time We Robustly Embrace The Philosophy of Decentralized Control?

Considering the types of environments, crises and adversaries the law enforcement officer will probably face on the streets of the future is it not time for a change in the bureaucratic processes to a system that affects individual and organizational decision making and sustaining cohesive departments? A law enforcement cultural change that embraces fully a philosophy of a decentralized bias for action based upon a high degree of professional trust and confidence between leaders of law enforcement and the led. This philosophy will

provide principles for exercising good judgment in unique situations, not formulas and checklists. Although specific tools i.e. weapons etc. and basic procedures are ingrained through training and repetition, this philosophy advocates adaptability in the application of the techniques on the street. Policies and procedures must be written in such a way that specifics are left to the cops on the street facing the problem, a bottoms up approach whose vast experience and education will allow him to pick the right solution for the right situation (mutual trust is crucial here). At the tactical level, an officer will make decisions according to the particular conditions of environment, the adversary or crisis his own resources and the overall mission and intent set by the leaders of the department using his best judgment. Currently, police training centers on teaching specific techniques or habits so they can be repeated in a consistent manner regardless of conditions.

The difference between how we currently train and prepare versus the philosophy I am advocating is similar to the difference between techniques and tactics. Techniques require inflexibility and repetition, while tactics require flexibility, good judgment and creativity. Officers can only gain the ability to execute this new philosophy with experience and education, stressing free play force on force training brought to a conclusion with clear winners and losers. Keep in mind no tactical concept is an end in itself and that there is more than one solution to a tactical dilemma.

Tell Them What To Think and Do... or Teach Them How To Think and Do?

My belief about leadership and developing an organizational environment that is supportive and understanding which helps greatly in developing cohesion based on mutual trust, empathy and common experiences as well as self-sacrifice. These attributes greatly enhance both efficiency and effectiveness. To ensure these attributes are more than mere words it is import for leaders to lead daily and not only when a crisis is upon us. Leadership is a daily thing not an event driven thing. Meaning good leaders develop their officers on a daily basis so they are ready and prepared when crisis hits, compared to leaders who prepare and educate themselves and then try to puppet master through micro-management their officers dealing with a crisis, creating more uncertainty and chaos. It is important when setting organizational goals that we focus on identifying outcomes. What is it we expect and officer to do and how do we expect an officer to behave and perform as he/she carries out their daily duties? Once those outcomes are

identified develop policy and procedures, rules and regulations, checklists, training programs that focus on balancing efficiency and effectiveness.

Let talk about balancing efficiency and effectiveness and how it relates to what we do. Efficiency, is commonly described as; achieving maximum productivity with minimum wasted effort or expense. Effectiveness, on the other hand is described as; being successful in producing a desired or intended result (outcome). Efficiency denotes we look at and measure results based on inputs or an opinion or recommendation offered as a guide to action, or conduct such as; policy and procedure or rules and regulations or a checklist to follow. Efficiency is an important aspect to policing. We must ensure things that need to be done such as; information and evidence gathering, dissemination and documentation in reports, etc., is indeed getting done. However it is important for leaders not to get lost in the efficiency of processes as it breeds a zero defects environment that creates a frontline that waits to be told what to think and do slowing down considerably the effectiveness of timely decision making and tactical problem solving.

To be Effective in human interaction, we need feedback on the policy, procedures, rules and regulations or checklist we are using. Are they working or not? Feedback or output as it is sometimes called is information gathered and perceived by the user, the cop on the street. The kinds of feedback the officer makes, and the kinds of input the officer on the street accepts, as he interacts with his environment and the people in it, defines the street cops orientation of the situation and effects the decisions and actions he takes. In this context, it is clear we need to understand the differences between being efficient and effective and balance them accordingly based on the unfolding situation. Efficient policy and procedures must be thought of as a framework based on foundational principles and include room for adaptation, people and Ideas, if they are to be fully effective.

A Simple Example: Balancing Our Efficiency and Effectiveness

Let's use something common to every law enforcement agency, marksmanship training to explore this a bit deeper. Police marksmanship training we focus on task, conditions and standards. The task is to be able to develop individual officers who can safely and efficiently shoot and hit a target from various distances. We do this by teaching stance, draw, grip, sight alignment, sight picture, trigger squeeze and follow-through. The condition this is taught in at most law enforcement locations is still a static range environment, using silhouette targets... The standard in most locations is to shoot so many rounds in an allotted amount of time, and includes magazine changes, malfunction drills, different shooting positions, firearms safety rules and to qualify with an 80% score. All our marksmanship training and this includes recruit and in-service training for veteran officers our focus is to qualify an officer in the safe and efficient use of a firearm. But is efficiency enough?

Is it enough at preparing young and veteran officers for the threats and problems they may face on the streets? So what is the outcome of the current way we train? We have pushed folks through training with a qualifying score in an efficient way hundreds of guys a year in Massachusetts alone and thousands across the country. On paper we have efficiently meant the standard of qualification. The question then comes to mind does meeting this standard, make them effective on the street? Can they maneuver and communicate with back-up officers, innocent bystanders, victims, and an adversary, assess threats and set up tactically appropriately? Can they if need be shoot accurately when being shot at themselves? Statistics prove otherwise and that 14-20% hit rates are common according to FBI statistics and research of real life gun fights.

What does effective marksmanship training look like? There have been some fine trainers in our profession who have realized efficiency is not good enough and have changed the training methodology to incorporate not only safety and fundamentals of marksmanship but as well, the attributes of self-awareness, problem solving and threat assessment, adaptability, critical and creative thinking, decision making, tactical skills, social skills, fitness, etc. that have resulted in more effective outcomes on the street in tactical responses and approaches, assessing threats, tactical decision making and more accurate hit rates when deadly force was utilized.

This type of training is known as free play force on force training which involves utilizing all the tools (mental and physical tools) those tangible and intangible skills as they will be used on the street to solve tactical dilemmas. There is nothing new here, when it comes to talking about this type of training hell we have talked about it for more than 20 years however most agencies across this country getting this type of training on a consistent basis are few and far between. WHY? Because we are focused on, to heavily on efficiently, meeting standards, versus effectively developing officers capable of reaching outcomes we seek. This problem is not based on dishonesty, lack of integrity, or lack of intelligence by us law enforcement senior leaders. The problems are systemic in nature, a complex mix of law enforcement tradition, conditioned responses and institutional responses to the world we live and work in. If we want to continually improve our effectiveness and safety on the street, we must evolve through continued learning. We can start by removing some of the rules, procedures and processes that stifle initiative and work together to develop cohesive top down/bottom up organizations that trust one another to execute in all aspects the job of policing requires. While at the same time develop rules, policies, procedures and processes in an effort to be efficient, achieving maximum productivity with minimum wasted effort or expense that focus as well on effectiveness, so the street cop is successful in producing a desired or intended result. This will leave maneuver room for experienced people to use their tactical ideas resulting in cops who become tactical problem solvers making them both more efficient and effective in all aspects of policing.

The outcomes we are looking for in our professions are centered on solving complex and continually evolving problems in our efforts to protect and solve problems in the communities we serve. Now in our strategy to protect and serve we must keep in mind all aspects of the conflicts and problems we face, in their many forms and how cops perform when dealing with these problems. For a law enforcement officer dealing with these problems, this takes an ability of applying numerous critical tasks working in synergistic way in constantly changing conditions.

The leadership climate and training provided to officers must not only focus on efficiently meeting tasks, conditions and standards, it must also include developing the attributes, required for individuals, teams, and organizations to carry out the mission effectively. I would be willing to bet these attributes and values are in most agencies mission statements and policies and procedure manuals as BOLD typed words! Is it not time we put those words into BOLD action?

The Path To Victory by Don Vandergriff is a great resource on this topic.

Stay Oriented! ✪

About the Author

Fred T. Leland, Jr. is the Founder and Principal Trainer of LESC: Law Enforcement & Security Consulting (www.lesc.net). In addition to his work with LESC, Fred Leland is an active Lieutenant with the Walpole (Mass.) Police Department. He previously worked as a deputy with the Charlotte County (Fla.) Sheriff's Department and before that spent six years with the United States Marines, including as a squad leader in Beirut, Lebanon.

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Deciding Under Pressure...and Fast: You Need to Understand the Concept of "Coup d'oeil"

By Fred T. Leland Jr..

"This facile coup d'oeil of the General, this simple art of forming notions, this personification of the whole action of War, is so entirely and completely the soul of the right method of conducting War, that no other but this broad way is it possible to conceive that freedom of the mind which is indispensable if it is to dominate events, not be overpowered by them."

—Carl von Clausewitz

The success of officers on the street or leaders overseeing operations often centers on our ability to read situations as they are unfolding in real time. Our ability to observe and exploit weakness in an adversary's position or decision making is an attribute many in law enforcement strive to develop, in an effort to improve on their ability to maneuver, in an effort to position, resources and, set up future tactical options. This ability is known in the world of tactical science as "Coup d'oeil" (pronounced koo doy or koo dwee).

Carl von Clausewitz in his book "On War" describes coup d'oeil in the section of his book titled "Military Genius" "This type of knowledge... can only be gained through a talent for judgment and by the application of accurate judgment to the observation of man and matter." Today this ability, to recognize the truth, instinctively, using all your senses as you accord with an adversary in uncertainty and the ebb and flow of conflict vary, is also known as Napoleons glance, strike of the

"This type of knowledge... can only be gained through a talent for judgment and by the application of accurate judgment to the observation of man and matter."

eye, strategic or expert intuition and today experts such as; Gary Klein and Don Vandergriff among others, use the term, recognized primed decision making. The idea of coup d'oeil translates well into the law enforcement world and combines the strategic and tactical mindset, and the explorer mentality, enhancing the ability to see openings and exploit opportunities. Understanding "coup d'oeil" can do wonders in enhancing real time decision making under pressure.

In his book "Field Command" (an outstanding resource, written by a veteran cop for cops), Sid Heal, states, "coup d'oeil" is a French expression which loosely translated means strike of the eye or the vision

behind the eye. The closest English translation would be that of "intuition." Intuition is defined as "perceptive insight" or the power to discern the true nature of a situation. It explains

the commanders ability to see what the terrain looks like on the other side of the hill, or the floor plan of the inside of a building, coupled with and understanding of the impact they have on an operation. When time is a factor, it might involve envisioning situations which cause the suspect to react in some predictable manner which can be exploited."

This implies that officers will be effective in handling crisis situations if braveness to march towards the sounds of the guns is supplemented by good tactics and initiative and the willingness of leaders and street officers to act independently. This also implies all of us

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in law enforcement must be experts in our field if we are to reduce the chaos crisis brings. There must be a high degree of self-confidence so we must develop officers who consider themselves experts, leaders who are proud to be part of their organizations and possess a willingness to trust and be trusted so decision making can be fluid and timely.

Sid Heal goes on to say; "While a commander who possesses coup d'oeil might be considered gifted, it is more likely that his abilities have been developed. Coup d'oeil involves judgment and judgment can be enhanced by a thorough knowledge of the three "T s" Tools, Troops and Tactics. The tools of the trade for tactical operations extend far beyond weapons and would include breaching devices, vehicles, communications equipment, diversionary devices and so forth." In addition to these team tactics the street cop, should consider some other tools; tactical response and approaches to include, ongoing deadly action, domestic violence, robbery calls, etc. Vehicles stop tactics, contact cover, subject and prisoner handling, and searches. A deep understanding of conflict and how humans respond to it is crucial as well, so the street cop must also possess sound social skills and the ability to apply them tactfully and tactically.

Coup d'oeil is developed through experience. Experience leveraged from both training and the real world.

Coup d'oeil is developed through experience. Experience leveraged from both training and the real world. We must harness every lesson possible taking advantage of tactical critiques in the form of debriefs and after action reviews. We

must study tactics with real effort if we are to increase our effectiveness in deciding under pressure. Insight and imagination lead to initiative only if we have the know how and are able to gain an understanding of what's going on and have some understanding into how it is to be resolved. Coup d'oeil comes from, understanding these tactical concepts and how to apply them.

"The most formidable warriors are students of their profession."

—Al Gray, USMC GEN (Ret.)

Stay Oriented! ☘

About the Author

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


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| VLTR ModBlock, CAR . . . | add \$120 | Picatinny Gas Block, Steel . . . | add \$40 |
| LMT SOPMOD Stock . . . | add \$225 | Flip-up Front Sight . . . | add \$55 |
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| With Bolt Carrier/Charging Handle . . . | add \$110 |
| Barrel Fluting, when available . . . | add \$60 |
| YHM 4-Rail Free Float, CAR . . . | add \$115 |
| YHM 4-Rail Free Float, Mid . . . | add \$125 |
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| PR Military Big Latch (batch only) . . . | add \$20 |
| Picatinny Gas Block, Steel . . . | add \$40 |
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| Multi-Aperture Detachable Rear Sight . . . | add \$75 |
| YHM Flip-up Rear Sight . . . | add \$90 |
| MI ERS Flip-up Rear Sight . . . | add \$90 |
| A.R.M.S. #40 Flip-up Rear Sight . . . | add \$110 |
| Troy Industries Flip-up Rear Sight . . . | add \$140 |



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
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
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
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WE SET THE STANDARD, OUR COMPETITORS WILL FOLLOW!

Field Training Exercise (FTX)—Marseilles Army National Guard Base Marseilles, Illinois May 29, 2013

By Eric Perkins

Over 60 active and retired law enforcement officers descended upon the Marseilles National Guard Base for this 1-day training event. Three courses of fire were offered which combined varying degrees of distance coupled with time constraints and very mild forms of physical fitness. This was the first FTX held this year at the Marseilles ANG and we couldn't ask for more perfect weather. This event, like others could not have been possible without the efforts of our volunteer Range Safety Officers. A special thanks goes out to the following members who made this possible.

Mitch Shore
Jeff Chudwin
Walter Wendel
Jerry Simmons
Eric Perkins
Loren Helwink
Chuck Soltys
Lee Caldwell
James Malloy
Mike Davey

Roy Lancore
Andrew Flentge
Terry Meagher
Deane Marrs
Ed Mohn—OIC
Greg Scerbicke
Roger Scott
Bill Webster
Dan Kaltenbach
Andrew Kjellgren

Dave Jarmusz
Jeff Peraino
Robert "Doc" Adelman
Lee Caldwell
Al Kulovitz
Chris Conley

Ryan Cruz
Jeremy Johnson
Kevin Ruel
Lisa Ruel
Matt Himpelmann

For those members who are certified firearms instructors this is a great opportunity to further your skills by volunteering at these events. Volunteering as a Range Safety Officer, not only assist the organization but increases your knowledge base regarding range safety matters and adds credibility to your commitment to law enforcement.

Make sure you're able to attend the next Marseilles FTX on August 21, 2013. Member fee is only \$10.00. Non-member fee is \$50.00 with membership. Go to www.itoa.org for further information. ☺

FTX Course Scores and Photo Gallery continued on pages 31 through 35 →



Photos courtesy of Alan Kulovitz

Course 1

Shooter #	Name	Department	First Score	Best Score
4	Jeff Chudwin	Peotone PD	300	300
1	Eric Perkins	Elk Grove Village PD	300	300
39	Garrett Church	Oak Brook PD	270	300
10	William Webster	Itasca PD	295	295
13	Matthew Himpelmann	Elmhurst PD	290	290
15	Christopher Joswick	North Aurora PD	290	290
37	Joseph Kanupke	Mt. Prospect PD	260	290
2	Andrew Flentge	Arlington Heights PD	285	285
24	Efren Pelayo	Elk Grove Village PD	285	285
35	Chad Peterson	Illinois State Police	285	285
43	Michael Prohaska	Chicago PD	285	285
49	Greg Muntean	Blue Island PD	260	285
26	Travis Heck	Illinois State Police	280	280
48	James Kaczmark	Worth PD	280	280
9	Greg Scerricile	Itasca PD	275	275
38	Jacob Schade	Illinois State Police	275	275
8	Deane Marrs	Will County Sheriff	240	275
42	Daniel Markus	Chicago PD	265	265
14	J.W. Price	Illinois State Police	265	265
25	Daniel Yates	Geneva PD	265	265
22	Reynaldo Vazquez	Illinois State Police	230	235
21	David Canizares	Illinois State Police	195	235
27	James Lazaro	Gurnee PD	210	225
44	Matthew McDonnell	Hanover Park PD	190	190

Photos courtesy of Alan Kulovitz



Course 2

Shooter #	Name	Department	Best Score
4	Jeff Chudwin	Peotone PD	100
39	Garrett Church	Oak Brook PD	100
15	Christopher Joswick	North Aurora PD	100
37	Joseph Kanupke	Mt. Prospect PD	100
34	James Kehm	Arlington Heights PD	100
23	Dennis Nation	U.S. Marshal Service	100
1	Eric Perkins	Elk Grove Village PD	100
43	Michael Prohaska	Chicago PD	100
9	Greg Scerricile	Itasca PD	100
5	James Tadrowski	Berwyn PD	100
25	Daniel Yates	Geneva PD	100
33	William Gross	Arlington Heights PD	95
13	Matthew Himpelmann	Elmhurst PD	95
42	Daniel Markus	Chicago PD	95
16	Dennis Sears	Bannockburn PD	95
21	David Canizares	Illinois State Police	90
2	Andrew Flentge	Arlington Heights PD	90
49	Greg Muntean	Blue Island PD	90
24	Efren Pelayo	Elk Grove Village PD	90
38	Jacob Schade	Illinois State Police	90
6	Roger Scott	Northbrook PD	90
35	Chad Peterson	Illinois State Police	85
27	James Lazaro	Gurnee PD	75
17	Ernest Banaz	Bannockburn PD	70
22	Reynaldo Vazquez	Illinois State Police	65
26	Travis Heck	Illinois State Police	60
10	William Webster	Itasca PD	60
48	James Kaczmark	Worth PD	50
14	J.W. Price	Illinois State Police	50



Photos courtesy of Alan Kulovitz

Course 3

Shooter #	Name	Department	First Score	Best Score
4	Jeff Chudwin	Peotone PD	200	200
2	Andrew Flentge	Arlington Heights PD	200	200
26	Travis Heck	Illinois State Police	200	200
44	Matthew McDonnell	Hanover Park PD	200	200
23	Dennis Nation	U.S. Marshal Service	200	200
1	Eric Perkins	Elk Grove Village PD	200	200
35	Chad Peterson	Illinois State Police	200	200
6	Roger Scott	Northbrook PD	200	200
16	Dennis Sears	Bannockburn PD	200	200
5	James Tadrowski	Berwyn PD	200	200
25	Daniel Yates	Geneva PD	200	200
37	Joseph Kanupke	Mt. Prospect PD	190	200
39	Garrett Church	Oak Brook PD	180	200
24	Efren Pelayo	Elk Grove Village PD	180	200
22	Reynaldo Vazquez	Illinois State Police	150	200
15	Christopher Joswick	North Aurora PD	100	200
21	David Canizares	Illinois State Police	70	200
38	Jacob Schade	Illinois State Police	190	190
13	Matthew Himpelmann	Elmhurst PD	180	180
10	William Webster	Itasca PD	180	180
17	Ernest Banaz	Bannockburn PD	160	180
27	James Lazaro	Gurnee PD	160	170
42	Daniel Markus	Chicago PD	140	140
43	Michael Prohaska	Chicago PD	110	140
48	James Kaczmark	Worth PD	130	130
49	Greg Muntean	Blue Island PD	130	130
14	J.W. Price	Illinois State Police	100	100

Photos courtesy of Alan Kulovitz





Photos courtesy of Alan Kulovitz



Photos courtesy of Alan Kulovitz

Why Surrender is Never an Option

By Larry and Stacey Mudgett

The Phases of Surrender

The first phase of surrender is failing to be armed, trained and committed to fight. We are prepared to surrender when we are unprepared to resist.

The second phase of surrender is failing to be alert. You must see trouble coming in order to have time to respond. The warning may be less than one second but it will be there and it must be recognized and acted upon immediately.

The Third phase of surrender is giving up your weapons.

The last phase of surrender is up to the monsters who have taken control of your life and perhaps the lives of your loved ones. The last phase of surrender is out of your hands.

Surrender during war

During the American Revolution 12,000 Colonists captured by the British died in captivity on prison ships, while only 8,000 died in battle. Had the 12,000 who surrendered continued to fight many would have survived and they could have done great damage to the British and likely shortened the war.

Civil War prisoners were treated so badly that some 50,000 died in captivity. More Americans have been killed by Americans than by any foreign army in any war. Six hundred and eighteen thousand Americans died in the Civil War.

As many as 18,000 captured American and Pilipino prisoners died or were murdered at the hands of the Japanese during the six days of the "Bataan Death March." Had most of these soldiers slipped into the jungle and fought as guerrillas they could have tied up elements of the Japanese Army for months or years and perhaps more of them would have survived the war.

Of the Americans who actually reached Japanese prison camps during the war, nearly 50,000 died in captivity. That is more than 10 percent of all the American military deaths in the entire war in both the Pacific and European theaters combined.

In addition to the 50,000 captured Americans who died in Japanese prison camps an additional 20,000 were murdered before reaching a prison camp. If those 70,000 Americans had continued to fight, they could have provided time for the United States to build and maneuver its forces, perhaps shortening the war and saving even more lives. Some of them would have likely survived the war. If they had all died in battle their fate would have been no worse.

During the early stages of the "Battle of the Bulge" American soldiers were massacred by the German troops

who captured them.

During the Vietnam conflict many American Prisoners Of War were tortured daily for years by the Communist North Vietnamese. Many Americans died during the process. Only Officers (Airmen) held in North Vietnam were ever repatriated. Enlisted Americans captured in South Viet Nam were routinely tortured, mutilated and murdered by the Communists. As a combat soldier and knowing my fate should I be captured, I was committed to fighting to the death. I made specific plans to force the enemy to kill me rather than allow myself to be captured.

In recent years, American troops captured by Islamic terrorists groups have virtually all been tortured and murdered in gruesome fashion. If I were fighting in the Middle East, I would make a similar vow and plan to fight to the death. Under no circumstances would I allow myself to be captured by our Islamic enemies.

Some have questioned the wisdom of ignoring the orders of one's superior officers and refusing to surrender. This is a matter for each individual to consider for himself. Considering the mass murder of prisoners of war throughout history, I feel that we each have a right to decide for ourselves whether or not we will follow such an order.

Death by Government

RJ Rummel, who wrote the book, "Death by Government" states that prior to the 20th Century; 170 million civilians were murdered by their own governments. Other historians now tell us the most current research indicates that during the 20th Century perhaps as many as 292 million civilians were murdered by their own governments.

Some of the Nations where the mass murder of civilians occurred during the 20th Century include Russia, Ukraine, Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, The Congo, Uganda, Armenia, Viet Nam, Cambodia, Nigeria, Laos, China, Cuba, Manchuria, Iraq, Iran, Biafra, Rwanda and many others. The slaughter of civilians by governments appears to be as common as not.

Most of these slaughters were only made possible by **disarming** the victims before killing them. Had these people resisted, their fate would have been no worse and perhaps better. Resistance is much more difficult after the government has already taken the means of resistance away from the people. Planned genocide has been the primary reason for weapon confiscation throughout history.

Jews and others who surrendered to the Nazis were

murdered in slave labor camps by the millions. Had all the Jews in Europe resisted when the Nazis started rounding them up they could have made the Nazis pay an enormous price for the holocaust. The fact that Hitler confiscated guns in 1936 made resistance far less feasible.

Had the Jews in Germany resisted, the outcome may have been the same but the world would have learned about the holocaust years earlier and may have intervened. Furthermore, most people would prefer to die fighting and trying to kill their oppressor, than be taken off to a death camp and tortured, starved to death or murdered in a gas chamber.

William Ayers, former leader of the Terrorist organization "The Weather Underground," and close friend of Barack Obama, told his followers in the Weather Underground, "When we (Communist Revolutionaries) take over the United States, we will have to kill 25 million Americans." He was referring to those who would never submit to a Communist takeover. Those who would refuse to deny and reject the Constitution would have to be murdered. If this sounds impossible, remember that Genocide by Government was the leading cause of death in the last Century.

Surrendering to Criminals

The "Onion Field Murder" in California was a wakeup call to Law Enforcement Officers everywhere. On March 9, 1963, two LAPD Officers were taken prisoner by two criminals. The Officers submitted to capture and gave up their weapons. They were driven to an onion field outside of Bakersfield.

One Officer was murdered while the other Officer managed to escape in a hail of gunfire. The surviving Officer suffered serious psychological trauma, having been unable to save his partner. As a result of this incident, the LAPD policy became, "You will fight no matter how bad things are." "You will never ever surrender your weapons or yourself to a criminal."

Consider the Ogden, Utah record store murders. Read the book if you do not know the story. The manner in which the criminals murdered their young victims cannot be described here. Resistance might have been futile. Compliance was definitely and absolutely futile.

The courts in this country have ruled that the police have no legal obligation to protect anyone. Why do Law Enforcement Officials always tell civilians **not** to resist a criminal, while they tell their Officers to **always** resist and never surrender? Police administrators fear being sued by a civilian victim who gets hurt resisting. Furthermore, the police, like all government agencies derive their power by fostering dependence.

According to Professor John Lott's study on the relationship between guns and crime, a victim who resists with a firearm is less likely to be hurt or killed than a victim who cooperates with his attacker. His book is titled "More Guns, Less Crime."

The Doctor and his family in Connecticut complied and cooperated, meeting every demand of the home invasion robbers to whom they had surrendered. The Doctor's wife and daughters were tortured, raped, doused with gasoline and burned alive. How did surrender and cooperation work out for them?

In another home invasion robbery, a kindly couple with 9 "adopted, special needs children," surrendered to the robbers. The victims opened their safe and did not resist in any way. When the robbers were finished ransacking the home and terrifying the children, they shot both parents in the head several times before leaving. How did surrender and complete cooperation work out for them?

Handing over your life by surrendering to someone who is in the process of committing a violent crime against you is a form of suicide. Some survive but many do not. The monster gets to decide for you.

We have heard brutalized victims say, "The robber said that he would not hurt us if we cooperated." Why would you believe anything that someone who is committing a crime against you says? He will be lying if he speaks. As we say in law enforcement, "If a criminal's lips are moving while he is speaking, he is lying." Criminals by definition are dishonest and should never be trusted or believed.

You have no doubt heard friends say, I would not resist a criminal, after all why would he kill me? This is stupid and naive. In law enforcement, we call these people "Victims by Choice" (VBC). There could be a long list of reasons why a criminal would kill you despite your cooperation.

You may be of a different race, thus a different tribe. Only members of his tribe are actually human in his mind. He may feel hatred toward you because you have more than he does. Gratification from being in a position of total power is reason enough for some.

Criminals are sometimes members of a Satanic Cult who worship death such as the "Night Stalker" in California. Eliminating a potential witness is often cited as a reason to kill a victim. Sometimes criminals simply enjoy causing suffering and death. There are people who are in fact, pure evil. I have heard criminals say, "I killed her just to watch her die."

A victim who begs for mercy can give his attacker a tremendous feeling of power which many criminals seem to enjoy. You cannot expect mercy from someone who does not know what mercy is.

Resist!

We each have a duty to ourselves, our loved ones, our neighbors, our community, our city, our state and our country to resist criminals. Reasoning with a thug who believes that his failures are because of people just like you is not likely to be helpful. Pleading with a terrorist who has been taught from birth that his salvation depends on murdering people like you is a doomed plan. Resist!

His gun may not be real. After you are tied up it will not matter. His gun may not be loaded. After you are tied up it will not matter. He may not know how to operate his gun. After you are tied up it will not matter. Resist!

Statistically if you run and your assailant shoots at you he will miss. Statistically if you run and he shoots and hits you, you will not die. Bad guys shooting at the police miss 90 percent of the time. Six out of seven people who are shot with a handgun do not die. The odds are on your side. Better to die fighting in place than to be tied up, tortured, doused with gasoline and burned alive. There are things worse than death. Surrender to a criminal or a terrorist and you will learn what they are. Resist!

If you resist with a commitment to win you may well prevail, especially if you are armed and trained. If you lose it is still better to die fighting in place than to be taken prisoner and have your head cut off with a dull knife while your screams gurgle through your own blood as we have witnessed on numerous videos from the Middle East, brought to us by the "Islamic practitioners of peace."

Some who have refused to surrender.

History is filled with brave people who refused to surrender. Some of these men and woman have won their battles despite what seemed to be insurmountable odds. Others have gone down fighting and avoided being tortured to death. Some fought to the death to help or save others. Many have fought to the death for an idea or a belief.

When General Santa Ana (also the President of Mexico at the time) ordered 180 "Texacans" to surrender the Alamo, Col. Travis answered with "a cannon shot and a rebel yell." Eventually General Santa Ana was able to build his troop strength to ten thousand. The Mexicans then swarmed the defenders and killed them all.

The battle of the Alamo delayed the Mexican Army long enough for Sam Houston to build his Texacan Army, which met and defeated the Mexican Army and captured General Santa Ana. General Santa Ana traded Texas for his life and the sacrifices of the Alamo defenders changed history.

Frank Luke was a heroic aviator in WWI. Shot down and wounded he refused to surrender when confronted by a German patrol. He killed 4 German soldiers with his 1911 Pistol before being killed. Luke was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

When his unit was pinned down by German Machine Guns and all of the Officers and non commissioned officers in his company were killed or wounded, Alvin York never considered surrendering. Instead, he attacked hundreds of German soldiers killing about 25 with his rifle and pistol and then captured 132 others by himself!

Most of the Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto (Poland) surrendered to the German Army. They were taken off to death camps and murdered. Between 400 and 1,000 Jews refused to surrender and armed with only a few pistols, revolvers and

rifles, they held off the German Army for three months before dying in battle.

During the "Battle of the Bulge," the 101st Airborne was surrounded by the German Army and ordered to surrender. Faced with overwhelming odds, the Commanding Officer of the 101st sent this reply to the Germans. "Nuts." The Americans refused to surrender and they stopped the German advance. Most of the American troops survived.

On Sept 2, 2010, 40 armed criminals took over and robbed a train in India. Some of the robbers had guns, others used knives and clubs. When they began to disrobe an 18 year old girl for the purpose of gang raping her, one of the passengers decided to fight. He was a 35 year old retired Gurkha soldier. He drew his Khukasri Knife and attacked the 40 robbers. He killed three of the robbers and wounded 8 more despite his being wounded in this 20 minute fight. The remaining criminals fled for their lives leaving their stolen loot and eleven comrades dead or wounded on the floor of the train. The eight wounded robbers were arrested.

How does one man defeat 40? How does he summon the courage to fight such odds? He utilized all of the Principles of Personal Defense: Alertness, Decisiveness, Aggressiveness, Speed, Coolness, Ruthlessness, and Surprise. He was skilled in the use of his weapon. **Most importantly, He refused to be a victim and allow evil to triumph!**

If this one inspirational soldier can defeat 40 opponents using his knife, it would seem that we should all be able to defeat a group of armed criminals by using our firearms if we are professionally trained as was this heroic Gurkha soldier.

Final thoughts

How will you respond if you are confronted by evil as some of us have been in the past and some of us will be in the future? If you have not decided ahead of time what you will do, you will likely do nothing. Those who fight back often win and survive. Those who surrender never win and often die a horrible death. Have you made your decision? **Remember, no decision is a decision to do nothing.** ☸

About the Authors

Larry Mudgett is a long time Rangemaster and Instructor at Gunsite. Larry and his wife Stacey also run classes in Utah through their own school, Marksmanship Matters. Larry retired from the LAPD after nearly 35 years where he served as the Chief Firearms Instructor at the LA Police Academy for 13 years and the Chief Firearms Instructor and team member for LAPD SWAT for 14 years. Larry also served as an Infantry Light Weapons Sergeant in the First Air Cavalry in Viet Nam 1967-1968. Larry trained the first USMC Special Operations Training Group at Camp Pendleton and was an adjunct firearms and hostage rescue instructor for the DOE Central Training Academy for 10 years. He currently teaches Rifle, Carbine, Pistol, Double Action Revolver and Single Action Revolver. Learn more at marksmanshipmatters.com.

Book Review—Officer Down / A Practical Tactical Guide to Surviving Injury in the Street

By Dr. Andrew Dennis

Reviewed by Jeff Chudwin, President ITOA

I first met Dr. Andrew Dennis in the 90's when he moved to Chicago area. He called to ask about ITOA and how he could get involved in assisting law enforcement with his medical skills. Come join us was my answer and he jumped into the effort. He went on to attend the part time academy and became a certified police officer. Today Doc Dennis is a SWAT medical provider, teacher, and trainer. From that first call, little could we know the impact that Dr. Dennis and our Tactical Emergency Medical Support (TEMS) Doctors and medics would have on our profession.

In a CQB pistol class in April, we asked how many officers were trained in emergency gunshot wound treatment. The majority of the class raised their hands. It was a moment of recognition, proof that the TEMS information and training has become part of our police culture.

A foundation element of the training is how to stop the bleeding, stay in the fight, and save your life or that of another. A pressure bandage and a tourniquet are the tools of choice and today, carried every shift by many officers.

Where TEMS was initially directed toward SWAT teams, we recognized that patrol officers have the same needs. The idea is that alone and wounded on a dark street, no help is coming fast enough. Only you can fight to win and save yourself.

All that said, a new book written by Doc Dennis; *Officer Down/A Practical Tactical Guide to Surviving Injury in the Street* sets out this information in a manner that every police officer can understand and put to use.


Over one hundred and twenty pages, this book spans the medical, tactical, psychological, physiological issues of self aid and buddy aid. Doc Dennis adds information on wound ballistics and ammunition along with key medical gear. Step by step he takes you through the gunfight. Mental preparation, training exercises, gear selection are all part of the core issues.

Gunshot photos and wound effects are clearly laid out and Doc Dennis's message is clear; so long as you are conscious and able to act, you can not only survive but prevail. By preparing yourself beforehand, you know what to expect and how to react. This knowledge goes beyond your work, it is with you every day and protects your family at

home, on vacation, at all times and all places.

Officer Down is a book for every officer working the street. Buy it, read it, learn the materials and then loan it to your partner. It will be one of the most important things you can do. As for the book on loan, forget it, it is gone; buy another one.

Join the ITOA TEMS effort and attend the Self Aid/Buddy Classes. Check into Doc Dennis's efforts at www.medicaltactics.com for further information. ☘



Illinois Tactical Officers Association

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